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“Useful Arts” in the Information Age
*

Alan L. Durham

The computer is a powerful symbol of technological progress. Once a prohibitively expensive and specialized piece of
equipment, the computer has become a tool of nearly universal
application, transforming such diverse fields as engineering,
communications, entertainment, medicine, business, education,
mathematics, and science.1 The computer defines our technological era as the steam engine defined the early years of the
industrial revolution;2 indeed, the term used to characterize
our modern times is no longer “the space age,” but “the information age.” The most direct contribution of the law to technological advancement rests in the grant of economic incentives
to inventors via the patent system. Article I, Section 8 of the
United States Constitution explicitly empowers Congress to
grant exclusive rights to inventors in order to “promote the
*
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1. For a rather critical account of the computer’s increasing impact on society,
see BENJAMIN B. WELLS, THE COMPUTER REVOLUTION (1997).
2. See J. DAVID BOLTER, TURING’S MAN: WESTERN CULTURE IN THE COMPUTER
AGE 40 (1984) (“The computer is succeeding the clock and the steam engine as the defining technology and the principal technological metaphor of our time, chiefly because
it can reflect the versatility of the human mind as no previous mechanism could do.”);
Yoneji Masuda, Computopia, in THE INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY REVOLUTION 621
(Tom Forrester ed., 1985).
The prime innovative technology at the core of development in industrial society
was the steam engine, and its major function was to substitute for and amplify the
physical labor of man. In the information society, ‘computer technology’ will be the
innovational technology that will constitute the developmental core, and its fundamental function will be to substitute for and amplify the mental labor of man.

Id.
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1420 BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [1999
Progress of . . . [the] useful Arts,”3 commonly defined as the
“technological arts.”4 No one questions the importance or technological credentials of the computer revolution, yet, until recently, many advancements in computing were coldly received
in the courts and administrative bodies that apply the patent
laws. Such advancements, when reduced to the fundamental
operations of calculating numbers and manipulating data, were
often viewed as fatally close to mathematics, principles of nature, or “abstract ideas,” none of which are subjects of exclusive
rights under the patent laws.5
With the Supreme Court’s decision in Diamond v. Diehr,6
and even more decisively with the Federal Circuit’s decision in
In re Alappat,7 the tide of judicial opinion has turned. Now a
broad range of computer-related inventions are considered patentable, at least so long as the invention is claimed as a tangible apparatus (i.e., a programmed computer) or in connection
with a specific and concrete application. The rules of the Patent
Office have reflected this change.8 Yet the new liberality brings
into prominence another dilemma, whose origins rest in the
very ubiquity, or universality, of computers. While the proper
subject matter of patents has been loosely described as “anything under the sun that is made by man,”9 there may be some
innovations, however ingenious, that lie beyond the technological “useful arts” and, hence, outside the patent system. Advancements in business, the fine arts, and the social sciences
have been so described. The dilemma is this: If an advancement in a non-technological field is claimed, not as the advancement per se, but in terms of the computer system by
which such advancements increasingly are realized, is such advancement sufficiently brought within the “technological arts”
3. “The Congress shall have the power . . . [t]o promote the Progress of Science
and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and inventors the exclusive
Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.” U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8. This
provision is the source of both patent and copyright law in the United States. See infra
notes 19-21.
4. See infra Part I.B.
5. See infra Part II.
6. 450 U.S. 175 (1981). See infra notes 293-309 and accompanying text.
7. 33 F.3d 1526 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (en banc). See infra notes 337-57 and accompanying text.
8. See infra notes 369-375 and accompanying text.
9. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980) (quoting S. REP. NO. 821979, at 5 (1952); H.R. REP. NO. 82-1923, at 6 (1952)). See infra note 172 and accompanying text.
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to be patentable? More broadly, when is computer programming a “useful art”? And how must patent applicants characterize their programming advancements in order to gain the
benefits of the patent laws? These are the issues that I address
in this article.
The Federal Circuit’s decision in State Street Bank & Trust
Co. v. Signature Financial Group10 illustrates the issues at
stake. The patent litigated in State Street uses a “Hub and
Spoke” configuration to describe a new way to administer a
family of mutual funds. Each mutual fund (or “Spoke”) invests
in a common portfolio (or “Hub”). The latter, organized as a
partnership, provides management services for the “Spoke”
funds. This arrangement is said to provide both economies of
scale and beneficial tax consequences.11 While it was apparently the “Hub and Spoke” organizational scheme that was new
and that was, in some sense, the applicant’s invention, the patent claims12 read in terms of the “data processing system” that
performs the necessary calculations. There is nothing new
about the computer system per se, and, in fact, it is described so
generally that the claims could be met by virtually any computer system managing a “Hub and Spoke” portfolio of mutual
funds.
Although one can applaud the business sense, or accounting
acumen, that led to the invention of the “Hub and Spoke” arrangement, one has to ask whether such an arrangement is an
advancement in the “useful” or “technological” arts. If not, does
it matter that the computer system inevitably used to implement the arrangement is claimed as the patentable invention?
Although the Federal Circuit upheld the validity of the State
Street patent, it addressed neither of these issues. The court
merely characterized the manipulation of data representing
dollar amounts as a “practical application of . . . a mathematical algorithm, . . . because it produces ‘a useful, concrete and
tangible result.’ ”13 Whether the Federal Circuit reached the
10. 149 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 1998), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 119 S. Ct. 851
(1999); see infra Part IV.B.
11. See State Street, 149 F.3d at 1371.
12. Patent claims are the numbered paragraphs that formally describe the applicant’s invention and define the scope of the patent. Section 112 of the Patent Act requires that a patent application “conclude with one or more claims particularly pointing out and distinctly claiming the subject matter which the applicant regards as his
invention.” 35 U.S.C. § 112 (1994).
13. 149 F.3d at 1373.
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right result is debatable, but the analysis in State Street is seriously deficient because the court failed to address, in any explicit or coherent fashion, the central problem of defining the
“technological arts.”
After the State Street decision, we can expect to see further
patents and patent applications reflecting “non-technological”
innovations claimed in terms of the computers used to implement them. Indeed, a patent has already been issued for a
scheme of rewarding those who view on-line advertisements.14
Another patent claims a system for funding an education by
promising “investors” shares of a student’s future earnings.15
Before we stray too far into this brave new world, we should
consider how best to define the “technological” or “useful arts”
in an era when so much is accomplished merely through the
manipulation of data. Is an innovation realized through the use
of a computer inherently “technological?” Is the programmer’s
art a “useful art?” Must we entirely redefine the “useful arts” to
reflect the genius of our postindustrial information age? I do
not suggest that there are simple answers to these questions,
but they are matters of consequence, and computers have become so pervasive in so many fields of endeavor that no one is
unaffected.
In Part I of this article, I consider the meaning of the term
“useful arts” in light of the scant historical evidence, court decisions equating “useful arts” with “technological arts,” and definitions of “technology” offered by philosophers, historians, and
others. I also discuss the computer programmer’s art and
whether programming should be considered a “useful art.” In
Parts II and III, I review the two threads of patent jurisprudence that converged in the State Street case. The first, addressed in Part II, is the protracted struggle of the courts to decide when a software-related invention should be held
unpatentable because it is nothing more than a “mathematical
algorithm.” The second thread, addressed in Part III, concerns
the tradition long recognized in treatises but “la[id] . . . to rest”
in the State Street opinion16 that “methods of doing business”
are not patentable subject matter. These subjects have been
treated exhaustively by others;17 I review them here with a
14.
15.
16.
17.

See U.S. Patent No. 5,794,210.
See U.S. Patent No. 5,809,484; infra note 442 and accompanying text.
149 F.3d at 1375.
Useful reviews of the “mathematical algorithm” problem can be found in
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particular emphasis on the problem of separating a “technological” application from a “non-technological” insight when the
invention involves aspects of both.
In Part IV, I review the cases, culminating in State Street,
where technological and non-technological ideas intersect in
the realm of computer programming. I also review some alternatives for deciding whether such cross-disciplinary inventions
should be awarded a patent. One alternative is to treat all
computer-implemented inventions as patentable subject matter.18 It is a simple solution, but an uncomfortable one when
the invention reflects an essentially non-technological idea.
Another alternative is to focus exclusively on the tangible,
technological nature of the computer hardware, or the physical
medium on which the program is stored, in cases where the invention is claimed in those terms. The Federal Circuit and the
Patent Office are headed in that direction and perhaps have already gone that far. This is another simple solution, but it
seems to place undue emphasis on form, not to mention the
tricks of the claim-drafter’s art. My own proposal is to recognize that the programmer’s art is the art of converting an often
non-technological plan (such as a particular scheme for managing a family of mutual funds) into the kind of logical structure
executed by a computer. Fashioning a logical structure is, like
fashioning a physical structure, a “technological” endeavor, at
least when the purpose is to produce a useful computer program. As long as the claimed invention reflects specific aspects
of the technological endeavor (specifics that reflect the programmer’s art and not, for example, the accountant’s art), then
the invention should be considered within the realm of the
“useful arts” and, hence, patentable subject matter. The distinction is a difficult one, but some guidance can be found in

David S. Benyacar, Mathematical Algorithm Patentability: Understanding the Confusion, 19 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 129 (1993) and Alan D. Minsk, The Patentability of Algorithms: A Review and Critical Analysis of the Current Doctrine, 8
SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 251 (1992). Examinations of the “methods
of doing business” exception include George E. Tew, Method of Doing Business, 16 J.
PAT. OFF. SOC’Y 607 (1934) and, more recently, Rinaldo del Gallo, Are ‘Methods of Doing Business’ Finally Out of Business as a Statutory Rejection? 38 IDEA 403 (1998).
18. 35 U.S.C. § 101 defines patentable subject matter as “any new and useful
process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof.” Although § 101 is broadly worded, and deliberately so, it is subject
to any limitations imposed by the constitutional reference to “the progress of . . . [the]
useful Arts.” See infra notes 29-33 and accompanying text.
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the “levels of abstraction” analysis applied in the copyright context as well as in the typical process of software design. This is
not a simple solution, but I believe it is the only one that properly situates the programmer’s skills, which are so important
in today’s technological environment, within the larger context
of the “useful arts.”
Some of the questions I address in this article are so subtle,
even metaphysical, that no answers can be expressed with
complete certainty. Yet we must address these questions seriously and soon. If we are too narrow in defining what is a patentable software invention, we unwisely withhold the benefits
of the patent system from a field of increasing technological
and economic importance. On the other hand, if we err too far
in the other direction, we will open a Pandora’s Box of future
patents for which even the most progressive citizens of the “information age” may be unprepared.
I. DEFINING THE “USEFUL ARTS”
Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution includes what is often called the “intellectual property clause.”19 It states that
Congress shall have power “[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors
and inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings
and Discoveries.20” This clause is the source of congressional
authority to establish both copyright and patent laws. The intellectual property clause is unusually specific in the direction
it provides to Congress. Not only does it detail the kind of protection that Congress may legislate (“exclusive right[s]” for
“limited Times”), it also spells out the goal of such protection: to
“promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts.”21
The common meanings of the terms “science” and “art” have
19. This term is something of an anachronism since the phrase “intellectual
property” was unknown to the Framers. Walterscheid suggests “the Science and useful
Arts clause” as a more historically correct description. EDWARD C. WALTERSCHEID, TO
PROMOTE THE PROGRESS OF USEFUL ARTS: AMERICAN PATENT LAW AND
ADMINISTRATION, 1798-1836, at 24 n.2 (1998). The clause might also be called the “patents and copyrights clause” since these appear to be the only forms of intellectual property the Framers had in mind. However, since “intellectual property clause” is the term
most often used, it is the term I adopt throughout my article.
20. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
21. See In re Shao Wen Yuan, 188 F.2d 377, 380 (C.C.P.A. 1951) (“It is interesting to note that this particular grant is the only one of the several powers conferred
upon the Congress which is accompanied by a specific statement of the reason for it.”).
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changed in the intervening years. Today the term “science” refers to the investigation of the natural world through observation, experimentation, and application of the “scientific
method.” In the eighteenth century, what we call “science”
would have been called “natural philosophy.”22 The Framers
understood the term “science” as something broader, which today we might call “knowledge” or “learning.”23 The term “art,”
on the other hand, was less identified with the fine arts than it
is today. “Art” meant something closer to the terms “technique”
or “craft.”24 Many patented inventions reflect an application of
scientific principles or discoveries, using “science” in the modern sense. Hence, some have explained the patent system as a
vehicle for promoting “Science and useful Arts.”25 However,
scholars now regard the intellectual property clause as an example of a “balanced sentence,” a common stylistic device of

22. See Anthony William Deller, An Inquiry Into the Uncertainties of Patentable
Invention and Suggested Remedies, 38 J. PAT. OFF. SOC’Y 152, 161-62 (1956); Giles S.
Rich, Principles of Patentability, 28 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 393, 396-97 (1960) (“A reference to Dr. Johnson’s definition of ‘scientifick’ will show . . . that the natural science
which the present connotation of the word calls to mind was, in the days when the
Constitution was written, referred to as ‘natural philosophy.’ ”).
23. See Karl B. Lutz, Patents and Science: A Clarification of the Patent Clause of
the U.S. Constitution, 18 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 50, 51 (1948) (“The word ‘science,’ which
comes from the Latin, scire, ‘to know,’ at the writing of the Constitution meant learning
in general.”); Arthur H. Seidel, The Constitution and a Standard of Patentability, 48 J.
PAT. OFF. SOC’Y 5, 11 (1966).
24. “Art” can also be synonymous with “method” or “process,” particularly when
applied in the context of an industry. See Cochrane v. Deener, 94 U.S. 780, 788 (1877).
The Patent Act of 1790 included “art” with manufacture, engine, machine, and device
as the classes of invention that are potentially patentable. The general recodification of
the patent laws in 1952 replaced the term “art” with “process,” apparently without any
intention of changing the scope of patentable subject matter. See Diamond v. Diehr,
450 U.S. 175, 182-84 (1981). The current Patent Act still defines “process,” with striking circularity, as a “process, art or method.” 35 U.S.C. § 100(b) (1994). Something like
the original meaning of “art” survives in usages such as “the art of baseball,” yet now
such “arts” are often contrasted with “science.”
25. The most infamous example is found in the concurring opinion of Justice
Douglas in Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v. Supermarket Equipment Corp., 340 U.S.
147, 154-58 (1950). Emphasizing the constitutional reference to “science,” Justice
Douglas argued that a patentable invention must “make a distinctive contribution to
scientific knowledge” sufficient to “push back the frontiers of chemistry, physics, and
the like.” Id. at 154. He concluded that “[t]he Constitution never sanctioned the patenting of gadgets. Patents serve a higher end—the advancement of science.” Id. at 155.
Justice Douglas’ fixation on “science” led him to an exaggerated view of the goals of the
patent system. It is actually very common for “gadgets” to be patented—gadgets that
do little if anything to advance scientific knowledge, but which are nevertheless “useful.”
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eighteenth-century prose.26 In this balanced sentence, “science”
is logically related to “authors” and “writings”; “useful arts” is
related, in a parallel fashion, to “inventors” and “discoveries.”27
The goal of “promoting” by a grant of exclusive rights for limited times is the same in both cases, but rights are granted to
authors to promote the progress of “science” and to inventors to
promote the progress of the “useful arts.” The former is the
source of copyright law, and the latter the source of patent
law.28
Even with the “balanced sentence” literary device sorted
out, one may ask how the constitutional goal of “promot[ing]
the Progress of . . . useful Arts” is of any significance in applying the patent laws. It is significant in two respects. First, it
may limit the power of Congress to enact legislation such that
any patent law that does not “promote the Progress of . . .
[the]useful Arts” (or, at least, any patent law that hinders the
progress of the useful arts) is unconstitutional. Second, even if
it does not limit Congress’s power, the “Progress of . . . useful
Arts” may be viewed as the preeminent guide to the interpretation of the patent laws.
In Graham v. John Deere Co.,29 the Supreme Court adopted
the strict view that the intellectual property clause of the Constitution actually limits Congress’s power, at least to the extent
of denying Congress the power to grant a monopoly on matters
that are not sufficiently inventive:
At the outset it must be remembered that the federal patent power stems from a specific constitutional provision which
authorizes the Congress “To promote the Progress of . . . useful Arts . . . .” The clause is both a grant of power and a limitation. This qualified authority, unlike the power often exer26. See WALTERSCHEID, supra note 19, at 60-61; Robert I. Coulter, The Field of
the Statutory Useful Arts (pt. 2), 34 J. PAT. OFF. SOC’Y 487, 491 (1952) [hereinafter
Coulter (pt. 2)].
27. See Lutz, supra note 23, at 51.
28. As the Court elaborated in Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470
(1974),
The patent laws promote this progress by offering a right of exclusion for a limited
period as an incentive to inventors to risk the often enormous costs in terms of
time, research, and development. The productive effort thereby fostered will have
a positive effect on society through the introduction of new products and processes
of manufacture into the economy, and the emanations by way of increased employment and better lives for our citizens.

Id. at 480.
29. 383 U.S. 1, 5-6 (1966).
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cised in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries by the English Crown, is limited to the promotion of advances in the
“useful arts.” . . . The Congress in the exercise of the patent
power may not overreach the restraints imposed by the stated
constitutional purpose.30

For example, Congress could not authorize a patent that
would withdraw access to information already in the public
domain because the effects of such a patent would be contrary
to the constitutional mandate. As the Court explained, “Innovation, advancement, and things which add to the sum of useful knowledge are inherent requisites in a patent system which
by constitutional command must ‘promote the Progress of . . .
useful Arts.’ This is the standard expressed in the Constitution
and it may not be ignored.”31
Certainly Congress’s other sources of power give it authority to impose laws that do nothing to promote the progress (and
some laws that actually hinder the progress) of the useful arts.
For example, Congress may pass legislation to preserve the secrecy of information on weaponry even if such secrecy hinders
the progress of such useful arts as nuclear engineering and lasers. What Congress may not do, according to John Deere, is to
establish patent laws under the authority of the intellectual
property clause that are contrary to the stated purpose of that
clause. The rhetoric of John Deere further suggests that Congress may not enact patent laws exceeding the constitutional
objective even if they are not contrary to that objective. In
other words, Congress may not “overreach the restraints imposed by the stated constitutional purpose” by awarding patents that promote only the progress of “non-useful” arts.32
While this was not the situation presented in John Deere, it is

30. Id. at 5 (citations omitted). Justice Douglas expressed a similar view in his
dissenting opinion in Special Equipment Co. v. Coe, 324 U.S. 370, 380-84 (1944), in
which Justices Black and Murphy joined. According to Douglas, “[t]he purpose ‘to promote the progress of science and useful arts’ . . . provides the standards for the exercise
of the power [of Congress] and sets the limits beyond which it may not go. That purpose
also provides the guide for the interpretation of patent laws enacted pursuant to that
power.” Id. at 381-82.
31. John Deere, 383 U.S. at 6. The Court did recognize, however, that “[w]ithin
the limits of the constitutional grant, the Congress may . . . implement the stated purpose of the Framers by selecting the policy which in its judgment best effectuates the
constitutional aim. This is but a corollary to the grant to Congress of any Article I
power.” Id.
32. Id.
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an important issue that will be discussed in due course.33
While John Deere treats the promotion of the “useful arts”
as a limitation on Congress’s power, the constitutional provision is more often employed as a tool for interpreting the patent statutes and divining congressional intent. Indeed, the
“useful arts” goal may be considered a part of the legislative
history of the Patent Act of 1952.34 House and Senate committee reports35 that accompanied the bill referred to the constitutional language and adopted the “balanced sentence” interpretation, which, as previously discussed, singles out promotion of
the “useful arts” as the objective of the patent laws. Earlier
versions of the Patent Act even included the constitutional language in their titles, as in the case of the first Patent Act called
“An Act to Promote the Progress of Useful Arts.”36 Hence,
courts interpreting fundamental concepts of patent law have
sought guidance in the ultimate purpose of the law as stated in
the text of the Constitution and as reaffirmed by Congress.
Specifically, the “Progress of . . . useful Arts” has been understood as the bedrock of Section 101 of the Patent Act,37 entitled “Inventions patentable.” Section 101 states that “[w]hoever
invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine,
manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful
improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefor, subject to
the conditions and requirements of this title.”38 No patent may
be obtained for any discovery, “however useful, novel, and
nonobvious, unless it falls within one of the enumerated categories.”39 The most difficult of these categories to define has
been “process.” Any activity may be considered, in a broad
sense, a “process,” yet some activities—the solving of a mathematical formula, the composition of a piece of music, the operation of a business—may be incompatible with the common idea
of a patentable invention. When such conflicts arise, the constitutional reference to the “useful arts” provides an interpretive

33. See infra Parts I.D, III.
34. See Rich, supra note 22, at 397. The Patent Act of 1952 was the last general
revision of the patent laws. Patent Act of 1952, ch. 950, 66 Stat. 792 (1952) (codified at
35 U.S.C. § 101 (1994)).
35. S. REP. NO. 82-1979, at 3 (1952); H.R. REP. NO. 82-1923, at 4 (1952).
36. The Act was passed on April 10, 1790. See Lutz, supra note 23, at 53.
37. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1994).
38. Id.
39. Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 483 (1974).
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touchstone. For example, in In re Musgrave,40 the court considered whether a method involving human thought would meet
the definition of “process.”41 The court concluded that it would
so long as the method fell within the “useful arts.” “All that is
necessary, in our view, to make a sequence of operational steps
a statutory ‘process’ within 35 U.S.C. § 101 is that it be in the
technological arts so as to be in consonance with the constitutional purpose to promote the progress of ‘useful arts.’ ”42
Most of the debate over the patentability of computerrelated inventions (particularly those inventions embodied in
computer software) has focused on whether the invention falls
within one of the § 101 categories. If the invention is only a
“mathematical algorithm” or an “abstract idea,” it fails the subject matter test, but if the invention is a “process” or “machine,”
it may be patented.43 The “promot[ing] . . . [of the] useful Arts”
objective has played, and continues to play, an important role
in these definitional questions. Yet, in many of the cases litigated so far, the computer-related invention addressed a technological or industrial goal. In Parker v. Flook,44 for example,
the invention concerned an improved system for curing rubber
implemented with a programmed computer. Applications such
as rubber curing meet anyone’s definition of a “useful art,” so,
in principle, patenting such inventions would seem consistent
with the constitutional objective of the patent laws. As more
patents of the State Street variety appear—i.e., patents describing computer implementations of non-technological ideas—we
must pay even closer attention to the meaning of “useful arts,”
both in construing § 101 and in applying the patent laws as the
Framers intended. Unfortunately, “useful arts” is not a term
that is easily defined.
A. The Historical Perspective
There is little “legislative history” to assist in interpreting
the intellectual property clause of the Constitution. The Ameri40. 431 F.2d 882, 893 (C.C.P.A. 1970).
41. See infra notes 113-119 and accompanying text.
42. Musgrave, 431 F.2d at 893. See also In re Foster, 438 F.2d 1011, 1014-15
(C.C.P.A. 1971). The use of “technological arts” as a synonym for “useful arts” is discussed infra at Part I.B.
43. This is assuming that it meets the other patentability requirements such as
novelty and non-obviousness.
44. 437 U.S. 584 (1978).
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can patent system was, to a large degree, a continuation of the
British tradition embodied in the Statute of Monopolies of
1623.45 Britain and other European nations awarded patents to
persons who introduced new industries to the national economy, either through invention or through importing the knowledge from abroad.46 Thomas Jefferson, who is sometimes called
the first administrator of the United States patent system,47 is
well known for expressing doubts as to whether such a system
should be emulated in the United States. In 1788 he wrote to
James Madison expressing his general satisfaction with the
newly ratified Constitution but suggesting that monopolies
were so objectionable that they should not be granted even as
an encouragement to inventors. He proposed an antimonopoly
provision for the Bill of Rights, and although he recognized
that a monopoly for a limited time might be an “incitement[] to
ingenuity,” he concluded that “the benefit even of limited monopolies is too doubtful to be opposed to that of their general
suppression.”48 However, notwithstanding Jefferson’s hesitation, the intellectual property clause did appear in the Constitution, and it was adopted, according to Madison’s notes, ne-

45. Statute of Monopolies, 1623, 21 Jam., ch. 3 (Eng.), reprinted in DONALD S.
CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS app. 8 (1999). See George Ramsey, The Historical Background of Patents, 18 J. PAT. OFF. SOC’Y 6, 6 (1936); Edward C. Walterscheid, To Promote the Progress of Science and Useful Arts: The Background and Origin of the Intellectual Property Clause of the United States Constitution, 2 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 1, 1213, 33-36 (1994).
46. See Frank D. Prager, A History of Intellectual Property From 1545 to 1787, 26
J. PAT. OFF. SOC’Y 711 (1944) (discussing the history of patents, particularly in Venice
and France, prior to the adoption of the United States Constitution); Edward C. Walterscheid, The Early Evolution of the United States Patent Law: Antecedents (Part 1),
76 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 697, 706 (1994).
47. See, e.g., Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 7 (1966). The first Patent Act
provided for examination of patent applications by a commission of three individuals:
the Secretary of State, the Secretary of War, and the Attorney General. See, Edward C.
Walterscheid, Patents and the Jeffersonian Mythology, 29 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 269,
279 (1995). Jefferson served as Secretary of State, and, perhaps because of his personal
interest in inventions, he is thought to have taken a leading role in the interpretation
and administration of the first Patent Act of 1790. See id. at 279-80. However, Walterscheid argues that Jefferson’s reputation as the founder of the patent system has been
exaggerated. See id. at 311-14.
48. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (July 31, 1788), quoted in
Walterscheid, supra note 47, at 274. Jefferson’s views were, however, equivocal. In
1807 he wrote to Oliver Evans, saying, “Certainly an inventor ought to be allowed a
right to the benefit of his invention for a certain time . . . . Nobody wishes more than I
do that ingenuity should receive a liberal encouragement.” Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Oliver Evans (May 1807), quoted in John Deere, 383 U.S at 8.
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mine contradicente—“no one dissenting.”49
The patent aspects of the intellectual property clause arose
from a suggestion made by Charles Pinckney to the Constitutional Convention’s Committee of Detail on August 18, 1787,
and possibly from a similar suggestion made at the same time
by Madison.50 According to Madison’s published notes, Pinckney proposed that Congress have the power “[t]o grant patents
for useful inventions.”51 Madison himself proposed that Congress have the power “[t]o encourage by premiums & provisions, the advancement of useful knowledge and discoveries.”52
Each of these proposals includes the word “useful” in describing
the subject matter to be encouraged although neither includes
the precise phrase “useful arts.” How these proposals were
transformed into the ultimate language of the intellectual
property clause is unknown.53 In any event, the modified language was proposed by the Committee on September 5, 1787,
and was approved unanimously by the Constitutional Convention on the same day.54
What did the Framers mean by the phrase “useful arts”?
The first clue comes from the language of the intellectual property clause itself. The “balanced sentence” in which that clause
is phrased distinguishes the “useful arts” from “science” and
makes only the former the province of the patent laws. Therefore, if “science” means knowledge in general, “useful arts”
must mean something different, or at least narrower. Further,
the substance of the “useful arts” must be the “discoveries” of
“inventors,” as opposed to the “writings” of “authors.” Yet none
of this gets us very far if the question is as subtle as whether,
for example, law or business could be considered a “useful art.”
As United States patent law is to some extent a continuation of European practices, it is relevant to examine the kinds

49. Walterscheid, supra note 45, at 26.
50. See id. at 43-47.
51. Id. at 45.
52. Id. Madison’s unedited, contemporaneous notes indicate that he proposed to
give Congress the power “to secure to the inventors of useful machines and implements
the benefits thereof for a limited time.” Id. at 46. The omission of this from Madison’s
edited notes has not been explained. See id. at 46-47.
53. See id. at 51. The Federalist has little to say about the intellectual property
clause, other than that “[t]he utility of this power will scarcely be questioned,” and
“[t]he right to useful inventions seems . . . to belong to the inventors.” THE FEDERALIST
NO. 43 (James Madison).
54. See Walterscheid, supra note 45, at 50-51.
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of “arts” those countries encouraged by issuing patents. Venice
issued one of the earliest known examples of a patent in 1469
to one John of Speyer, who is said to have introduced the art of
printing to that nation.55 The patent “decreed that for five
years next following there should be nobody whosoever who
would, could, might or dare exercise said art of bookprinting in
Venice and its territories, except master John himself.”56 Interestingly, the patent referred to the reservation of exclusive
rights “[i]n the same manner as usual in other useful arts.”57
Later patents concerned specific innovations in printing and
new developments in the important Venetian art of glass making.58 In sixteenth-century France, patents served as an element of the “mercantile system” designed to encourage manufactures and export.59 In 1536 France granted a patent-like
“privilege” to Etienne Turquetti for the introduction of a silkmaking industry.60 France awarded its first genuine monopoly
patent to an Italian, Theses Mutio, who in 1551 introduced the
art of making glassware in the Venetian manner.61 Examples
such as these suggest a time-honored European tradition of
awarding patents for industrial developments considered important to the nation.62
Like its continental counterparts, Britain issued patents to
foster the introduction of new industries.63 In 1561, for example, Britain issued patents for the milling of soap and the
55. See Prager, supra note 46, at 715.
56. Id. at 750.
57. At least in the translation that appears in Prager’s account. See id.
58. See id. at 716.
59. Id. at 721.
60. Id. at 722.
61. See id. at 723; see also Walterscheid, supra note 46, at 711.
62. The “mercantilist” view is reflected in a Connecticut statute of 1672, which
states that “There shall be no monopolies granted or allowed amongst us but of such
new inventions as shall be judged profitable for the country . . . .” Prager, supra note
46, at 758.
63. The defendant in the so-called “Case of Monopolies,” decided in 1603, offered
a classic expression of the underlying principle:
[W]hen any man by his own charge and industry, or by his own wit and invention
doth bring any new trade into the realm, or any engine tending to the furtherance
of a trade that never was used before; and that for the good of the realm;—in such
cases the king may grant to him a monopoly-patent for some reasonable time, until
the subjects may learn the same, in consideration of the good that he doth bring by
his invention to the commonwealth . . . .

Quoted in P. J. Federico, Origin and Early History of Patents, 11 J. PAT. OFF. SOC’Y
292, 301 (1929).
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manufacture of saltpeter.64 Other patents covered specific inventions better characterized as advancements in existing industries. These included patents issued in the 1560s and 1570s
on such things as an improvement in knife handles, a grinding
mill, dredging machines, ovens and furnaces, and a knapsack.65
The Crown also granted monopolies on already existing commodities, such as salt and paper, not to encourage the development of new industries, but for other ends, such as rewarding favored subjects.66 Popular resentment of such oppressive
and “illegal” monopolies led to the Statute of Monopolies in
1623. The Statute is primarily directed to the prohibition of
monopolies, but it is most significant in the study of patent law
for the exception it provides for inventions. The prohibition
does not extend to “grants of privilege for the term of fourteen
years or under . . . of the sole working or making of any manner
of new manufactures within this realm . . . to the first and true
inventor . . . and inventors of such manufactures.”67
By the late eighteenth century, patent applications for specific improvements, as opposed to general industries, had become the norm—perhaps a sign of Britain’s industrial maturity.68 At the same time, the number of patents issued increased
significantly.69 Although the American colonies were far less
industrialized than England, there were instances in which individual colonies granted exclusive rights for the purpose of introducing new industries.70 As in England, colonial monopolies
included broader industries as well as specific mechanical inventions.71 Examples include salt, pitch and turpentine production, paper and glass manufacturing, water-powered mills, a
surveying instrument, and an improved scythe.72

64. See id. at 296.
65. See id. at 297.
66. See id. at 299.
67. 21 Jam. 1, ch. 3 (Eng.), reprinted in CHISUM, supra note 45, at app. 8.
68. See 11 SIR WILLIAM HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 427-29
(1938).
69. More patents were issued in Britain between 1760 and 1785 than in the preceding 140 years. See id. at 426 n.1. The increase may have been due to the advancing
industrialization of the British economy. See id. at 425-26.
70. See P.J. Federico, Colonial Monopolies and Patents, 11 J. PAT. OFF. SOC’Y 358
(1929). These efforts primarily focused on the introduction of new industries by importation, as opposed to invention. See id.
71. See id. at 359-64.
72. See id. at 360-62.
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Clearly, patents were closely associated with industry and
mechanical innovation. Yet it is difficult to reduce this association to any sharply defined rule or custom regarding the subject matter of patents, or to argue that the Framers consciously
intended to embody such a rule in the phrase “useful arts.”
Moreover, the Framers did not adopt the phrase “manufactures” to describe the subject matter of patents, as they might
have done had they used the Statute of Monopolies as a more
explicit model. Hence, it is conceivable (though there is no real
evidence for this) that the Framers intended “useful arts” to
suggest a broader subject matter for patents than had been
customary in Britain.73
“Useful arts” is not a term unique to the Constitution, so a
better understanding of the phrase can be sought in other,
roughly contemporaneous usages.74 One example is particularly
interesting because it occurred as the Constitutional Convention was underway and, perhaps, with the intention of influencing the proceedings. This was the address of Tench Coxe to
an assembly of the Friends of American Manufactures. Coxe
delivered the address on August 9, 1787, (only nine days before
the suggestions of Pinckney and Madison to the Committee of

73. Lutz speculates that the Framers chose “useful arts” instead of “manufactures” because the latter seems to exclude processes. See Lutz, supra note 23, at 53-54.
Even in Britain, some patents were granted for innovations that were neither industrial nor mechanical. For example, as long ago as the sixteenth century, Britain
granted a patent on a system of shorthand. See Federico, supra note 63, at 297. It also
issued patents on insurance schemes—one of them in 1778. See 11 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 68, at 427 n.7. These are precisely the kinds of patents that muddy the concept of “useful arts” today.
74. Seidel turned to Samuel Johnson’s Dictionary of the English Language for
the meaning of the individual words “useful” and “art.” See Seidel, supra note 23, at 10
n.11. The 1755 edition of Johnson’s Dictionary, no doubt the leading dictionary of the
day, broadly defines “useful” as “Convenient; profitable to any end; conducive or helpful
to any purpose.” SAMUEL JOHNSON, A DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (Times
Books Ltd. 1983) (1755). Johnson assigns “Art” a number of meanings, the most relevant of which are: “1. The power of doing something not taught by nature and instinct;
as, to walk is natural, to dance is an art. . . . 2. A science; as, the liberal arts. . . . 3. A
trade.” Id. The example for the third definition is from Boyle: “This observation is afforded us by the art of making sugar.” Id. Seidel concludes that “useful arts” refers to
the “helpful trades.” Seidel, supra note 23, at 10; see also WALTERSCHEID, supra note
19, at 52 (“In 1787 ‘useful arts’ meant basically helpful or valuable trades.”). This may
be true in a general sense, but it does not answer the hard questions. For example, are
accounting, law, education, and advertising “useful arts” because they are “helpful
trades?” Or did the compound term “useful arts” (which does not appear in Johnson’s
Dictionary) have a narrower meaning specifically limited to the industrial or manufacturing arts?
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Detail) at the University of Pennsylvania, on the occasion of
the establishment of a Society for the Encouragement of Manufactures and the Useful Arts.75 Coxe did not offer a definition of
“useful arts” per se, but the tenor of his address suggests that
they are intimately related to industry and the production of
goods. The following passage, which applauds the progress
America had already made in the production of manufactured
goods, suggests Coxe’s understanding of the phrase:
Under all the disadvantages which have attended manufactures and the useful arts, it must afford the most comfortable reflection to every patriotic mind to observe their progress in the United States and particularly in Pennsylvania.
For a long time after our forefathers sought an establishment
in this place, then a dreary wilderness, every thing necessary
for their simple wants was the work of European hands. How
great—how happy is the change. The list of articles we now
make ourselves, if particularly enumerated would fatigue the
ear, and waste your valuable time. Permit me however to
mention them under their general heads: meal of all kinds,
ships and boats, malt and distilled liquors, potash, gunpowder, cordage, loaf-sugar, pasteboard, cards and paper of every
kind, books in various languages, snuff, tobacco, starch, cannon, musquets [sic], anchors, nails, and very many other articles of iron, bricks, tiles, potters ware, mill-stones, and other
stone work, cabinet work, trunks and Windsor chairs, carriages and harness [sic] of all kinds, corn-fans, ploughs and
many other implements of husbandry, sadlery [sic] and
whips, shoes and boots, leather of various kinds, hosiery, hats
and gloves, wearing apparel, coarse linens, and woolens, and
75. TENCH COXE, AN ADDRESS TO AN ASSEMBLY OF THE FRIENDS OF AMERICAN
MANUFACTURES: CONVENED FOR THE PURPOSE OF ESTABLISHING A SOCIETY FOR THE
ENCOURAGEMENT OF MANUFACTURES AND THE USEFUL ARTS, READ IN THE UNIVERSITY
OF PENNSYLVANIA, ON THURSDAY THE 9TH OF AUGUST 1787 (Philadelphia, R. Aitkin &
Son 1787). The announced objectives of the Society, published as Plan of the Pennsylvania Society for the Encouragement of Manufactures and the Useful Arts, 2 AM.
MUSEUM 167, 167 (AMS Press 1965) (1787), reinforces the idea that “useful arts”
means industrial arts:
Our distance from the nations of Europe,—our possessing within ourselves
the materials of the useful arts, and articles of consumption and commerce,—the
profusion of wood and water, (those powerful and necessary agents in all arts and
manufactures)—the variety of natural productions with which this extensive country abounds and the number of people in our towns, and most ancient settlements,
whose education has qualified them for employments of this nature,—all concur to
point out the necessity of promoting and establishing manufactures among ourselves.

Id.
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some cotton goods, linseed and fish oil, wares of gold, silver,
tin, pewter, lead, brass and copper, clocks and watches, wool
and cotton cards, printing types, glass and stone ware, candles, soap and several other valuable articles with which
memory cannot furnish us at once.76

If Coxe understood “useful arts” to encompass anything
other than techniques for the furtherance of industry, the production of goods, and the satisfaction of material needs, there is
no suggestion of it in this encyclopedic list or anywhere else in
his address. Similar associations are apparent in a pamphlet
written by Joseph Barnes in 1792, complaining of the inadequacies of the early patent system. His work, entitled Treatise
on the Justice, Policy, and Utility of Establishing an Effectual
System for Promoting the Progress of Useful Arts,77 distinguishes between real property and intellectual property, which
he refers to as “mental” property.78 “[B]y the latter, is understood the products of genius, which consists in discoveries in
science,79 and in the useful arts; by means of which agriculture,
navigation, manufactures, and manual labor are, not only facilitated, but much promoted; and, indeed, to these they owe
their present state of perfection.”80 Again, “useful arts” seems
to refer to practical knowledge applied in labor, production and
industry.81
76. COXE, supra note 75, at 17-19.
77. JOSEPH BARNES, TREATISE ON THE JUSTICE, POLICY, AND UTILITY OF
ESTABLISHING AN EFFECTUAL SYSTEM FOR PROMOTING THE PROGRESS OF USEFUL ARTS
(Philadelphia, Francis Bailey 1792).
78. Id. at 4.
79. It is unclear whether Barnes is using “science” in the modern sense, or to refer to learning in general. See supra notes 22-23 and accompanying text.
80. BARNES, supra note 77, at 4.
81. “Useful arts” continued to be used in the nineteenth century to refer to the
“arts” employed in industry and the production of goods. For example, a periodical established in 1821 to circulate information about patented inventions associates the
“useful arts” with “mechanics and manufactures”:
We might now sum up, in saying, that as the present is as much an age of discovery as of enterprise, this work may be a means of originating further inventions
and improvements, and of bringing them to bear upon the useful arts. Chemistry,
which has made greater advances in the last half century, than perhaps all the
other sciences taken together, is still unfolding new elements of nature, and giving
new principles, applicable both to mechanics and manufactures. In both, it is
highly desirable to connect, as fast as possible, these discoveries with our work
shops and factories.

AM. J. IMPROVEMENTS USEFUL ARTS & MIRROR PAT. OFF. U.S., Jan.-Mar. 1828 at 16
(Washington, William Greer). Similar usages, though again without any attempt to
define the phrase “useful arts,” can be found in the preface of J. Leander Bishop’s A
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In the end, however, such historical information takes us
only so far. It is clear enough that the phrase “useful arts” includes machines, manufactures, and the physical techniques of
industry. Ships and shoes and sealing wax, and the techniques
for producing those things, are “useful arts.” But it cannot be
said with equal certainty that an accounting method, or a
teaching technique, or an election strategy are not “useful
arts.” Perhaps the Framers would have thought this obvious,
but, as Prager says of the intellectual property clause, “It is
unknown what the authors of our organic law intended, subjectively.”82
B. “Useful Arts” As “Technological Arts”
In more recent times, courts and scholars have suggested
“technological arts” as the modern-day equivalent of the term
“useful arts.” Patent attorney Robert I. Coulter, writing in
1952, the year of the last comprehensive revision of the United
States patent code, may have been the first. Coulter’s attempt
to define “useful arts” is still the most exhaustive and deeply
considered.83 Coulter’s ultimate concern is whether patent
method claims involving “mental steps,” such as calculating,
comparing, and observing, should be considered outside the
scope of patentable subject matter (particularly in terms of the
pre-1952 statute, in which the categories of patentable subject
matter included “useful art” rather than “process”).84 He concludes that such “mental steps” claims should be considered
patentable subject matter so long as they fall within the “useful
arts” as the phrase is used in the Constitution.85
HISTORY OF AMERICAN MANUFACTURES FROM 1608 TO 1860, EXHIBITING THE ORIGIN
AND GROWTH OF THE PRINCIPLE MECHANIC ARTS AND MANUFACTURES, FROM THE
EARLIEST COLONIAL PERIOD TO THE ADOPTION OF THE CONSTITUTION; AND COMPRISING
THE ANNALS OF THE INDUSTRY IN THE UNITED STATES IN MACHINERY, MANUFACTURES
AND USEFUL ARTS (Philadelphia, Edward Young & Co. 1868). Some of the “useful arts”
or “mechanic arts” discussed by Leander, such as brewing and wine making, are perhaps matters more of technique than of machinery, but all of them are industrial.
82. Prager, supra note 46, at 746; see also WALTERSCHEID, supra note 19, at 59 &
n.12 (noting the absence of any historical record commenting on the meaning of the
intellectual property clause as it was understood by the Framers).
83. Coulter’s work on this issue appeared as a three part series. See Robert I.
Coulter, The Field of the Statutory Useful Arts (pts. 1 & 3), 34 J. Pat. Off. Soc’y 417, 718
(1952) [hereinafter Coulter (pt. 1) and Coulter (pt. 3), respectively]; Coulter (pt. 2), supra note 26.
84. See Coulter (pt.1), supra note 83, at 417.
85. See Coulter (pt. 3), supra note 83, at 731-33.
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According to Coulter, “[i]t seems clear that ‘useful arts’ (as a
unitary technical term) embraced the so-called industrial, mechanical and manual arts of the 18th century.”86 Indeed, that
much does seem clear, but how much more than these specific
“arts” might the term encompass?87 Coulter approaches that
question by “generalizing outward” from the characteristics of
the eighteenth-century industrial and mechanical trades and,
in particular, from the kinds of people who practiced those
trades.88 They were, writes Coulter, manual laborers of limited
education and intellectual ambitions.89 Such people, according
to Coulter, “had no need of liberal arts colleges, universities, or
of schools of fine arts.”90 Instead, their province was “to do
practical things in practical ways to satisfy the physical needs
of mankind.”91 Coulter distinguishes between “useful arts”
practiced by the tradesmen and “cultural arts” practiced at the
universities and in some professions.92 The latter included the
seven “liberal arts” of grammar, logic, rhetoric, arithmetic, geometry, music, and astronomy.93 “Cultural arts” also included
the “fine arts,” such as painting, sculpture, poetry, and
drama.94 Other arts, such the arts of business, teaching, and
politics apparently fell in neither category.95
To further define the “useful arts” and to distinguish them
from the other “arts” Coulter appeals to traditions as old as antiquity. More than once he refers to the pantheon of Greek and
Roman gods and to the conceptual division of “arts” suggested
by the patronage of one god or another. He identifies Athena
and Hephaestus as the overseers of the “useful arts.”96 Athena
86. Coulter (pt. 2), supra note 26, at 496.
87. Coulter believes that the phrase “useful arts” was deliberately broad and that
the Framers did not intend to limit it to the particular “useful arts” practiced at the
time. See id. at 496, 499. For a summary of historical perspectives on the term “useful
arts,” see supra Part I.A.
88. Coulter (pt. 2), supra note 26, at 496.
89. See id.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 494.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. See Coulter (pt. 1), supra note 83, at 418. Coulter admits that “many of the
cultural arts are useful in a broad sense, and certainly the arts of business are useful.”
Coulter (pt. 2), supra note 26, at 495-96. See infra Part III for further discussion on the
classification of the “art” of business.
96. Coulter (pt. 2), supra note 26, at 497.
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patronized such practical arts as shipbuilding, shoemaking,
spinning, and weaving.97 Hephaestus patronized artisans generally and, specifically, the art of metalworking.98 Medicine,
Coulter reasons, is not a “useful art” as a matter of tradition,
but rather one of those uncategorizable arts. Its Greek practitioners looked to Aesculapius for patronage, not to the deities of
the manual trades.99 Moreover, medicine involves ethical issues
and a doctor-patient relationship that “requires more than
technical skill and learning.”100
Coulter’s observations are valuable, but unfortunately his
appeals to history and tradition are made with little reference
to historical evidence, particularly in support of his contention
that the classically-educated Framers would have understood
that “useful arts” excludes “other disparate arts . . . such as the
arts of teaching, politics, war, [and] business.”101 Moreover,
Coulter’s “blue collar” distinction seems better suited to identifying the “useful arts” of the eighteenth century than “expanding outward” to identify the “useful arts” of today. Coulter admits that “[t]he practitioners of the useful arts are no longer
merely mechanics, artisans, craftsmen and the like; but include
highly educated technologists, engineers, chemists and applied

97.
98.
99.
100.
101.

See id.
See id. Hephaestus’s “chief characteristic was usefulness.” Id.
See Coulter (pt. 3), supra note 83, at 724-25.
Id. at 724.
Coulter (pt. 2), supra note 26, at 494. Coulter writes:

The founding fathers were well-read in the classics . . . . They were wellaware of the general nature of the occupational activities to which the “useful
Arts” relate. They knew that there were a variety of “arts” and that from the days
of classical antiquity there were certain arts, originated by inventions, and performed by artisans and the like, which were useful in putting the elementary
forces and materials of nature to work for the material welfare of mankind . . . .
They well-knew the basic differences between these practical arts and the cultural
arts and sciences, recognized from antiquity, and that there were other disparate
arts such as those of business, teaching, politics, medicine, etc.

Coulter (pt. 3), supra note 83, at 731-32. In general terms, Coulter must be right; anyone can perceive differences between the industrial or mechanical arts and the other
“arts” to which he refers. Yet Coulter’s implication that the Framers consciously distinguished between these arts and that such a distinction is embodied in their choice of
the phrase “useful arts” may be overconfident, at least in the absence of more specific
historical evidence. On the other hand, Coulter’s ultimate point is that “useful arts”
refers to certain fields of activity; that is, it is not a term embodying metaphysical concepts of corporeality that might disqualify a process involving “mental steps.” Id. at
732. Whatever specific disciplines may be included within the “useful arts,” the conclusion that the term refers to certain fields of endeavor seems correct.
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scientists.”102 As for Coulter’s reliance on the ancient pantheon,
he notes that Athena was “the special patroness of the philosophers and of all the liberal arts, sciences, and learning in general.”103 Such lack of specialization among the Greek deities
places in doubt the significance of their patronage as an indication of divisions among the arts, even if it could be shown that
the Framers thought in such terms. On the other hand, Coulter
offers a key definition of the “useful arts” as seen through the
lens of antiquity:
It is said that Athena was the first to tame the horse and
to bridle and yoke it to the chariot. In this we see the real key
to the most fundamental attribute of the useful arts, especially as to procedures. They all relate to controlling the forces
and materials of nature and putting them to work in a practical way for utilitarian ends serving mankind’s physical welfare.
Probably the best word in common usage today that expresses this idea is “technology.” The technological arts are the
“useful arts.”104

Some of the first judicial decisions to define “useful arts”
came from the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals (the
“CCPA”).105 Whether through Coulter’s influence or otherwise,
102. Coulter (pt. 2), supra note 26, at 499.
103. Id. at 498.
104. Id.; see also Lutz, supra note 23, at 54 (“The term ‘useful arts,’ as used in the
Constitution . . . is best represented in modern language by the word ‘technology.’ ” ).
105. Prior decisions had broken some ground in defining “useful arts” but primarily through distinguishing a specific “art” (i.e. patentable process) from an intangible
concept or principle of nature. Examples include Cochrane v. Deener, 94 U.S. 780, 788
(1877), often cited for its definition of “process,” and the “Telephone Cases,” 126 U.S. 1,
532-33 (1887), which discuss the difference between the unpatentable natural phenomenon of electromagnetism and the potentially patentable application of that phenomenon in telephony. See also O’Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. 62, 100-01 (1853). Other
cases discuss the distinction between the subject matter of patents and the subject
matter of copyrights and, thus, may be relevant to the distinction between the “useful
arts” and what Coulter calls the “cultural arts.” See, e.g., Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99,
102-05 (1879) (holding that a copyright on a book describing an art, system, or manufacture conveys no exclusive right to the art, system, or manufacture itself; such rights
can be secured, if at all, only by patent); Brown Instrument Co. v. Warner, 161 F.2d
910, 911 (D.C. Cir. 1947) (“Articles intended for practical use in cooperation with a machine are not copyrightable. Both law and policy forbid monopolizing a machine except
within the comparatively narrow limits of the patent system.”) (citation omitted); Taylor Instrument Co. v. Fawley-Brost Co., 139 F.2d 98, 99-101 (7th Cir. 1943) (holding
that subject matters of patent and copyright do not overlap; a mechanical device belongs exclusively in the domain of patents). However, the CCPA cases seem to be the
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they adopted his definition of “useful arts” as “technological
arts.”106 Not coincidentally, all of these cases involved inventions implemented through computers.
The first of these cases, the so-called “first Prater opinion,”107 raised the kinds of “mental step” issues that concerned
Coulter. Prater had invented a method and machine (which
could be either an analog or a digital computer) for determining
the proportions of gases in a mixture from the data generated
by spectrographic analysis. The inventive aspect consisted of a
method of identifying a particular set of equations that would
produce the most accurate results from a given set of data.108
According to the patent examiner, whose decision was affirmed
by the PTO Board, the method claims were beyond the scope of
patentable subject matter because the novel aspect of the
method could be performed in someone’s head.109 The examiner
and the Board held the apparatus claims, in so far as they included a programmed digital computer, to be unpatentably obvious if one disregarded the novelty of the mathematical principles involved.110 The CCPA reversed, rejecting, as Coulter did,
the argument that “mental steps” claims are inherently unpatentable.111 The only issue, the court held, was whether the invention fell within the “useful arts”:
[O]ur present holding . . . is that patent protection for a process disclosed as being a sequence or combination of steps, capable of performance without human intervention and directed to an industrial technology—a “useful art” within the
intendment of the Constitution—is not precluded by the mere
fact that the process could alternatively be carried out by

first to address directly the scope of the “useful arts” as opposed to other “arts.”
106. In re Musgrave, 431 F.2d 882 (C.C.P.A. 1970), one of the first and most often
cited of these cases, includes a reference to Coulter’s writings, but not on the specific
point of defining “useful arts” as “technological arts.” See id. at 889-90.
107. In re Prater, 415 F.2d 1378 (C.C.P.A. 1968), superceded, 415 F.2d 1393
(C.C.P.A. 1969).
108. See id. at 1378-79.
109. See id. at 1381-82.
110. See id.
111. Over a forceful objection by Judges Rich and Almond, see id. at 1390, the
court granted the Patent Office a rehearing. The product of that rehearing is the “second Prater opinion,” In re Prater, 415 F.2d at 1393. In that opinion, the court affirmed
the rejection of the method claims, but on grounds of indefiniteness rather than unpatentable subject matter. See id. at 1404-05. As to the apparatus claims, the court persisted in its reversal of the Patent Office rejection. See id. at 1405-06.
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mental steps.112

In In re Musgrave,113 the CCPA adopted a definition of “useful arts” even closer to Coulter’s definition. Musgrave was another “mental steps” case, this time involving a method of correcting seismographic data revealing the structure of
underground rock formations.114 The PTO Board ruled the
claims unpatentable because the only novelty lay in steps that
could be performed by the human mind.115 Once again the
CCPA reversed, in language similar to that found in the first
Prater opinion:
We cannot agree with the board that these claims (all the
steps of which can be carried out by the disclosed apparatus)
are directed to non-statutory processes merely because some
or all of the steps therein can also be carried out in or with
the aid of the human mind or because it may be necessary for
one performing the processes to think. All that is necessary,
in our view, to make a sequence of operational steps a statutory ‘process’ within 35 U.S.C. § 101 is that it be in the technological arts so as to be in consonance with the Constitutional
purpose to promote the progress of “useful arts.”116

In a concurring opinion, Judge Baldwin complained that to
define a statutory “process” only in terms of the “technological
arts” was to create both a new principle of law117 and a new dilemma:
First and foremost will be the problem of interpreting the
meaning of “technological arts”: Is this term intended to be
synonymous with the ‘industrial technology’—mentioned by
Judge Smith [in the first Prater opinion]? It sounds broader to
me. Necessarily, this will have to be considered a question of
law and decided on a case-by-case basis. Promulgation of any
all-encompassing definition has to be impossible. This task is
now before us.118

112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.

Id. at 1389 (emphasis added).
431 F.2d 882 (C.C.P.A. 1970).
See id. at 883-86.
See id. at 885-86.
Id. at 893 (emphasis added).
See id. at 894.
Id. at 895. Judge Baldwin also raised another concern:

[S]uppose a claim happens to contain a sequence of operational steps which can
reasonably be read to cover a process performable both within and without the
technological arts? This is not too far fetched. Would such a claim be statutory?
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Judge Baldwin argued that the case could have been decided on narrower grounds and that the “academic” problem
addressed by resort to the “technological arts” could have been
left where it belongs—in the hands of law professors.119
Musgrave cites no authority for the proposition that “technological arts” and “useful arts” are the same; however, Musgrave itself is cited as authority in subsequent opinions. For
example, in In re Foster,120 the CCPA addressed another computer-implemented system for improving the analysis of seismographic data, and again it held, quoting Musgrave, that the
only requirement of a statutory “process” is that it “be in the
technological arts so as to be in consonance with the Constitutional purpose to promote the progress of ‘useful arts.’ ”121 In In
re Waldbaum, the CCPA expressed the Musgrave formulation
in even stronger terms, eliminating the vague reference to
“consonance” in favor of a stricter equivalence between “useful
arts” and “technological arts”:
With regard to the “mental steps” rejection, whether appellant’s process is a “statutory” invention [in terms of § 101 patentable subject matter] depends on whether it is within the
“technological arts.” The phrase “technological arts,” as we
have used it, is synonymous with the phrase “useful arts” as it
appears in Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution.122

The Waldbaum court may have gone further than Musgrave
in another sense. In Musgrave, the invention concerned seismographic analysis, which can be considered a subset of the
technological field of oil and mineral prospecting. In Waldbaum, the applicant claimed a more efficient computing algorithm to be used in determining the number of “ones” in certain
data sets.123 Although the invention had “real world” applications, such as in analyzing the traffic on telephone lines,124 the
Would it comply with section 112 [regarding the definiteness of claims]? We will
have to face these problems some day.

Id.
119. Id. at 894.
120. 438 F.2d 1011 (C.C.P.A. 1971); see also In re Bergy, 596 F.2d 952, 958
(C.C.P.A. 1979), vacated sub nom. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 444 U.S. 1028 (1980), reconsidered, 596 F.2d 952 (C.C.P.A.), aff’d, 447 U.S. 303 (1980).
121. Foster, 438 F.2d at 1015 (quoting Musgrave, 431 F.2d at 893).
122. In re Waldbaum, 457 F.2d 997, 1003 (C.C.P.A. 1972) (emphasis added).
123. See id. at 998; see also In re Johnston, 502 F.2d 765, 771 n.12 (C.C.P.A. 1974),
rev’d sub nom. Dann v. Johnston, 425 U.S. 219 (1976).
124. See Waldbaum, 457 F.2d at 998.
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“field of the invention” in this case was best described as “computing,” and it was that “technological art” on which the court
relied in overturning the § 101 rejection. Without much discussion, the court stated, “It is clear that appellant’s process,
which is useful in the internal operation of computer systems,
is within the ‘useful arts.’ ”125 The same thought is expressed,
with greater elaboration, in In re Benson,126 where the applicant invented a method for computers to convert binary-codeddecimal (BCD) numbers into ordinary binary numbers. The
court observed that, unlike previous computer software cases
where “some subsidiary or additional art was involved,” in the
present case “[t]he claims . . . are directed solely to the art of
data-processing itself.”127 Yet, said the court,
[i]t seems beyond question that the machines—the computers—are in a technological field, are a part of one of our
best-known technologies, and are in the ‘useful arts’ rather
than the ‘liberal arts,’ as are all other types of ‘business machines,’ regardless of the uses to which their users may put
them. How can it be said that a process having no practical
value other than enhancing the internal operation of those
machines is not likewise in the technological or useful arts?128

Whether computers and computer programs are themselves
within the “technological arts” is discussed infra Part IV. One
must first consider the more fundamental question posed by
Judge Baldwin in his Musgrave concurrence: If it is settled that
“useful arts” means “technological arts,” what does “technological arts” mean?
C. What Is “Technology?”
Waldbaum refers to “technological arts” as though “technology” is a term so clear and familiar as to need no elaboration.
Yet the more one looks at how “technology” has been defined by
scholars, the less one is sure what it means. This is particularly
true when the question is whether such problematic “arts” as
business and education are “technological.”

125. Id. at 1003.
126. 441 F.2d 682 (C.C.P.A. 1971), rev’d sub nom. Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S.
63 (1972). The Benson case is discussed in greater detail infra notes 264-82 and accompanying text.
127. 441 F.2d at 686.
128. Id. at 688; see also In re De Castelet, 562 F.2d 1236, 1241 (C.C.P.A. 1977).
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The word “technology” derives from the Greek τεχνη
(techne), meaning “skill” or “art.”129 Narrower definitions of
“technology” encompass systematic techniques, particularly in
an industrial context, used to create physical things or to shape
the physical environment for the satisfaction of mankind’s
practical needs. Some of the most restrictive definitions emphasize the “applied science” aspect of technology. For example,
Chambers’ Science and Technology Dictionary defines “technology” as “[t]he practice, description and terminology of any or all
of the applied sciences which have practical value and/or industrial use.”130 Yet it is incorrect, at least in an historical sense, to
limit “technology” to the products of a rigorous scientific
method. The tools developed by primitive peoples are as likely
to be the product of magic131 as of what we would call science,
yet such tools are undoubtedly “technology.”132 Even today,
many useful things are devised without any understanding or
application of science. As one writer puts it, “[I]t would be ridiculous to suppose that invention has to wait humbly, cap in
hand, for science to open the door before it can proceed. Technology is purposive and it tends . . . to be positivist. The criterion is simply, does it work?”133 Perhaps a field of endeavor
129. L. Ttondl, On the Concepts of “Technology” and “Technological Sciences,” in
CONTRIBUTIONS TO A PHILOSOPHY OF TECHNOLOGY 1, 4 (Friedrich Rapp ed., 1974).
130. CHAMBERS’ SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY DICTIONARY 888 (1988).
131. Some argue that magic may be considered a primitive “technology” “for with
it primitive man attempted to control or at least influence his environment . . . . If we
now feel that our ancestors used their magic without much success, let us not fall into
the error of equating technology only with successful technology.” Melvin Kranzberg &
Carroll W. Pursell, Jr., The Importance of Technology in Human Affairs, in 1
TECHNOLOGY IN WESTERN CIVILIZATION 5 (Melvin Kranzberg & Carroll W. Pursell, Jr.
eds., 1967).
132. “Sometimes technology is defined as applied science. . . . But technology for
much of its history had little relation with science, for men could and did make machines and devices without understanding why they worked or why they turned out as
they did.” Id. at 5-6. It was only in the nineteenth century that technology came to be
associated with applied science. Charles Singer et al., Preface to 1 A HISTORY OF
TECHNOLOGY vii (Charles Singer et al. eds., 1954).
133. DONALD CARDWELL, THE NORTON HISTORY OF TECHNOLOGY 492-93 (1995). In
fact, this is exactly the position taken by the patent laws. They require that an invention have utility, 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1994) (patentable inventions must be “useful”), and
they require that the patent disclosure enable persons skilled in the art to practice the
invention, 35 U.S.C. § 112 ¶ 1 (1994), but they do not require that the inventor correctly understand the scientific principles that make the invention work. See Newman
v. Quigg, 877 F.2d 1575, 1581 (Fed. Cir.) (“[I]t is not a requirement of patentability
that an inventor correctly set forth, or even know, how or why the invention works.”)
(citation omitted), modified, 886 F.2d 329 (Fed. Cir. 1989). Invention without understanding is still a contribution to the “useful arts.”
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cannot be considered “technological” if it is not systematic, but
few would argue that it must be, in a strict sense, scientific.134
Other definitions of “technology” emphasize its role in producing whatever is “practical” or “useful.”135 Such definitions
are of limited value because they merely substitute one difficult
concept for another. In his Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle observes that all human endeavors aim at some ultimate good.136
To the extent that they succeed in their goals, all “arts,” including those of business, education, politics, and law, are “useful”
and “practical” in the broadest sense, as are literature, music,
and painting. They all satisfy some human need. Yet it is apparent from the structure of the intellectual property clause

134. As Cardwell points out, definitions of “technology” that rely upon “science”
leave open the question of what is meant by “science.” If one defines “science,” not as a
strict application of the scientific method, but in a broader sense, perhaps even in the
eighteenth-century sense of “knowledge in general,” see supra notes 22-23 and accompanying text, then “science” may be an aspect of all “technology.” Yet the broader the
concept of “science,” the less it adds to our understanding of “technology.” See
CARDWELL, supra note 133, at 485-86.
135. For example, WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF THE
ENGLISH LANGUAGE (1971) defines “technology” with reference to applied science and
practicality: “2a: the science of the application of knowledge to practical purposes: applied science . . . . b (1): the application of scientific knowledge to practical purposes in
a particular field . . . . (2): a technical method of achieving a practical purpose.” Id. at
2348. The definition of “practical” brings one full circle back to “useful”: “3: available,
usable, or valuable in practice or action: capable of being turned to use or account: useful. Id. at 1780. See also JOHN KENNETH GALBRAITH, THE NEW INDUSTRIAL STATE 12
(2d. rev. ed. 1971) (“Technology means the systematic application of scientific or other
organized knowledge to practical tasks.”); CARL MITCHAM, THINKING THROUGH
TECHNOLOGY: THE PATH BETWEEN ENGINEERING AND PHILOSOPHY 151 (1994) (“Technologies are bodies of skills, knowledge, and procedures for making, using and doing
useful things.”) (quoting Robert S. Merrill, The Study of Technology, in 15
INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 576-77 (1968)); ARNOLD
PACEY, THE CULTURE OF TECHNOLOGY 6 (1983) (defining “technological practice” as
“the application of scientific and other knowledge to practical tasks by ordered systems
that involve people and organizations, living things and machines”).
136. Actions that differ in their immediate goals are often unified in a broader
goal, and broader goals similarly unified at an even more general level. Aristotle
writes:
[A]s there are many actions, arts, and sciences, their ends also are many; the end
of the medical art is health, that of shipbuilding a vessel, that of strategy victory,
that of economics wealth. But where such arts fall under a single capacity—as bridle-making and the other arts concerned with the equipment of horses fall under
the art of riding, and this and every military action under strategy, in the same
way other arts fall under yet others—in all of these the ends of the master arts are
to be preferred to the subordinate ends; for it is for the sake of the former that the
latter are pursued.

ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS 1 (Sir David Ross trans., Oxford Univ. Press 1966).
At the end of this progression is the ultimate goal of “happiness.” See id. at 11-12.
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that the Framers regarded at least the fine arts as distinct
from the “useful” arts.137 One could adopt the opposite extreme
and define as “useful” or “practical” only those things that satisfy mankind’s most basic physical needs, but this would produce too narrow a definition of “technology.” “Technology” includes many things that, at best, contribute to the satisfaction
of mankind’s desires. As Kranzberg and Pursell write:
[Man] cultivates a taste for more exotic foods than those
necessary to still the pangs of hunger. He yearns to achieve
faster and more lasting communications with others. He
wants to travel abroad and be entertained, and to fill his
house and his life with beauty as he sees it.138

Thus, Rolex watches are the stuff of technology, as are
roller coasters and ice cream, even if in many senses these are
neither “practical” nor “useful.”
Another approach to “technology” is to emphasize the making of physical artifacts and the physical alteration of the environment. “Technology should mean the study of those activities, directed to the satisfaction of human needs, which produce
alterations in the material world.”139 If, like Coulter, one believes that “arts” such as law, education, and politics differ
fundamentally from those properly regarded as “technologi137. See supra notes 26-28 and accompanying text.
138. The problem of defining “useful” also arises in the context of separating an
unpatentable “disembodied concept” from a patentable application of that concept that,
in the phrase adopted by the Federal Circuit, produces “a useful, concrete and tangible
result.” Kranzberg & Pursell, supra note 131, at 6; see infra Part II.A.
139. V. Gordon Childe, Early Forms of Society, in 1 A HISTORY OF TECHNOLOGY,
supra note 132, at 38. A similar, but somewhat more vague definition of “technology” is
“the totality of artifacts and methods humankind has created to shape our relations to
the world that surrounds us, modifying it into something that can be used and manipulated to submit to our needs and desires.” DAVID ROTHENBERG, HAND’S END:
TECHNOLOGY AND THE LIMITS OF NATURE xii (1993); see also MITCHAM, supra note 135,
at 152 (noting the difficulty of defining “technology,” but remarking on the “primacy of
reference to the making of material artifacts, especially since this making has been
modified and influenced by modern science”); Viscounte Caldecote, Technology, Master
or Servant?, in MAN AND TECHNOLOGY: THE SOCIAL AND CULTURAL CHALLENGE OF
MODERN TECHNOLOGY 14 (Bruce M. Adkins ed., 1983) (“Technology is concerned with
the application of scientific knowledge to the creation of useful things, processes and
services;” technology creates “real wealth” when “we add value by brain and muscle
power, and through machines, to the raw materials found in nature.”). Interestingly, in
his nineteenth-century treatise on patent law, Robinson argued that a process having
no physical effects could not be patented, “however greatly it may promote the comfort
or the welfare of mankind,” because it “lies outside the domain of the industrial arts.”
WILLIAM C. ROBINSON, THE LAW OF PATENTS FOR USEFUL INVENTIONS § 166, at 250
(Sage Hill Publishers 1971) (1890) (emphasis added).
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cal,”140 the distinction between the physical and the abstract is
a promising path of analysis. Yet even here the boundaries are
elusive. The most abstract of “arts” have their physical manifestations and effects on the material world. The field of law,
for example, produces contracts and statutes written on paper,141 and it alters conditions and conduct in the “real world.”
At the same time, other activities that seem “technological”
have little tangible impact. A scientist who analyzes neutrino
emissions from the sun seems involved in a “technological”
pursuit, yet his actions have little effect on the neutrinos, and
no effect on the sun.
In answer to the last example, one could say that the “technology” lies, not in the analysis, but in the physical techniques
and equipment that the scientist employs. One could say that
“technology” is, in fact, the endeavor of making and using
tools.142 This also holds promise, but definitions of “tool” can differ. The word calls to mind tangible instruments, such as chisels and spectrometers, yet Peter F. Drucker, who has written
extensively on the subject of technology and business, argues
that “tools” and “technology” are not limited to physical artifacts.
Language, too, is a tool, and so are all abstract concepts. . . .
According to the technologist’s definition of ‘tool,” the abacus
and the geometer’s compass are normally considered technology, but the multiplication table or table of logarithms is not.
Yet this arbitrary division makes all but impossible the understanding of so important a subject as the development of
the technology of mathematics.143

Drucker defines “technology” in terms of “human work,”144
140. See supra notes 86-95 and accompanying text.
141. The idea of a writing as a physical artifact may seem trivial. However, a
number of “method of doing business” cases involving printed coupons and tickets show
that the issue is not as simple as it may seem. See infra notes 376-93 and accompanying text.
142. See MCGRAW-HILL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY 406 (1997)
(“Engineering is the application of objective knowledge to the creation of plans, designs,
and means for achieving desired objectives. Technology deals with the tools and techniques for carrying out the plans.”).
143. PETER F. DRUCKER, TECHNOLOGY, MANAGEMENT AND SOCIETY 43-44 (1970).
144. Id. at 45-46.
[T]echnology is not about things: tools, processes, and products. It is about work:
the specifically human activity by means of which man pushes back the limitations
of the iron biological law which condemns all other animals to devote all of their
time and energy to keeping themselves alive for the next day, if not for the next
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implying that such things as law, education, and politics might
be considered “technological” activities. Many broad definitions
of “technology”—as in the case of Singer’s definition of technology as “the systematic treatment of any thing or subject”145 or
as “the field of how things are commonly done or made”146—
invite this conclusion.147 Kranzberg and Pursell object to
Singer’s definition precisely because “[it] is so broad and loose
that it encompasses many items that scarcely can be considered as technology. For example, the passage of laws is something which is ‘done,’ but the history of law is certainly not the
history of technology.”148 On the other hand, some scholars embrace the broad definition, and with it the conclusion that virtually everything we do is “technology.” An example of this extreme approach can be found in the writings of Joseph Agassi:
Usually the word ‘technology’ is applied to physical engineering, at times to biological technology, especially medicine
and agriculture, hardly ever to other fields such as education
or psychoanalysis or behavior therapy. Yet there is no reason
for this other than certain Baconian prejudices . . . . And if we
ever agree to include under the heading of technology any
kind of human technique, educational, organizational, or psychological, then we shall have to include Yoga exercises too.149

In fact, Agassi argues that “[w]hat we call the arts, or the
fine arts—painting and sculpture and music—plus the applied
arts—whether carpentry or advertisement—are all technol-

hour.

Id. at 45.
145. Singer et al., supra note 132, at vii. Singer offers this as the proper etymological meaning of “technology.”
146. Id.
147. See also ALBERT BORGMAN, TECHNOLOGY AND THE CHARACTER OF
CONTEMPORARY LIFE 14 (1984) (“[I]n one sense technology is nothing but the systematic effort to get everything under control.”). Even no-nonsense scientific dictionaries
contain surprisingly broad definitions of “technology”—e.g., “Systematic knowledge and
action, usually of industrial processes but applicable to any recurrent activity.”
MCGRAW-HILL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY, supra note 142, at 406
(emphasis added).
148. Kranzberg & Pursell, supra note 131, at 5. Mitcham, whose conception of
“technology” emphasizes material things, agrees: “[T]echnology can be described as the
making and using of artifacts. Human making, in turn, can be broadly distinguished
from human doing—for example, political, moral, religious, and related activities.”
MITCHAM, supra note 135, at 153.
149. JOSEPH AGASSI, TECHNOLOGY: PHILOSOPHICAL AND SOCIAL ASPECTS 90
(1985).
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ogy.”150
The extremes to which one could take this view of “technology” are suggested in Jaques Ellul’s The Technological Society,151 in which he writes of the systematizing of all aspects of
modern life and culture. Ellul refers to this systematizing force
as “technique,” which he defines as the “totality of methods rationally arrived at and having [as its goal] absolute efficiency
(for a given stage of development) in every field of human activity.”152 This “technique” is something broader than Ellul’s own
understanding of machine-oriented “technology,”153 but everything it embraces takes on some of the characteristics of a machine:
From another point of view . . . the machine is deeply
symptomatic: it represents the ideal toward which technique
strives. The machine is solely, exclusively, technique; it is
pure technique, one might say. For, whenever a technical factor exists, it results, almost inevitably, in mechanization:
technique transforms everything it touches into a machine.154

“Technique” means a coldly rational, analytical, and systematic approach to any human endeavor. The “technical operation” includes “every operation carried out in accordance
with a certain method in order to obtain a particular end.”155 It
can extend to such things as economic and managerial organization,156 psychoanalysis,157 sociology,158 and propaganda.159 It
150. Id. at 49. See also MITCHAM, supra note 135, at 150 (“[T]echnology has sometimes been defined so as to include even the making of nonmaterial things such as laws
and languages—although the implications of such definitions have not been widely
thought through or adopted.”).
151. JAQUES ELLUL, THE TECHNOLOGICAL SOCIETY (John Wilkinson trans., Alfred
A. Knopf 1964).
152. Id. at xxv. Regarding Wilkinson’s translation, see MITCHAM, supra note 135,
at 57 & n.21.
153. See ELLUL, supra note 151, at xxv, where he states, “The term technique, as I
use it, does not mean machines, technology, or this or that procedure for attaining an
end.” Elsewhere he writes that “technique is applied outside industrial life” and “[t]he
growth of its power today has no relation to the growing use of the machine.” Id. at 4.
In fact, “[t]echnique has now become almost completely independent of the machine.”
Id.
154. Id. at 4.
155. Id. at 19.
156. See id. at 11-12. “An economic plan is purely an intellectual operation, which
nevertheless is a technique” even though “no physical act is involved.” Id. at 13. “The
accountant is no longer a mere agent for registering the movements of funds in an enterprise . . . . [h]e has become a veritable ‘profits engineer.’ ” Id. at 166.
157. See id. at 14.
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would include even “a technique of mastication based on the
science of nutrition, or techniques of sport, as in the Boy Scout
movement.”160 Indeed, “[t]oday no human activity escapes [the]
technical imperative. There is a technique of organization . . .
just as there is a technique of friendship and a technique of
swimming.”161 It was not Ellul’s intention to comment on the
meaning of “technology,” much less on what advancements
should be considered patentable. However, his vision of logic
and system applied to all facets of human activity suggests the
potential scope of a broadly defined “technology,” as well as the
potential scope of patentable subject matter.
There is simply no single, generally accepted definition of
“technology.” “ ‘[T]echnology’ is not a universal term; it does not
mean exactly the same thing in all contexts. It is often, and in
significant ways, context dependent—both in speech and in the
world.”162 It is “used loosely in different contexts and it is not at
all clear how it may be understood in general.”163 Certain
things, such as industrial processes and physical artifacts,
meet any definition of “technology” and might be considered its
conceptual core. The courts that have used “technological arts”
as a substitute for “useful arts” probably had these things in
mind. Judge Rich said as much in his Waldbaum concurrence.
Referring to the majority’s statement that “useful arts” means
“technological arts,” Judge Rich wrote:
As the originator of that “test” in In re Musgrave, I hereby
express my agreement with the above-quoted statement. The
phrase “useful arts” which was written into the Constitution
conjures up images of the Franklin stove, horse collars, and
buggy whips. The term “technological arts” was selected in
Musgrave as probably having a connotation in these times
158. See id.
159. See id. at 14-15. “Here the operation is of a moral, psychic and spiritual character. However, that does not prevent it from being a technique. But what we are talking about is a world once given over to the pragmatic approach and now being taken
over by a method.” Id. at 15. Propaganda is a form of what Ellul calls “human technique.” “Human technique takes on various forms, ranging all the way from medicine
and genetics to propaganda (pedagogical techniques, vocational guidance, publicity,
etc.). Here man himself becomes the object of technique.” Id. at 22.
160. Id. at 15.
161. Id. at 21-22.
162. MITCHAM, supra note 135, at 152.
163. AGASSI, supra note 149, at 21; see also Kranzberg & Pursell, supra note 131,
at 4 (“While the influence of technology is both widespread and fundamental, the term
cannot be defined with precision.”).
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roughly equivalent to that which ‘useful arts’ had in the
eighteenth century. No new legal concept was intended.164

Yet the concern raised by Judge Baldwin in Musgrave165 is a
genuine concern. How can a court proceed when the invention
at issue is not a Franklin stove, horse collar, or buggy whip, but
rather an insurance scheme or a pedagogical technique? Are
these things “technology?” Judge Baldwin doubted that any
“all-encompassing definition” could be found,166 and certainly
no court has addressed the definitional problems discussed
here. Judge Baldwin believed that the issue would have to be
“decided on a case-by-case basis,”167 yet such an approach
would inevitably be arbitrary and ad hoc without the application of some guiding standards. In fact, the failings of the
“enumerationist” approach to defining “technology”—i.e., definition by listing examples of “technology”—have already been
noted by scholars.168
D. A Provisional Definition of “Useful Arts”
There is something to be said for adopting a broad definition of the “useful arts” corresponding to a broad definition of
“technology.” Mirroring Ellul’s conception of “technique,” one
could define “useful art” as any field of endeavor in which
knowledge is applied systematically toward the achievement of
definite goals. Business, politics, pedagogy, and law (at least
the practice of law) might qualify as “useful arts” under that
definition.169 Such “useful arts” would have many things in
common with the industrial and mechanical arts that have
traditionally been the subject of patents, including the application of reason to achieve a goal, the possibility of improvement,
the potential to benefit society by introducing such improve-

164. In re Waldbaum, 457 F.2d 997, 1003 (C.C.P.A. 1972).
165. See supra notes 117-119 and accompanying text.
166. In re Musgrave, 431 F.2d 882, 895 (C.C.P.A. 1970).
167. Id. at 894.
168. “It is evident that this enumerationist approach is only an auxiliary means
for explaining the concept of technology and can be neither complete nor exhaustive.”
Ttondl, supra note 129, at 3.
169. The fine arts might not qualify, either because they are not systematic or because they lack definable goals, but this is a difficult question. At least some branches
of the fine arts are highly systematic (certain kinds or music and poetry, for example),
and they strive for aesthetic goals, even if the relevance of those goals, or the success of
a work of art in achieving them, might be the subject of disagreement.
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ments, and the applicability of most, if not all, of the standards
now used to evaluate whether an invention is otherwise patentable—e.g., utility,170 novelty, non-obviousness, enablement,
and definiteness.171 Support for such a broad vision of patentable subject matter can also be found in the legislative history of the 1952 Patent Act. As quoted with approval by the
Supreme Court, patentable subject matter “include[s] anything
under the sun that is made by man.”172
Whether such an approach should be adopted comes down
to two questions, one a matter of history and the other a matter
of policy. The historical question—What did the Framers intend by the phrase “useful arts?”—has already been discussed.
As we have seen, the historical record provides no definitive
answers. Still, Coulter’s view that the Framers intended “useful arts” to refer only to material goods and industrial processes seems more likely true than not. Americans of the late
eighteenth century were much concerned with the nation’s industrial development, particularly in relation to the European
nations from which the colonies had imported so much of their
raw materials and manufactured goods. The existence of societies like the Friends of American Manufactures and the Society
for the Encouragement of Manufactures and the Useful Arts173

170. The standard of utility involves its own concept of “usefulness.” See 35 U.S.C.
§ 101 (1994) (“Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine,
manufacture, or composition of matter . . . may obtain a patent therefor . . . .”) (emphasis added). However, that standard is generously applied, and any invention that
serves its intended purpose is unlikely to be denied a patent for lack of utility. See TolO-Matic, Inc. v. Proma Produkt-Und Mktg. Gesellschaft M.b.H., 945 F.2d 1546, 1553
(Fed. Cir. 1991) (“All that the law requires is that the invention should not be frivolous,
or injurious to the well-being, good policy, or good morals of society. The word useful
therefore is incorporated into the act in contradistinction to mischievous or immoral.”)
(citation omitted). Such things as toys, games, and novelties are patented routinely
whether or not they are “useful” in the strictest sense. Hence, if inventions such as advertising techniques pass the constitutional test of “useful arts,” they should not be
held to lack utility under § 101.
171. Some of these standards would create practical problems for the Patent Office. Whenever it is decided that a type of invention previously treated as categorically
unpatentable may indeed be patented, the Patent Office faces a shortage of prior art
patents with which to test the novelty and non-obviousness of the claimed invention.
This has happened before with software, and it could happen again with “method of
doing business” patents. See infra Part III.
172. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980) (quoting Committee Reports accompanying the 1952 Patent Act: S. REP. NO. 82-1979, at 5 (1952); H.R. REP.
NO. 82-1923, at 6 (1952)). Chakrabarty held that genetically engineered bacteria qualify as patentable subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101. See id.
173. See supra note 75 and accompanying text.
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(together with Tench Coxe’s remarks174 on the founding of the
latter) are evidence of that concern. In 1790, the House of Representatives directed Treasury Secretary Alexander Hamilton
to prepare a Report on Manufactures,175 including “the means
of promoting such as will tend to render the United States, independent on foreign nations for military and other essential
supplies.”176 In that Report, Hamilton observes that “[t]he expediency of encouraging manufactures in the United States,
which was not long since deemed very questionable, appears at
this time to be pretty generally admitted.”177 A healthy manufacturing industry at home would contribute to national security and keep the profits of agricultural surpluses from being
transferred abroad.178
Hamilton lists the encouragement of new inventions and
the introduction of inventions from other countries, “particularly those [inventions] which relate to machinery,” as “among
the most useful and unexceptionable of the aids, which can be
given to manufactures.”179 “The usual means of that encouragement,” writes Hamilton, “are pecuniary rewards, and, for a
time, exclusive privileges. . . . For the last, so far as respects
‘authors and inventors,’ provision has been made by Law.”180
Hamilton refers, of course, to the patent system.181 As Hamilton
observes, the grant of exclusive rights by patent was a “usual”
means of encouraging industry and “manufactures,” as shown
by European and colonial practices.182 It is reasonable to conclude that industry is what the Framers intended to encourage
by exclusive rights and that industry is what they meant by the
“useful arts.”183
174. See supra note 74 and accompanying text.
175. Alexander Hamilton, Report on Manufacturers (Dec. 5, 1791), in THE
REPORTS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 115 (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1964).
176. Id. at 115.
177. Id. at 115-16.
178. See id. at 116.
179. Id. at 175.
180. Id. at 175-76.
181. And perhaps, by his reference to “authors,” to the copyright system as well,
though this system has little obvious relationship to the encouragement of “manufactures.”
182. See supra notes 55-72 and accompanying text.
183. According to Coulter, “[t]here can be no doubt that the promotion of the ‘useful Arts’ in America was regarded by the founding fathers as a matter of life-and-death
importance to the prosperity of the new nation.” Coulter (pt. 2), supra note 26, at 489.
If “useful arts” means industry, then Coulter is probably right.
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There is no corresponding evidence that the Framers intended to encourage developments in business methods, political strategies, pedagogical techniques, or similar undertakings.
In fact, there is no evidence that they viewed such endeavors as
subject to improvement by “inventors.” In all likelihood, it did
not occur to the Framers to include such things in the patent
system. If the Framers had entertained such unconventional
thoughts (unconventional in light of the kinds of invention
usually rewarded with patents), one might expect some explicit
statement to that effect either in the Constitution or in the
early patent acts.184 It is also wise to remember the Framers’
general antipathy to monopolies,185 seen most vividly in the initial reluctance of Thomas Jefferson to endorse any patent system at all.186 If there is any question as to whether “useful arts”
should be interpreted broadly or narrowly, the narrow interpretation, with its correspondingly narrower scope of monopoly,
seems most in keeping with the likely intentions of the Framers. It is one thing to extend patent protection to new industries (“anything under the sun that is made by man”187); it is
something else to extend protection to fields that are not industrial at all. The “burden of persuasion,” at least, should be on
those who argue for the broader interpretation of “useful arts.”
The policy question is whether the benefits of granting exclusive rights to advancements in such fields as education,
business, and advertising outweigh the costs. Is the nation ac-

184. Business methods, political strategies, pedagogical techniques, and so forth,
existed in the eighteenth century, so they do not stand on the same footing as new
technologies, which the Framers could neither have foreseen nor commented upon.
185. See Walterscheid, supra note 45, at 55-56. The patent laws have been called
an “attempt to reconcile this Nation’s deep-seated antipathy to monopolies with the
need to encourage progress.” Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 319 (1980) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting Deepsouth Packing Co. v. Laitram Corp., 406 U.S. 518,
530-31 (1972); see also In re Shoa Wen Yuan, 188 F.2d 377, 380 (C.C.P.A. 1951). Inclusion in the Constitution of a reason for patent law
doubtlessly was due to the fact that those who formulated the Constitution were
familiar with the long struggle over monopolies so prominent in English history,
where exclusive rights to engage in ordinary business activities were granted so
frequently by the Crown for the financial benefits accruing to the Crown only. It
was desired that in this country any Government grant of a monopoly for even a
limited time should be limited to those things which serve in the promotion of science and the useful arts.

Id.
186. See supra notes 47-48 and accompanying text.
187. Diamond, 447 U.S. at 309 (quoting S. REP. NO. 82-1979, at 5 (1952); H.R.
REP. NO. 82-1923, at 6 (1952)). See supra note 172 and accompanying text.
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tually benefited by “progress” in such fields? In the case of education, one would guess so. In the case of business, and particularly advertising, one cannot be sure.188 If such “progress” is desirable, how much would it be encouraged by the grant of
exclusive rights? How much would be lost by denying advancements in these fields to the general public even if only for
a limited time? These questions might be dismissed as irrelevant by a constitutional literalist, but, in the absence of definitive historical information, they are worth considering. They
might even provide some insight into the thoughts and intentions of the Framers. However, no one has marshaled evidence
that sheds light on these issues, and it may be that no such
evidence can be marshaled. Even if we could agree on what we
mean by “progress” in these arts, it is difficult to imagine by
what experiment it could be measured. Moreover, these arts
differ sufficiently from the industrial arts that it seems rash to
infer that what encourages progress in the latter must also encourage progress in the former.
Until there is historical or policy-oriented evidence to the
contrary, it seems best to adopt a conservative definition of the
“useful arts”—perhaps defining them as the products, processes, and tools of industry or as “industrial technology” in the
language of the first Prater opinion.189 As Judge Baldwin
warned in Musgrave, a perfect and all-encompassing definition
may be impossible, given the inherent imprecision of language.190 But it should be possible to extend the field of the
“useful arts” to new technologies by analogy to the “Franklin
stoves, horse collars, and buggy whips”191 at its traditional core
and to exclude certain arts, such as law, business, politics, and
pedagogy, which are fields of human behavior—what Mitcham
refers to as “human doing” as opposed to “human making.”192
This conservative approach also seems consistent with the intentions of the courts in defining “useful arts” as “technological
arts.” However, even if we decide that “useful arts” has this
narrower meaning, the twentieth century “art” of computer

188. See generally Ralph S. Brown, Jr., Advertising and the Public Interest: Legal
Protection of Trade Symbols, 57 YALE L.J. 1165, 1166-67 (1948).
189. See supra notes 107-110 and accompanying text.
190. See supra notes 117-119 and accompanying text. One could, for example,
quibble over what is meant by “industry.”
191. In re Waldbaum, 457 F.2d 997, 1003 (C.C.P.A. 1972).
192. MITCHAM, supra note 135, at 153.
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programming presents special difficulties. Before examining
those difficulties in detail, it is worth reviewing briefly the
characteristics of that “art.”
E. The “Art” of Computer Programming
The fundamental operations of a computer are extremely
simple logical and arithmetical operations which, when combined in great numbers and in the right sequence, can accomplish complex tasks like word processing, web browsing, and
graphics rendering.193 Computers are tools of great flexibility,
but they do only what they are instructed to do by a computer
program.194 In order to be processed by a computer, the instructions of which a program consists must be expressed in binary
code—strings of ones and zeros. Computer programs can be
written at this “machine language” level, but it is impractical
to do so. Instead, programs are written in “higher level” programming languages such as PASCAL or C. Because these
languages are more like human languages, they allow programs to be more easily written, read, and understood by humans.195 Before they can be used by a computer, higher level
programs must be converted by a “compiler” into corresponding
strings of binary digits.196
The process of writing down program instructions is known
as “coding.”197 However, programming does not begin with cod193. See NICLAUS WIRTH, SYSTEMATIC PROGRAMMING: AN INTRODUCTION 1 (1973).
194. “A computer program is defined as a series of instructions or statements, in a
form acceptable to a computer, designed to cause the computer to execute an operation
or series of operations.” PHILLIP BRUCE & SAM M. PEDERSON, THE SOFTWARE
DEVELOPMENT PROJECT 7 (1982). Computer hardware components (microprocessors,
storage devices, input devices, displays, and so forth) easily qualify as patentable subject matter. An engineer who designs a new disk drive is unquestionably practicing a
technological “useful art.” See In re Benson, 441 F.2d 682, 688 (C.C.P.A. 1971) (“It
seems beyond question that the machines—the computers—are in a technological field,
are a part of one of our best-known technologies, and are in the ‘useful arts’ rather than
the ‘liberal arts’ . . . .”), rev’d sub nom. Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63 (1972). Only
when the invention is embodied in computer software or when the invention generally
lies in a new use for existing hardware, do questions of patentable subject matter arise.
195. See WIRTH, supra note 193, at 12-13.
196. See J.D. ARON, THE PROGRAM DEVELOPMENT PROCESS 6-7 (1974). A program
in its intelligible, programming-language state is known as “source program;” in the
form in which it can be executed by a computer, it is known as “object program.” See id.
at 34.
197. See RAY TURNER, SOFTWARE ENGINEERING METHODOLOGY 103 (1984) (“Coding is the process of translating the design of a program, module by module, into a form
that can be read by a computer and converted by it into an object code which can be
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ing any more than house building begins with nailing boards
together. In either case, the construction phase is preceded by a
planning stage.198 The planning stage of programming, sometimes referred to as “software design,”199 is a process of moving
from the general to the specific.200 It begins with the identification of a problem to be solved or a function to be performed by
the program.201 For example, one might begin with the idea of a
program for indexing a collection of baseball cards. During the
“concept phase” of development,202 the initial rough idea is refined into a specific plan for what the program will accomplish.
Software designers typically prepare a document called a
“functional specification,”203 detailing their specific ideas about

executed.”).
198. See id. at 5 (“Software design is not just ‘programming a computer’ any more
than hardware design is ‘hooking up some IC’s [Integrated Circuits].’ If we characterize
the activities in software design and development in a general way, it is clear that programming is only a part of the total process.”) For Turner’s definition of “programming,” see infra note 199.
199. See TURNER, supra note 197, at 5-6. Turner limits the term “programming” to
the implementation stage, rather than applying it as well to the design stage, see id. at
5, but it is often used in a sense that includes both. See, e.g., ARON, supra note 196, at
55 (“Programming is a comprehensive term. It includes the activities of analysis, planning, design, etc., as well as coding and debugging.”). As the software business has become more complex, the tasks of design and coding have become more distinct; now the
person who designs software may do little, if any, of the actual coding. See SUSAN
LAMMERS, PROGRAMMERS AT WORK 3 (1986).
200.
[D]esign has to be broken down into chunks that are amenable to human comprehension. This is generally accomplished by attacking the problem at an abstract
level and then proceeding to more detailed levels of design. . . . The whole process
of development of programs can be viewed as moving from an abstract statement
of the problem to a concrete representation of the solution in code that can be executed on the target machine.

Judith C. Enos & R.L. Van Tilburg, Software Design, in SOFTWARE ENGINEERING 71
(Randall W. Jensen & Charles C. Tonies eds., 1979). “Beginning with a high-level design and proceeding to lower and lower levels of detail is only a natural way of intellectually tackling a large, complex problem. The generic term ‘top-down design’ has been
applied to this process, and all followers of design methodologies profess to follow this
general approach . . . .” Id. at 72. See also ARON, supra note 196, at 97 (“The important
facet of top-down design is that it establishes the logical structure of the solution before
it decides on the detailed elements of the solution.”).
201. “Programs are written to solve problems. The programmer’s first act is to obtain a good definition of the problem.” ARON, supra note 196, at 55. The problemsolving idea may be in response to customer demands, competitive pressures, or simply
a design for “a better mousetrap.” See TURNER, supra note 197, at 21.
202. See TURNER, supra note 197, at 10. This stage of problem analysis is also
known as the “requirements definition phase.” Enos & Tilburg, supra note 200, at 65.
203. TURNER, supra note 197, at 10, 13.
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what the program is to do.204 A functional specification for the
baseball card program would spell out its various functions:
sorting and display of card information alphabetically by
player, alphabetically by team, by year issued, by date purchased, by price paid, and so forth. It might specify features
like the display of scanned images of individual cards and a
link to an Internet site supplying up-to-date price information.
It would likely describe elements of the “user interface,” such
as how the screens should look and the kinds of commands
available to the user. It might also cover certain technical requirements, such as whether the program will run on all Windows PCs and whether it will fit on a single CD-ROM.205 The
details of the functional specification reflect the programmer’s
ambitions, marketing requirements, hardware limitations, and
many other considerations.
When the functional specification is complete, the design
process enters what has been called the “implementation
phase,”206 or “software design phase.”207 In this phase, the question is not so much what the software will do, but how it will do
it.208 Here the programmer determines the high-level structure
of the program, eventually recorded in a document called a “design specification.”209 A program is a sequence of operations
that, in the design phase, are often represented graphically by

204. See id. at 22 (“The output of the Concept Phase is the functional specification
(sometimes called a problem specification) which defines, in detail, what the product
does and how it interacts with the user, the hardware, and other software.”).
205. See id. at 13. In chapter five of his book, Turner discusses in some detail the
kinds of information likely to be included in a functional specification. See id. at 43-54.
206. See id. at 14. Issues that arise in the implementation phase may cause the
programmer to rethink the functional specification. Hence, there may be some interaction between the processes of design and implementation. See ARON, supra note 196, at
83.
207. Enos & Tilburg, supra note 200, at 66.
208. See id. at 69. Turner refers to a “definition phase” preceding actual coding.
“The definition phase converts the what must be done from the functional specification
into the how it will be done of the design specification.” TURNER, supra note 197, at 22.
209.
The purpose of the design specification is to define an implementation approach for the software product. It defines a system architecture, data structures,
and the high-level structure of the program itself (not necessarily the entire program structure). It explains design decisions made and justifies them against the
requirements of the functional specification.

TURNER, supra note 197, at 14-15. The design specification is also referred to as a
“Functional Design Document.” See BRUCE & PEDERSON, supra note 194, at 75.
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“flow charts.”210 A flow chart is a diagram showing the order of
events and any “branches” that occur when decisions are made.
Labeled boxes in a flowchart represent distinct functions, such
as “sort cards alphabetically by name of player.” The programmer may have to reduce such functions into their own subsidiary components, represented in additional flowcharts.211 In the
example, a subsidiary flowchart might represent the steps necessary to perform the alphabetizing—i.e., locate the memory
array in which the names of players are stored, isolate the first
letter of each player’s last name, convert those letters into numerical equivalents based on the order of the alphabet, use a
mathematical operation to sort the names, and so on. A complex program may require several layers of structure to describe its detailed operation.212
During the software design phase, the programmer defines
the program “modules” that perform the various operations required by the overall design213 and the program structure, or
“architecture,”214 that determines how these modules interact.215 The programmer also defines the “data structures” that
store the information on which the program operates.216 The
baseball card program would have data structures for storing

210. See ARON, supra note 196, at 104-05.
211. See id. at 105.
212. See Enos & Tilburg, supra note 200, at 72.; TURNER, supra note 197, at 60,
64-66 (describing the hierarchical nature of “structured design”). “This natural ‘divide
and conquer’ process allows the designer to deal with a small number of subfunctions
at one time and to push down or ignore details of implementation not relevant at that
level . . . in the . . . hierarchy.” Id. at 65.
213. See TURNER, supra note 197, at 58-59. A “module” is “[t]he lowest level of
program structure consisting of a group of statements that performs one function or a
small number of related functions. [It is] [e]quivalent to a subroutine or subprogram.”
Id. at 3. Turner provides sample module descriptions in Figures 4-3 and 4-4 of his book.
See id. at 33-34.
214. See Enos & Tilburg, supra note 200, at 75 (“The architectural design must
describe the arrangement (or structure) of the component parts (called modules) that
communicate (through interfaces) in proper sequence (control structure) to solve the
user’s problem.”).
215. See TURNER, supra note 197, at 30; BRUCE & PEDERSON, supra note 194, at
71-72.
216. See TURNER, supra note 197, at 31-32 fig. 4-2 (“Typical Data Structure Definition”). The Functional Design Document must “[i]dentify and name the levels of data
base hierarchy (e.g., data base, file, record, array), down to the individual parameter
level. For each level of data base hierarchy, the Functional Design Document identifies
the name, contents (description and units), and size of the data base components.” See
BRUCE & PEDERSON, supra note 194, at 75. “Some interaction between data structure
definition and program structure will naturally occur.” TURNER, supra note 197, at 23.
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numerical information, such as the year each card was acquired and the price paid; strings of letters, such as the names
of teams and players; and pictures, such as the scanned images
of individual cards. The programmer would define data structures with characteristics suited to each kind of information.
Coding takes place only after the program structure and design
have been determined. In a sense, the text of the program is
the final and most specific description of the program’s structure as well as the means for causing the computer to execute
the programmed instructions.
Programming is not always the formal process that the
foregoing suggests, particularly when it is done by an individual rather than by an organized group. However, the hierarchical methodology of moving from idea to code is generally the
same. Software designer Charles Simonyi describes programming as follows:
If we’re talking strictly about programming, then let’s assume
I already know what I want to do. If I don’t then there is some
aspect of the process that is common to all problem solving:
What am I trying to do? What is the goal?
For example, I want a text editor to be menu driven, fast,
have a spelling checker, and so on. I need to know the end
product before the true programming begins. . . .
....
The first step in programming is imagining. Just making it
crystal clear in my mind what is going to happen. In this initial stage, I use paper and pencil. I just doodle, I don’t write
code. I might draw a few boxes or a few arrows, but it’s just
mostly doodles, because the real picture is in my mind. I like
to imagine the structures that are being maintained, the
structures that represent the reality I want to code.
Once I have the structure fairly firm and clear in my mind,
then I write the code. I sit down at my terminal—or with a
piece of paper in the old days—and write it. . . . The code for
the most part writes itself, but it’s the data structures I maintain are the key. They come first and I keep them in my mind
throughout the entire process.217

217. Interview with Charles Simonyi, in LAMMERS, supra note 199, at 14-15; see
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Moving from the concept, even the detailed concept embodied in the functional specification, to a specific program architecture requires considerable skill. It is not a mechanical process that always results in the same program, or even a
program of equivalent value: “Ten programmers given a functional definition of a program and using ad hoc design techniques would produce ten different high-level designs for that
program. Each would presumably be a correct design but some
would be better designs than others.”218 Better designs result in
programs that are faster, that require less memory, and that
are more intelligible and, hence, more easily modified and debugged.219
Is programming an “industrial technology” or “useful art?”
It is not an art the Framers knew, and in one respect it differs
from any art they could have imagined. Programmers do not
work with physical materials—the stuff of “Franklin stoves,
horse collars, and buggy whips.”220 Although the execution of a
program depends upon physical hardware and the flow of electrons, these are not the essence of the program itself. As W.
Daniel Hillis demonstrated by building a tic-tac-toe-playing
computer entirely out of Tinker Toys and string,221 the hardware is incidental. The essence of a program is logic. In the
eighteenth century, abstract logic was not the province of artisans; it was the province of mathematicians and philoso-

also Interview with programmer Gary Kildall, in LAMMERS, supra note 199, at 58.
It goes back to the fundamentals of programming: simplifying the problem. Part of
the programming process is general problem solving. How do you solve a problem
that’s complex, whether it’s designing a computer program or constructing a building? You start at the point where you think it’s too hard to solve, and then you
break it down into smaller pieces.

Id.
218. TURNER, supra note 197, at 77; see also ARON, supra note 196, at 89 (“Another truism is that any problem can be programmed in many ways. The wide variation in programmer productivity that is so evident in classroom situations where all
the students are given the same problem demonstrates the [truth of this] statement.”).
219. See ARON, supra note 196, at 89-94; TURNER, supra note 197, at 77 (“The
quality of a design directly affects the cost to implement and maintain it.”); EDWARD
YOURDON, TECHNIQUES OF PROGRAM STRUCTURE AND DESIGN 6-7 (1975) (discussing
the attributes of a “good” program).
220. In re Waldbaum, 457 F.2d 997, 1003 (C.C.P.A. 1972).
221. See W. DANIEL HILLIS, THE PATTERN ON THE STONE 16-18 (1998). In theory,
the electronic transistors now found in computers could be replaced with hydraulic
valves, chemical reactions, or Tinker Toy switches, and the programs would still run.
See id. at 10.
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phers.222 If programming is a branch of engineering, as it is
now often regarded, it is still engineering of a singularly intangible kind.223 Whereas Coulter characterizes “technology” in
terms of “controlling the forces and materials of nature,”224
[w]hat especially characterizes the programmer is his
withdrawal from nature into the private intellectual world of
the program he is writing. Normally, he thinks neither of the
keyboard at which he is typing nor of the electrons that are
performing the calculations. He concentrates his full attention
on the abstract problem, its representations in the programming language, and the logical design of the machine he is using. In this respect, he resembles the mathematician, the philosopher, the theologian, or indeed the chess master, all of
whom live more or less completely in intellectual worlds of
their own making.225

On the other hand, significant parallels can be drawn between the design of a computer program and the design of a
steam engine or a clock or any of the kinds of physical tools
that were familiar to the Framers. In the words of software designer Gary Kildall, “[A] lot of programming is invention and
engineering. It’s much like a carpenter who has a mental picture of a cabinet he’s trying to build. He has to wrestle with the
design and construction to get it into a physical form. That’s
very much what I do in programming.”226 Like the cabinet
builder, the programmer turns an idea into a useful product.
The builder’s task is to transform physical materials into useful
objects within the constraints imposed by nature; “[t]he pro-

222. See BOLTER, supra note 2, at 167-68 (“Philosophers and mathematicians have
been with us since before Greek times; their abstract labor is familiar. The computer
programmer is remarkable because he is the first technological man whose work is divorced from nature in this way.”).
223.
There is one outstanding difference between software engineering and all
other branches of engineering. Engineers usually deal with material (visible and
tangible) objects. . . . Electrical engineering is the most abstract of the classical engineering fields since electricity is not material, but, through the use of appropriate tools, electricity exhibits characteristics that are both visible and tangible.
Electricity can thus be dealt with as though it were a physical object. Software,
however, is nonmaterial in every sense.

Randall W. Jensen & Charles C. Tonies, Introduction to SOFTWARE ENGINEERING, supra note 200, at 10.
224. See supra text accompanying note 104.
225. BOLTER, supra note 2, at 167.
226. Kildall, supra note 217, at 65.
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grammer’s task is to set logic to work in the world, and to do so
he must mediate between the problem to be solved and the rigorous and curiously unnatural brand of logic by which the computer operates.”227 The programmer and the builder are each
highly skilled,228 and each turns out a product that, at least in
some cases, is practical and valuable.
Kildall argues that programs are “like mechanical devices;
the way one piece of code works with another is very similar to
the way one gear meshes with another gear. Building code is a
little like building a transmission.”229 In fact, logical structures
can often substitute for physical structures and vice versa.
Computer users are familiar with “virtual” substitutes for a
wide variety of useful things—clocks, calendars, notepads,
typewriters, artist’s pallets, and film editors among them. Conversely, Hillis built the logic necessary to play tic-tac-toe out of
Tinker Toys and string. Designers of computerized systems often have a choice as to whether certain functions should be
embodied in a program or “hard wired” as electronic circuitry.230 Consequently, any “useful arts” distinction based on

227. BOLTER, supra note 2, at 168. Programming also seems to provide some of the
aesthetic satisfaction produced by fine craftsmanship; “[a] programmer may polish his
program just as a watchmaker polishes and ornaments his work for display.” Id. at
173. See also FREDERICK P. BROOKS, THE MYTHICAL MAN-MONTH 7-8 (1979).
The programmer, like the poet, works only slightly removed from pure thoughtstuff. He builds his castles in the air, from air, creating by exertion of the imagination. . . . Yet the program construct, unlike the poet’s words, is real in the sense
that it moves and works, producing visible outputs separate from the construct itself. It prints results, draws pictures, produces sounds, moves arms. The magic of
myth and legend has come true in our time. One types the correct incantation on a
keyboard, and a display screen comes to life, showing things that never were nor
could be.

Id.
228.
Like the engineers who build computers, the programmer has the character of a
professional technologist and often works as a member of a team. Good technical
programming for creating new languages, control programs, or programming tools
may require years of training and a mastery of mathematics, if not solid state
physics.

BOLTER, supra note 2, at 166.
229. Kildall, supra note 217, at 59. Kildall states that “[d]ata structures, which
are the foundations of programs, are mechanical by nature.” Id. at 62.
230. See In re Alappat, 33 F.3d 1526, 1583 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (en banc) (Rader, J.,
concurring) (“[T]he line of demarcation between a dedicated circuit and a computer algorithm accomplishing the identical task is frequently blurred and is becoming increasingly so as the technology develops. In this field, a software process is often interchangeable with a hardware circuit.”).
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physicality is disturbingly superficial.231
Some programmers view programming as a “science”; others view it as an “art” or a “craft.”232 Most seem to view programming as a subset of engineering—a discipline that includes elements of art, science, and craft.233 Like other
branches of engineering, programming seems intuitively “technological,” however one may debate the meaning of that term.
It is commonplace now to refer to the “software industry,” and
one can imagine that the Framers would have looked with approval on America’s successes in that industry, both at home
and abroad. It is also an industry that advances by innovation,
and, hence, one potentially benefited by the patent system. If
programming is indeed a branch of engineering and the basis of
a technological industry, perhaps there should be no question
that programming is a “useful art.” Indeed, the courts, which
have become increasingly receptive to software patents,234 seem
to have accepted this conclusion implicitly.
But things are not so simple. As we have seen, the programmer’s task is to reduce a general plan into a specific software implementation. Sometimes the general plan is a “technological” one, such as a plan to refine the analysis of
seismographic data for use in oil and mineral prospecting. In
that case, the programmer’s work spans two arguably “technological” fields—prospecting and programming—and the transition may be difficult to define. In other words, it may be difficult to say where the prospector’s art ends and the
programmer’s begins. Yet because both arts are “technological”
(conceding for the moment that fashioning program logic is a
technological activity), no issue of patentability arises. On the
other hand, sometimes the general plan is not part of a “technological” or “useful art,” at least according to the conservative

231. See generally infra Part IV.C.
232. See Interview with programmer Jaron Lanier, in LAMMERS, supra note 199,
at 295 (“I treat programming more as an art than anything else. . . . [Peter Deutsch]
said programming was a craft. Then there are some people who think of it as mathematics. It just depends on the person.” ).
233. See Interview with programmer Bob Frankston, in LAMMERS, supra note 199,
at 158 (“The term computer science is overused; I’d rather refer to software engineering
or computational engineering or information engineering.”); Interview with Adobe Systems founder John Warnock, in LAMMERS, supra note 199, at 55) (“[Programming is
not science, but] more of an engineering discipline; a very good, fruitful engineering
discipline.”). Software Engineering is also the title of a textbook, see supra note 200.
234. See infra Part IV.A-B.
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definition proposed in Part I.D, supra. The plan might, for example, involve an accounting technique developed for its beneficial tax consequences. Here the transition from accountant’s
plan to software implementation may be significant. If the plan
itself is not patentable because it does not lie within the “useful
arts,” does that mean that the implementation must also be
unpatentable? Or is a software implementation of any plan inherently within the “useful arts”? Or does it depend on how the
programmer characterizes the “invention”? As computerization
deepens its incursions into traditionally “non-technological”
fields, such as business, education, and the fine arts, these
questions will become increasingly important.
In Part IV.C, infra, I suggest an approach for dealing with
these boundary-challenging inventions. First, however, we
must set the stage by reviewing how courts have dealt with
software inventions in general and how courts have dealt with
the patentability of business methods. The latter is important
because many software patents of the most troubling kind arise
in the business context.
II. WRESTLING WITH THE ALGORITHM
The course of software patent jurisprudence has never run
straight and true. For a number of years, the Patent Office and
the courts have struggled with issues of software patentability
and have reversed directions, with or without admitting it, on a
number of occasions. Sometimes the issue is whether the
claimed software invention is too abstract or too much like
mathematics to be patentable, and sometimes it is whether the
invention embraces “mental steps.” Always the problems can be
traced back to a characteristic of software already discussed—
namely, the way in which it straddles the divide between pure
logic and practical machine.
A. The “Mental Steps Doctrine”
The debate over the patenting of “mental steps” began well
before the invention of the modern computer. As long ago as
1907, the Commissioner of Patents, in Ex parte Meinhardt, 235
ruled that a method involving human measurement and calcu-

235. Dec. Comm’r Pat. 237 (1907) (rejecting patent application on a system for
scaling and spacing free-hand letters within an area of given size).
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lation could not be patented, apparently because the method
lacked the physical component of a mechanical or chemical process. The Patent Office Board of Appeals picked up this theme
in the 1940s, in Ex parte Read236 and Ex parte Toth.237 In Read,
the Board denied a patent to a method of determining the
speed of an aircraft, or the distance it had traveled, using a
pair of mechanically-controlled logarithmic scales. Citing
Meinhardt, the Board held that the method claims failed to define “a true method” because they did not “define any true manipulative steps, except the moving of one scale relative to the
other.”238 The act of reading an instrument is “purely a mental
act that cannot be regarded as a true manipulative step.”239 The
Board also rejected a separate claim to the apparatus, but on
grounds of insufficient novelty.240 Similarly, in Toth the Board
denied a patent to a claimed method of determining pressure in
an oil well. The Board held that steps such as “correcting said
indicated pressure” and “determining the well pressure” were
“purely mental” and, therefore, not the steps of a patentable
process.241
These early “mental steps” cases have nothing explicit to
say about the constitutional foundations of the patent system.
They seem to reflect the definition of “process”242 articulated in
Cochrane v. Deener:
A process is a mode of treatment of certain materials to produce a given result. It is an act, or a series of acts, performed
upon the subject-matter to be transformed and reduced to a
different state or thing. If new and useful, it is just as patentable as is a piece of machinery. 243

A mental act does not “transform” any material or reduce it
236. 123 U.S.P.Q. 446 (P.T.O. Bd. App. 1943).
237. 63 U.S.P.Q. 131 (P.T.O. Bd. App. 1944).
238. Read, 123 U.S.P.Q. at 447.
239. Id.
240. See id.
241. 63 U.S.P.Q. at 132.
242. “Process” was then represented in the statutory list of patentable subject
matter by the synonymous “art.” See supra text accompanying note 84.
243. 94 U.S. 780, 788 (1877). Robinson’s treatise on patent law similarly defines
“art” or “process” as “an act or a series of acts performed by some physical agent upon
some physical object, and producing in such object some change either of character or of
condition.” ROBINSON, supra note 139, § 159, at 230. “[T]hough an art embraces so wide
a field of inventive skill, it includes only such operations as are capable of producing
physical effects.” Id. § 166, at 249.
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“to a different state or thing;” hence, it is not a patentable “process” or “art” as defined in Cochrane.244 More recently, it has
been argued that the Cochrane language was not intended to
be definitive or limiting; it was only intended to make clear
that a new process could be patented, regardless of the use of a
new machine.245 Nevertheless, the Cochrane formula has had
continuing relevance in analyzing the patentability of software.246
The Court of Customs and Patent Appeals endorsed the
“mental steps” doctrine in In re Heritage,247 where the claimed
invention concerned the production of coated fiber boards. Although this seems both a physical endeavor and a “useful art,”
the method involved testing various coating densities to determine the optimum balance between the thoroughness of coating and the desired acoustical qualities of the finished board.248
Because coated fiber boards had been manufactured before, the
feature relied upon for novelty was the “mental process of making a selection of the amount of coating material to be used
in . . . accordance with a predetermined system.”249 The court
ruled that “[s]uch purely mental acts [i.e., observation and selection] are not proper subject matter for protection under the
patent statutes.”250
The “mental steps doctrine” may have reached its zenith in

244. See Toth, 63 U.S.P.Q. at 132 (“These acts are purely mental and hence do not
come within the definition of an ‘art . . . .’ ”). A literalist might argue that even mental
acts cause chemical or electrical alterations in the human brain. This observation is not
wholly trivial given the courts’ occasional reliance on the physical or electrical changes
that occur in a computer executing a particular software program. See infra, notes 33536 and accompanying text. On the other hand, it is implausible to regard biochemical
changes in the brain as within the scope of the “useful arts” contemplated by the
Framers—unless such changes are accompanied by some kind of action in the material
world.
245. See, e.g., In re Prater, 415 F.2d 1378, 1387-88 (C.C.P.A.), superceded, 415
F.2d 1393 (C.C.P.A. 1969).
This passage has sometimes been misconstrued as a “rule” or “definition” requiring that all processes, to be patentable, must operate physically upon substances. . . . To deduce such a rule from the statement would be contrary to its intendment which was not to limit process patentability but to point out that a
process is not limited to the means used in performing it.

Id.
246.
247.
248.
249.
250.

See infra notes 280-81 and accompanying text.
150 F.2d 554 (C.C.P.A. 1945).
See id. at 554-55.
Id. at 557.
Id. at 556.
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In re Abrams.251 The applicant’s invention (like the invention in
Musgrave252) concerned a method of petroleum prospecting. Petroleum deposits were detected by pumping down the atmospheric pressure in boreholes drilled for the purpose, then
measuring the time that it took for subsurface gasses to seep
in.253 The claimed method included steps such as “measuring,”
“determining,” and “comparing,” as well as decidedly physical
steps such as “sinking . . . boreholes” and “sealing off . . . said
boreholes.”254 Because the only novel aspect of the method lay
in the “mental steps,” the court affirmed the Patent Office’s rejection of the claim.255 Regarding the rationale for its holding,
the court said simply, “Citation of authority in support of the
principal that claims to mental concepts which constitute the
very substance of an alleged invention are not patentable is
unnecessary. It is self-evident that thought is not patentable.”256
The CCPA eventually curtailed the “mental steps doctrine”
as expressed in Abrams. Significantly, the court’s retreat occurred in the context of claimed methods capable of being performed either by the human mind or by a machine—in other
251. 188 F.2d 165 (C.C.P.A. 1951).
252. See supra text accompanying note 114.
253. See Abrams, 188 F.2d at 165.
254. Id.
255. See id. at 166, 170. The applicant proposed three “rules” for dealing with
claimed methods involving mental steps: (1) if all of the steps of the method are mental
steps, then the method is unpatentable; (2) if the method includes both mental steps
and “positive and physical steps,” but the novelty of the claim lies only in the mental
steps, then the method is unpatentable; (3) if the method includes both mental steps
and “positive and physical steps,” and the novelty lies in those physical steps (the mental steps only limiting or defining the process), then the method is patentable. Id. at
166. The court found that the method claimed in this case fell within Rule 2 and was
unpatentable. See id. at 170. However, it is unclear whether the court adopted the
rules as its own, or whether it merely considered them for the sake of argument. Later
CCPA decisions adopt the latter conclusion. See In re Musgrave, 431 F.2d 882, 893
(C.C.P.A. 1970); In re Prater, 415 F.2d 1378, 1387-88 (C.C.P.A.), superceded, 415 F.2d
1393 (C.C.P.A. 1969). These rules, and the debate surrounding them, prefigure the debate over whether a computerized method involving both mathematical operations and
physical steps, but in which only the former are novel, should be considered invalid as
unpatentable subject matter or for lack of novelty. See infra Part IV.
256. Abrams, 188 F.2d at 168; see also In re Shao Wen Yuan, 188 F.2d 377, 380
(C.C.P.A. 1951) (“This court has deemed it to have been thoroughly established by decisions of various courts that purely mental steps do not form a process which falls
within the scope of patentability as defined by statute.”); Halliburton Oil Well Cementing Co. v. Walker, 146 F.2d 817, 821 (9th Cir. 1944) (“We think these mental steps,
even if novel, are not patentable” (citing Cochrane v. Deener, 94 U.S. 780 (1877) (definition of “art” or “process”))), aff’d, 326 U.S. 969 (1946), modified, 329 U.S. 1 (1946).
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words, a computer. The most significant of these cases, Prater
and Musgrave, have already been discussed.257 In Musgrave
and the first Prater opinion, the court questioned the logical
and precedential foundations of the “mental steps doctrine” and
found them wanting.258 The court held that even methods involving “mental steps” satisfy the demands of patentable subject matter, so long as they fall within the constitutional limits
of the “useful arts” (defined here as “technological arts,” or, in
the first Prater opinion, as “industrial technology”).259
Perhaps the development of the computer compelled a reexamination of the “mental steps doctrine.” Actions such as “calculating” and “determining,” which the Abrams court had
found self-evidently unpatentable, were no longer entirely
within the domain of human thought.260 When such steps can
be performed by machines, there is less reason to regard them
as distinctly different from the physical process steps that have
always been considered patentable. In the second Prater opinion, the court held that the “mental steps doctrine,” if it were
justified at all, did not apply to steps that were to be performed
only by a machine.261 In fact, the court argued that computer
programs ought to be patentable, even when executed by a preexisting general-purpose computer, because a new program, in
effect, creates a new machine:262
No reason is now apparent to us why, based on the Constitution, statute, or case law, apparatus and process claims
broad enough to encompass the operation of a programmed
general-purpose digital computer are necessarily unpatentable. In one sense, a general-purpose computer may be regarded as but a storeroom of parts and/or electrical components. But once a program has been introduced, the general257.
258.
259.
260.

See supra notes 107-19 and accompanying text.
See Prater, 415 F.2d at 1386-89; Musgrave, 431 F.2d at 893.
See supra text accompanying note 112.
See John Halton, The Anatomy of Computing, in THE INFORMATION
TECHNOLOGY REVOLUTION, supra note 2, at 4 (“Now, information can not only be
stored, retrieved, communicated, and broadcast in enormous quantities and at phenomenal speeds; but it can also be rearranged, selected, marshalled, and transformed.
Until recently, these activities were the sole province of the human brain.”).
261. See Prater, 415 F.2d at 1403; see also In re Mahony, 421 F.2d 742, 745-46
(C.C.P.A. 1970); In re Bernhart, 417 F.2d 1395, 1399 (C.C.P.A. 1969). Prater held the
applicant’s Claim 9 indefinite under 35 U.S.C. § 112 because it was intended to apply
only to operations performed by a computer, but in fact it could be read to cover operations performed by a person with pencil and paper. See Prater, 415 F.2d at 1404-05.
262. See infra notes 337-57 and accompanying text.
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purpose digital computer becomes a special-purpose digital
computer (i.e., a specific electrical circuit with or without electro-mechanical components) which, along with the process by
which it operates, may be patented subject, of course, to the
requirements of novelty, utility, and non-obviousness. Based
on the present law, we see no other reasonable conclusion.263

Reading the foregoing in 1969, one might have predicted
that patenting software would become a matter of routine.
However, at the same time the “mental steps doctrine” fell
aside as a significant barrier to software patents, another issue
arose to take its place. That issue was the patentability of
“mathematical algorithms,” and this time the Supreme Court
intervened.
B. The Supreme Court Trilogy
The first case in which the Supreme Court took a hard look
at the patentability of computer software was Gottschalk v.
Benson.264 The invention in Benson concerned a method of converting Binary Coded Decimal (BCD) numbers into pure binary,265 a method useful in computer programming and probably little else.266 The Patent Office rejected the claims as
describing “mental processes” or “mathematical steps.” 267 The
CCPA reversed, once again questioning the validity of the
“mental steps doctrine” and finding, in any case, that the
claims did not cover a process performed by the human mind.268
263. Prater, 415 F.2d at 1403 n.29.
264. 409 U.S. 63 (1972).
265. Binary numbers are numbers expressed in base two, using only the ones and
zeros that can be processed by a computer. See supra text accompanying notes 194-196.
Expressed in binary, the decimal sequence “0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6” is “0000, 0001, 0010,
0011, 0100, 0101, 0110.” In Binary Coded Decimal, or BCD, individual digits in a
multi-digit decimal number are expressed as their binary equivalents. Hence, in BCD
the number 13 would be represented as 0001 0011—the binary equivalent of 1, followed by the binary equivalent of 3. In pure binary, the number 13 would be represented as 1101.
266. See In re Benson, 441 F.2d 682, 688 (C.C.P.A. 1971), rev’d sub nom.
Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63 (1972).
267. Id. at 684.
268. See id. at 686-87. Claim 8 referred to a step performed by a “reentrant shift
register,” thereby excluding any possibility that the method, as claimed, could be performed in a human mind. Id. at 687. Claim 13 included no such reference to apparatus,
but the method still called for some kind of “hardware” implementation—whether a
digital computer, pencil and paper, or red and blue poker chips. Id. at 687-88.
Only in the manual performance would it require the operator even to think and
then only to the extent necessary to assure that he is doing what the claim tells
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The court sidestepped the “mathematical steps” issue, saying
only that the digital computer in which the claimed method
would find its practical application was clearly a “technological” device.269
On appeal, the Supreme Court held the claims unpatentable, observing that the applicant’s claims “were not limited
to any particular art or technology,270 to any particular apparatus or machinery, or to any particular end use.”271 The claims
“cover[ed] any use of the claimed method in a general-purpose
digital computer of any type.”272 The Court characterized the
claimed method as an “algorithm,” a procedure for solving a
mathematical problem.273 The algorithm had been optimized for
a computer by changing the order of steps that a human would
ordinarily use, but the algorithm could be performed with any
computer, or even without a computer.274 Such an algorithm,
the Court held, is akin to an “abstract principle,” a “fundamental truth,” a “phenomenon of nature,” or an “abstract intellectual concept.”275 Such things are the “basic tools of scientific
and technological work.”276 A practical application of such a

him to do. In no case is the exercise of judgment required or even the making of a
decision as between alternatives.

Id. at 688. Cf. In re McNabb, 127 U.S.P.Q. 456, 457-58 (P.T.O. Bd. App. 1959)
Any method or step in a method which can be manually performed and requires
the use of the human eyes for detection or determination of any condition, such as
temperature, pressure, time, etc., and/or the use of the hands for the purpose of
manipulating, such as turning off or on or regulating a given device in a certain
manner or at a certain time, etc., to produce a certain result necessarily involves
the human mind and hence can be classed as a mental step. Such steps, however,
are not purely mental or interpretive mental steps and are not the kind which are
prohibited by the decisions relating to purely mental steps.

Id.
269. Benson, 441 F.2d at 688. See also supra text accompanying note 263.
270. Except, arguably, the art of digital computers. See Benson, 409 U.S. at 64.
271. Benson, 409 U.S. at 64.
272. Id. One could argue that a general-purpose digital computer is a “particular
apparatus or machine.” However, as previously discussed, a general-purpose computer
can be implemented, at least in theory, with anything from electronic circuitry to
Tinker Toys. See supra note 221 and accompanying text.
273. Benson, 409 U.S. at 65. Strictly speaking, the term “algorithm” can be applied
to any procedure described as a sequence of steps. All computer programs are, in this
sense, algorithms. The kind of algorithm to which the court referred is more accurately
called a “mathematical algorithm.” See In re Iwahashi, 888 F.2d 1370, 1374 (Fed. Cir.
1989).
274. See Benson, 409 U.S. at 63.
275. Id. at 67.
276. Id.
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fundamental truth can be patented; the truth itself cannot.277
What concerned the Court, in part, was the preemptive effect of patenting something as general as the applicant’s BCD
conversion algorithm. The method was described in such “abstract and sweeping” terms that it could cover numerous applications of BCD to binary conversion, both known and yet to be
discovered.278 In what has become known as its “nutshell”
summary, the Court explained,
It is conceded that one may not patent an idea. But in
practical effect that would be the result if the formula for converting BCD numerals to pure binary numerals were patented in this case. The mathematical formula involved here
has no substantial practical application except in connection
with a digital computer, which means that if the judgment below is affirmed, the patent would wholly preempt the mathematical formula and in practical effect would be a patent on
the algorithm itself.279

The Court also alluded to the definition of “process” inspired by Cochrane v. Deener:280 “Transformation and reduction
of an article ‘to a different state or thing’ is the clue to the patentability of a process claim that does not include particular
machines.”281
As the CCPA had observed, the Benson algorithm was an
unusually “pure” example of abstract mathematics since the
applicant had not linked the algorithm to any particular technological application, nor to any particular hardware, other

277. “He who discovers a hitherto unknown phenomenon of nature has no claim to
a monopoly of it which the law recognizes. If there is to be invention from such a discovery, it must come from the application of the law of nature to a new and useful end.”
Id. (quoting Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 130 (1948)).
278. Id. at 68. “The end use may (1) vary from the operation of a train to verification of drivers’ licenses to researching the law books for precedents and (2) be performed through any existing machinery or future-devised machinery or without any
apparatus.” Id.
279. Id. at 71-72.
280. See supra notes 243-45 and accompanying text.
281. Benson, 409 U.S. at 70. But a few paragraphs later the Court seems to retract
this statement:
It is argued that a process patent must either be tied to a particular machine
or apparatus or must operate to change articles or materials to a ‘different state or
thing.’ We do not hold that no process patent could ever qualify if it did not meet
the requirements of our prior precedents.

Id. at 71. Ambiguities such as this have made the Benson case a source of lively debate.
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than a general-purpose computer.282 While the Benson case
seemed to close the door on claims to mathematical algorithms
per se, there was still the possibility of patenting a specific
technological application of an algorithm. That was the question presented in the second case of the Supreme Court “trilogy,” Parker v. Flook.283
In Flook, the invention concerned the catalytic conversion of
hydrocarbons.284 During the conversion process, certain parameters such as temperature and pressure must be monitored
to ensure that they do not exceed predetermined “alarm limits”
indicating potentially dangerous conditions. During certain
stages of the process, such as start-up, the “alarm limits” need
to be variable rather than fixed. The applicant claimed a
method of “updating” the alarm limits, consisting of three
stages: an initial stage of measuring the current values of the
relevant parameters (such as temperature), an intermediate
stage of recalculating the correct “alarm limits” using an algorithm, and a final stage of changing the alarm limits to reflect
the results of the calculation.285 The only difference between
the applicant’s method and existing methods lay in the algorithm and the particular formula it used for recalculating the
alarm limits.286 While the computations could be performed by
hand, the application “ma[de] it clear that the formula is primarily useful for computerized calculations producing automatic adjustments in alarm settings.”287 The application included no detailed discussion of the catalytic conversion
process, the monitoring of the process parameters, the selection
of an appropriate margin of safety, or the physical activation of
an alarm.288
The claim at issue in Flook differed in important respects
from the claim at issue in Benson. In Flook, the applicant
claimed an algorithm as applied in the clearly technological
field of hydrocarbon processing. The method also involved the

282. See In re Benson, 441 F.2d 682, 686 (C.C.P.A. 1971) (“The claims in this case
are directed solely to the art of data-processing itself . . . .”), rev’d sub nom. Gottschalk
v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63 (1972).
283. 437 U.S. 584 (1978).
284. See id. at 585.
285. See id.
286. See id.
287. Id. at 586.
288. See id.
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gathering of “real world” data. Hence, the Flook claim was
much less abstract, and arguably less preemptive,289 than the
claim discussed in Benson. Although the Patent Office rejected
Flook’s application, the CCPA reversed, reading Benson as applying only to claims that preempt the use of a mathematical
formula per se.290 The Supreme Court disagreed, explaining
that since the mathematical algorithm was the only novel aspect of the method and since algorithms are unpatentable, the
claim as a whole failed to describe a patentable “invention.”291
The Court also rejected the argument that “post-solution activity,” in the form of changing the alarm limit, distinguished the
case from Benson by adding a critical element of practical application:
The notion that post-solution activity, no matter how conventional or obvious in itself, can transform an unpatentable
principle into a patentable process exalts form over substance.
A competent draftsman could attach some form of postsolution activity to almost any mathematical formula; the Pythagorean theorem would not have been patentable, or partially patentable, because a patent application contained a final step indicating that the formula, when solved, could be
usefully applied to existing survey techniques.292

The last case in the trilogy, Diamond v. Diehr,293 involved
facts curiously similar to those in Flook. Diehr’s invention concerned a process for molding and curing rubber.294 In order to
289.
The patent claims cover any use of respondent’s formula for updating the
value of an alarm limit on any process variable involved in a process comprising
the catalytic chemical conversion of hydrocarbons. Since there are numerous processes of that kind in the petrochemical and oil-refining industries, the claims cover
a broad range of potential uses of the method. They do not, however, cover every
conceivable application of the formula.

Id.
290. See In re Flook, 559 F.2d 21, 23 (C.C.P.A. 1977), rev’d sub nom. Parker v.
Flook, 437 U.S. 584 (1978).
291. See 437 U.S. at 594. Using a somewhat confusing analytical tool, the court
treated the algorithm “as though it were a familiar part of the prior art,” although this
was not actually the case. “Whether the algorithm was in fact known or unknown at
the time of the claimed invention, as one of the ‘basic tools of scientific and technological work,’ it is treated as though it were a familiar part of the prior art.” Id. at 591-92
(citation omitted) (quoting Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972)); see 437 U.S.
at 594.
292. Id. at 590.
293. 450 U.S. 175 (1981).
294. See id. at 177.
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obtain a “perfect cure,” a molding press must be opened at a
specific time. That time can be calculated using the well-known
Arrhenius equation, which takes into account factors like temperature and pressure.295 Diehr’s contribution was to provide a
means for repeatedly measuring the temperature inside of the
press and, using that data and the Arrhenius equation, to continually update the time remaining before the press should be
opened.296 As in Flook, this updating process was performed by
a computer.297 When the computer determined that the ideal
cure time had arrived, it signaled a device to open the press
automatically.298
In Benson and Flook, the Court reacted cautiously to the
expansion of patent protection into new areas, at least without
a specific congressional mandate;299 in Diehr the Court adopted
a far more liberal attitude, in the spirit of Chakrabarty.300 Patentable subject matter, the Court reminded us, was meant to
“include anything under the sun that is made by man.”301 Rubber curing is a § 101 “process,” even under a definition that requires the “transformation” of a material thing, and rubber curing is an “industrial process[]” of the kind historically eligible
for patent protection.302 The inclusion of a mathematical equation and digital computer as a part of that process does not
make the process, considered as a whole, unpatentable subject
matter.303 The problem in Flook, the Court explained, was that
the claimed invention described only the calculation of a number; there was no disclosure in the application relating to the
catalytic conversion process as a whole.304 Here, however, “respondents . . . do not seek to patent a mathematical formula.
Instead, they seek patent protection for a process of curing syn-

295. See id. at 177-78.
296. See id. at 178.
297. See id.
298. See id. at 179.
299. See Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 72-73 (1972); Parker v. Flook, 437
U.S. 584, 595-96 (1978).
300. See supra note 172 and accompanying text.
301. Diehr, 450 U.S. at 182 (quoting S. REP. NO. 82-1979, at 5 (1952); H.R. REP.
NO. 82-1423, at 6 (1952)). However, not every discovery is patentable subject matter.
“Excluded from such patent protection are laws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas.” Id. at 185.
302. Id. at 184.
303. See id. at 185.
304. See id. at 186.
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thetic rubber.”305 The claim would not preempt all uses of the
formula—only use of the formula in a specific industrial context.306 In an apparent contradiction of the analysis adopted in
Flook, the Court in Diehr held it to be “inappropriate to dissect
the claims into old and new elements and then to ignore the
presence of the old elements in the analysis.”307 “The ‘novelty’ of
any element or steps in a process, or even of the process itself,
is of no relevance in determining whether the subject matter of
a claim falls within the § 101 categories of possibly patentable
subject matter.”308 Four dissenting justices argued that the “invention” was not a method of curing rubber (a technique already known), but an unpatentable method of calculating the
time to open the press.309
Flook and Diehr are difficult to reconcile.310 Diehr suggests
that the only fault in Flook’s claim was a failure to include
more references to the conventional process of catalytic hydrocarbon conversion. Yet it seemed that far more was at stake in
Flook than such a minor lapse in the claim-drafter’s art. Given
the tensions between Benson, Flook, and Diehr and the contradictory statements found even within the same opinion, it is
not surprising that the post-trilogy handling of software patents has been less than straightforward. An exhaustive discussion of the “algorithm” question dealt with in the trilogy is beyond the scope of this work. However, with respect to the
“useful arts” question, it is significant that the Supreme
Court’s acceptance of computer-related inventions depended

305. Id. at 187.
306. See id. However, the Court still said that “[a] mathematical formula as such
is not accorded the protection of our patent laws, . . . and this principle cannot be circumvented by attempting to limit the use of the formula to a particular technological
environment.” Id. at 191 (citation omitted). Moreover, “insignificant postsolution activity [as seen in Flook] will not transform an unpatentable principle into a patentable
process.” Id. at 191-92.
307. Id. at 188.
308. Id. at 188-89.
309. Id. at 205-09.
What they claim to have discovered, in essence, is a method of updating the original estimated curing time by repetitively recalculating that time pursuant to a
well-known mathematical formula in response to variations in temperature within
the mold. Their method of updating the curing time calculation is strikingly reminiscent of the method of updating alarm limits that Dale Flook sought to patent.

Id. at 209 (emphasis added).
310. This is true in spite of the Court’s insistence that “[o]ur reasoning in Flook is
in no way inconsistent with our reasoning here.” Id. at 192 n.14.
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upon the association of the computer program “algorithm” with
an application in a traditional industrial art, such as rubber
manufacturing. When the program “algorithm” was claimed on
its own, as in Benson, the Court rejected the claim as too abstract, or too much a mathematical “principle.” The Court did
not treat the program as the practical application of a mathematical principle in the “useful art” of computer programming.
Had the Court adopted such an approach, we might have arrived at nearly where we are today on the issue of software
patentability and by a much less circuitous route.
C. Software Patents in the Federal Circuit
After Diehr, the leading voice on the patentability of software has been that of the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, the successor of the CCPA. The Federal Circuit decisions
are, in some respects, as difficult to reconcile as those of the
Supreme Court. A few of the former will be discussed here for
the light they shed on the “useful arts” inquiry and to illustrate
how far we have progressed toward the complete acceptance of
software as patentable subject matter.
In In re Grams,311 the court reaffirmed the Benson principle
that a mathematical algorithm, as such, cannot be patented.
The claimed invention in Grams was rather abstract; it concerned a method of diagnosing an abnormal condition in a patient by measuring certain parameters through laboratory tests
and comparing the results to standard values in a way that detects significant deviations.312 The analysis relied on what the
court termed a “mathematical algorithm,”313 realized through a
computer program. The “critical question” to be answered by
the court was “What did [the] applicants invent?”314 The court
held that what they had invented was just an algorithm—a
conclusion bolstered by the content of the specification.
The sole physical process step in Grams’ [sic] claim 1 is . . .
performing clinical tests on individuals to obtain data. The
specification does not bulge with disclosure on those tests. To

311. 888 F.2d 835 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
312. See id. at 836-37.
313. Id. at 837. The procedure described in the claim did not look “mathematical”
since it did not include any equations. See id. at 837 n.1. However, the applicants did
not dispute the presence of a “mathematical algorithm.” Id. at 837.
314. Id. at 839.
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the contrary, it focuses on the algorithm itself . . . . From the
specification and the claim, it is clear to us that applicants
are, in essence, claiming the mathematical algorithm, which
they cannot do under Gottschalk v. Benson.315

Grams differed from Benson in at least one respect: the
claim in Grams included the physical step of performing a “plurality of clinical laboratory tests on the individual.”316 Hence,
one could argue, in light of Diehr, that the invention as a whole
was really a statutory process (conducting laboratory tests) improved by the addition of a computer-implemented algorithm.
The court held, however, that merely adding a “data gathering”
step to an algorithm does not make the latter patentable subject matter.317 “No mathematical equation can be used, as a
practical matter, without establishing and substituting values
for the variables expressed therein.”318
In another case involving medical diagnosis, Arrhythmia
Research Technology, Inc. v. Corazonix Corp.,319 the Federal
Circuit reached a contrary result. The invention in Arrhythmia
concerned the analysis of electrocardiographic signals in order
to predict a potentially dangerous heart condition.320 In the
claimed method, the signals were digitized and filtered, and
certain characteristics of the signal were then compared to a
standard value.321 The computer performing the analysis could
be a programmed general-purpose computer, a special-purpose
computer, or “hard wired logic circuitry.”322 While most algorithm patentability cases stem from a Patent Office rejection,
in this case an accused infringer raised the challenge. The district court granted summary judgment, finding that the claims
failed to recite patentable subject matter under 35 U.S.C. §
101.323
315. Id. at 840. Cf. In re Iwahashi, 888 F.2d 1370, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (upholding claim to “a combination of interrelated means” (computer circuitry) configured to
execute an algorithm).
316. Grams, 888 F.2d at 836.
317. See id. at 839-40; see also In re Warmerdam, 33 F.3d 1354, 1360 (Fed. Cir.
1994).
318. Grams, 888 F.2d at 839 (quoting In re Sarkar, 588 F.2d 1330, 1335 (C.C.P.A.
1978)).
319. 958 F.2d 1053 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
320. See id. at 1055.
321. See id.
322. Id.
323. See id. at 1054.

DUR-FIN.DOC

4/5/00 7:27 AM

1480 BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [1999
On appeal, the Federal Circuit reviewed the history of software patentability cases, including the so-called “FreemanWalter-Abele test”324 developed by the CCPA in response to the
holdings of the Supreme Court trilogy. As summarized by the
court:
It is first determined whether a mathematical algorithm is
recited directly or indirectly in the claim. If so, it is next determined whether the claimed invention as a whole is no
more than the algorithm itself; that is, whether the claim is
directed to a mathematical algorithm that is not applied to or
limited by physical elements or process steps. Such claims are
nonstatutory. However, when the mathematical algorithm is
applied in one or more steps of an otherwise statutory process
claim, or one or more elements of an otherwise statutory apparatus claim, the requirements of section 101 are met.325

The court assumed that a mathematical algorithm formed a
part of the claimed process and proceeded to the second step of
analysis—whether the process was “otherwise statutory.”326
The challenger argued that the process merely calculated a
number, much like the process claimed in Flook,327 but the
court found the process more analogous to that discussed in
Diehr.328 The answer to the question “What did the applicant
invent?” was, in this case, not “an algorithm” but “a method of
analyzing electrocardiographic signals.”329 The signals were
“not abstractions” because they “related to the patient’s heart
function.”330 Similarly, the “output [was] not an abstract number, but . . . a signal related to the patient’s heart activity.”331
The claim did not preempt all uses of the algorithm, but only
its use in connection with a specific diagnostic procedure.332
The data analyzed by the claimed method was not an ab324. Named after In re Freeman, 573 F.2d 1237 (C.C.P.A. 1978), In re Walter, 618
F.2d 758 (C.C.P.A. 1980), and In re Abele, 684 F.2d 902 (C.C.P.A. 1982).
325. See Arrhythmia, 958 F.2d at 1058. However, the court cautions that the
Freeman-Walter-Abele test is not the only test of patentability, and, while it apparently
describes a “safe harbor” for challenged claims, “failure to meet [the] test may not always defeat the claim.” Id.
326. Id. at 1058-59.
327. See id. at 1060.
328. See id. at 1059.
329. Id.
330. Id.
331. Id.
332. See id.
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straction, but neither was the data analyzed in Flook or Grams.
Although the algorithm in Arrhythmia could be described as
only part of a larger process, the same could have been said in
Flook and, perhaps, in the more abstract context of Grams. The
different result reached in Arrhythmia may be explained, at
least in part, by an increased emphasis on the physical aspects
of data processing. The steps of the algorithm, observed the
court, are “physical process steps that transform one physical,
electrical signal into another.”333 The apparatus claims described “a combination of interrelated means” for performing
the steps required by the process, including electronic devices
like an analog-to-digital converter, a disc memory unit, and a
programmed computer.334 This hardware “transform[s] a particular input signal to a different output signal, in accordance
with the internal structure of the computer as configured by
electronic instructions. ‘The claimed invention . . . converts one
physical thing into another physical thing just as any other
electrical circuitry would do.’ ”335 The mathematical algorithm
served to define the “electronic structure and operation of [the]
apparatus.”336
This focus on the physical aspects of computing continued
in In re Alappat.337 Alappat had invented a way of smoothing
the appearance of lines on an oscilloscope display by illuminating selected picture elements at varying intensities.338 A software algorithm determined the best way to display a particular
line.339 Alappat did not claim the algorithm directly. Instead,
his Claim 15 refers to a “rasterizer” (a component of certain
displays) that includes “means” for performing various functions required by the algorithm. Such “means-plus-function”
claim drafting is permitted by 35 U.S.C. § 112(6),340 and a

333. Id. Moreover, “[t]he view that ‘there is nothing necessarily physical about
‘signals’ is incorrect.” Id.
334. Id. at 1060 (quoting In re Iwahashi, 888 F.2d 1370, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 1989)).
335. Arrhythmia, 958 F.2d at 1060 (quoting In re Sherwood, 613 F.2d 809, 819
(C.C.P.A. 1980)).
336. Arrhythmia, 958 F.2d at 1060.
337. 33 F.3d 1526 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (en banc).
338. See id. at 1537-38. When a display consists of a grid of picture elements in
rows and columns, curved or diagonal lines appear “jagged.” Alappat’s “anti-aliasing”
technique adds, in effect, “shades of gray” to produce fuzzier but smoother-looking
lines. Id.
339. See id.
340.
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“means-plus-function” claim is construed to cover any apparatus that performs the recited functions using structures identical or equivalent to the structures described in the patent
specification.341 The “structures” described in Alappat’s specification included conventional computer circuitry, such as an
“arithmetic logic circuit,” “barrel shifters,” and a ROM (Read
Only Memory).342 The Patent Office rejected Alappat’s claim as
essentially an unpatentable process claim,343 observing that
Claim 15 could be read to cover any general-purpose computer
(such as the one on which this article was composed), so long as
it was programmed to carry out Alappat’s procedure.344 All that
Alappat had invented was a mathematical algorithm.345
The majority of the Federal Circuit’s en banc panel disagreed, holding that the structures described by Alappat, when
combined and configured to carry out the steps of the algoAn element in a claim for a combination may be expressed as a means or step for
performing a specified function without the recital of structure, material, or acts in
support thereof, and such claim shall be construed to cover the corresponding
structure, material or acts described in the specification and equivalents thereof.

35 U.S.C. § 112(6) (1994). This provision relieves the patent applicant of the burden of
listing each and every structure that might serve as an element of an equivalent combination.
341. See King Instruments Corp. v. Perego, 65 F.3d 941, 945-46 (Fed. Cir. 1995);
Pennwalt Corp. v. Durand-Wayland, Inc., 833 F.2d 931, 934 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (en banc).
The patent “specification” includes “a written description of the invention, and of the
manner and process of making and using it.” 35 U.S.C. § 112 ¶ 1 (1994). It must “enable any person skilled in the art to which it pertains, or with which it is most nearly
connected, to make and use the same, and shall set forth the best mode contemplated
by the inventor of carrying out his invention.” Id.
342. Alappat, 33 F.3d at 1541.
343. See In re Alappat, 23 U.S.P.Q.2d 1340, 1344-45 (PTO Bd. Pat. Ap. & Int.
1992), rev’d, 33 F.3d 1526 (Fed. Cir. 1994). The Patent Office routinely ignored the limiting effect of § 112(6) and treated such claims as covering all structures that perform
the recited functions, rather than only structures equivalent to those disclosed in the
specification. The Federal Circuit finally put a stop to this practice. See In re Donaldson, 16 F.3d 1189, 1193 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (en banc). But cf., In re Freeman, 573 F.2d
1237, 1247 (C.C.P.A. 1978).
Though a claim expressed in ‘means for’ (functional) terms is said to be an
apparatus claim, the subject matter as a whole of that claim may be indistinguishable from that of a method claim drawn to the steps performed by the ‘means.’ . . .
[I]f allowance of a method claim is proscribed by Benson, it would be anomalous to
grant a claim to apparatus encompassing any and every ‘means for’ practicing that
very method.

Id.
344. See 23 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1345. “The disclosed ALU, ROM and shift registers are
all common elements of stored program digital computers.” Id.
345. See id. at 1346; see also In re Alappat, 33 F.3d 1526, 1565 (Fed. Cir. 1994)
(Archer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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rithm, formed a patentable “machine.”346 Even though the
structures could be found in existing general-purpose computers, the programming could not be ignored: “[S]uch programming creates a new machine, because a general purpose
computer in effect becomes a special purpose computer once it
is programmed to perform particular functions pursuant to instructions from program software.”347 Importantly, Alappat’s
invention was “not a disembodied mathematical concept which
may be characterized as an ‘abstract idea,’ but rather a specific
machine to produce a useful, concrete, and tangible result”348—
i.e., an improved oscilloscope display.
The Alappat case resulted in six additional opinions, in
which various combinations of judges concurred in, or dissented from, all or a portion of the majority’s opinion. Judge
Archer, who concurred in part349 and dissented in part, compared Alappat’s “new machine” to a compact disc player playing newly recorded music:
Music of course is not patentable subject matter; a composer
cannot obtain exclusive patent rights for the original creation
of a musical composition. But now suppose the new melody is
recorded on a compact disc. In such case, the particular musical composition will define an arrangement of minute pits in
the surface of the compact disc material, and therefore will
define its specific structure. . . .
Through the expedient of putting his music on known
structure, can a composer now claim as his invention the
structure of a compact disc . . . and obtain a patent therefor?
The answer must be no. The composer admittedly has invented or discovered nothing but music. The discovery of music does not become patentable subject matter simply because
there is an arbitrary claim to some structure.350

Similarly, Alappat’s superficial claim to “structure” did not
reflect the nature of his invention, which was nothing more
346. Alappat, 33 F.3d at 1541 (“Claim 15 unquestionably recites a machine, or apparatus, made up of a combination of known electronic circuitry elements . . . .”). “Machine” is one of the categories of patentable subject matter listed in 35 U.S.C. § 101. See
35 U.S.C. § 101 (1994).
347. Alappat, 33 F.3d at 1545 (emphasis added).
348. Id. at 1544.
349. The concurrence related to a jurisdictional issue. See id. at 1545 (Archer, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
350. Id. at 1553-54 (Archer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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than a mathematical procedure for converting one set of data to
another.351 His computer, argued Judge Archer, was no more a
“new machine” than a player piano that had switched from
playing Chopin to Brahms.352 “What is going on here,” he said,
“is a charade.”353
Judge Rader agreed that the majority had overemphasized
the status of the invention as a “machine,” but, unlike Judge
Archer, he concurred in the result.354 Even if Alappat’s invention were viewed as a process, it would be a patentable process
in Judge Rader’s view. The process may have been claimed in
terms of a mathematical algorithm, but it was still a “useful
art,” not an abstraction of the kind condemned in Benson and
Flook.355
The limits on patentable subject matter within section 101
do not depend on whether an invention can be expressed as a
mathematical relationship or algorithm. Mathematics is simply a form of expression—a language. . . .
. . . [I]nventors may express their inventions in any manner they see fit, including mathematical symbols and algorithms. Whether an inventor calls the invention a machine or
a process is not nearly as important as the invention itself.356

Judge Newman also concurred, in an opinion emphasizing
the importance of robust patent protection in developing fields
of technology.357
The Alappat decision, however controversial, marked an
important milestone in the post-Benson expansion of software
patent protection. The sharp disagreement among the judges of
the Federal Circuit shows how little had been settled by the
351. See id. at 1563-64. “Alappat’s claimed invention . . . is not the invention or
discovery of a machine. The presence of structure on the face of the claims does not ipso
facto make the claimed invention or discovery one of statutory subject matter.” Id. at
1561. “The majority’s simplistic approach of looking only to whether the claim reads on
structure and ignoring the claimed invention or discovery for which a patent is sought
will result in the awarding of patents for discoveries well beyond the scope of the patent law.” Id. at 1554.
352. See id. at 1567.
353. Id. at 1564.
354. See id. at 1581 (Rader, J., concurring).
355. See id. at 1583. Citing Article 1, Section 8 of the Constitution, Judge Rader
stated that the Patent Office “has no justification within the Patent Act to ignore algorithmic processes or machines as ‘useful Arts’ within the scope of section 101.” Id.
356. Id.
357. See id. at 1570-71 (Newman, J., concurring).
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Supreme Court trilogy and the cases that followed. Whatever
its failings, Alappat established a reasonably bright line between unpatentable algorithms and patentable applications.
All the applicant must do under Alappat is draft the claims in
terms of the physical hardware that performs the steps of the
algorithm, and the result will be a “new machine.” This may
seem an extreme reading of Alappat, which does include some
qualifying language,358 but it is born out in at least two subsequent cases. In In re Warmerdam,359 the Federal Circuit held
unpatentable a method claim on constructing a “bubble hierarchy” defining the space around an object.360 With respect to the
apparatus claim, the court held that “[c]laim 5 is for a machine,
and is clearly patentable subject matter.”361 Yet the apparatus
claim said merely, “A machine having a memory which contains data representing a bubble hierarchy generated by the
method of any of [unpatentable] Claims 1 through 4.”362 In In re
Trovato,363 the Federal Circuit initially rejected an apparatus
claim consisting of various “means” for computing a “least cost
path” in an abstract “space” representing certain variables.364
Because of the lack of disclosure of any physical apparatus, the
court found the apparatus claim to be merely a “guise” for an
unpatentable algorithm claim.365 However, the Federal Circuit
en banc, in a per curiam opinion,366 granted the applicant a re-

358. The majority suggests, obliquely and without explanation, that a claim to a
structure might be rejected if it were merely a “guise” for an abstract mathematical
process. See Alappat, 33 F.3d at 1540-41. Judge Archer seized on this suggestion as a
potential opening for the kind of analysis he favored, but criticized the majority for its
failure to elaborate. See id. at 1568 n.30 (Archer, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part).
359. 33 F.3d 1354 (Fed. Cir. 1994). Although Warmerdam appears before Alappat
in the Federal Reporter, it bears a decision date of August 11, 1994, subsequent to
Alappat’s date of July 29, 1994. The Warmerdam opinion makes explicit reference to
Alappat. See id. at 1358.
360. See id. at 1355-56. “Bubble hierarchies” are used in applications such as
automatic collision avoidance for industrial robots, but, significantly, the challenged
claim did not recite any such specific, technological use. See id. at 1355-58.
361. Id. at 1360.
362. Id. at 1358.
363. 42 F.3d 1376 (Fed. Cir. 1994), vacated and remanded, 60 F.3d 807 (Fed. Cir.
1995) (en banc).
364. Trovato, 42 F.3d at 1377-78, 1383.
365. See id. at 1382-83. “[A]ll the disclosed means are simply software instructions; no ‘structure’ appears in the specification as required under § 112, ¶ 6.” Id. at
1382.
366. See Trovato, 60 F.3d at 807.
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hearing, vacated the earlier opinion, and remanded (sua
sponte) for further consideration in light of Alappat and the
Patent Office’s Proposed Examination Guidelines for ComputerImplemented Inventions367 (hereinafter, the “Guidelines”). This
procedure was unorthodox since the Guidelines do not have the
force of law and Alappat had been mentioned and distinguished
in the prior opinion.368 The purpose seems to have been to preserve the sense of certainty created by Alappat.
The Patent Office blazed its own new path in the Guidelines. For years the Patent Office had taken a relatively hard
line on the patentability of software inventions, and its rejections were often reversed by the CCPA or the Federal Circuit.369 The Guidelines signaled a change in policy, seen most
dramatically in the treatment of software inventions claimed
as the physical medium (such as a floppy disk or ROM) on
which the software is stored.370 In this context, the Guidelines
distinguish between “functional descriptive material” and “nonfunctional descriptive material.” 371 The former “consists of data
structures and computer programs which impart functionality
[i.e., which cause a computer to do something] when encoded
on a computer-readable medium.”372 Such material is “structurally and functionally interrelated to the medium” on which
it is stored, and it will be considered statutory in most cases.373
“Non-functional descriptive material” includes “music, literary

367. Examination Guidelines for Computer Related Inventions, 61 Fed. Reg. 7478
(1996), reprinted in 17 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 311 (1998) [hereinafter Guidelines]. See
Trovato, 60 F.3d at 807.
368. This was pointed out in a strongly worded dissent by two of the three panelists who took part in the original Trovato decision. See Trovato, 60 F.3d.at 808 (Nies &
Michel, JJ., dissenting).
369. See, e.g., the cases discussed supra at Part II.A-B.
370. A floppy disk, as a physical object, may be claimed as a “manufacture” under
§ 101, and a floppy disk on which a new program has been recorded is, in a minute
sense, physically different than other floppy disks due to the unique alignment of the
magnetic particles that store the information. The Federal Circuit missed a chance to
rule on the patentability of floppy disk/program claims in In re Beauregard, 53 F.3d
1583 (Fed. Cir. 1995). The Patent Office Board rejected a floppy disk claim as violative
of the printed matter doctrine, discussed infra at note 403 and accompanying text, but
changed its mind before the Federal Circuit could rule. Beauregard, 53 F.3d at 1584
(“The Commissioner now states ‘that computer programs embodied in a tangible medium, such as floppy diskettes, are patentable subject matter under 35 U.S.C. §
101 . . . .’ ”). Since there was no longer a controversy, the case was dismissed.
371. Guidelines, supra note 367, § 2106(IV)(B)(1).
372. Id.
373. Id.
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works and . . . compilation[s] or mere arrangement[s] of data”
that may be recorded on a medium such a floppy disk, but that
are not “functional” in the same sense.374 The latter cannot be
patented.375 These Guidelines take the Alappat “new machine”
concept even further into the realm of software; this means, in
effect, that any “functional” software is likely to be treated as
patentable subject matter if the claim is properly drafted.
After Benson and Flook, the subject-matter door to software
patentability seemed firmly shut; now it opens wide. But because the “mathematical algorithm” issue no longer bars most
software patents, there must be a renewed focus on any limits
still imposed by the “useful arts” stricture of the Constitution.
The analysis of the former issue lends some insights into the
latter. For example, an emphasis on physical hardware, storage
media, and “electrical signals” may be as relevant to identifying
“technology” as to distinguishing between an abstract principle
and a concrete application. Before undertaking that analysis,
however, we must add a final piece to the puzzle. Many of the
newer software patent applications concern innovations in
business, a field that is not a “useful art” as defined supra in
Part I.D. Hence, it is worth reviewing briefly the treatment of
business methods, and tools for doing business, as patentable
subject matter.
III. PATENTING BUSINESS
Courts were considering the patentability of business systems long before the dawn of the “information age.” Such systems were often claimed in terms of the printed documents by
which they were implemented. In Hotel Security Checking Co.
v. Lorraine Co.,376 the plaintiff’s patent claimed a “method of

374. Id. Distinguishing between what is “functional” and “nonfunctional” may
prove difficult. For example, is software that plays a predetermined melody “nonfunctional” like a compact disk? What if the software generates its own melodies using
an algorithm? Moreover, the line between program and data is not always crystal clear.
One of the characteristics of the standard von Neumann computer architecture is the
common treatment of instructions and data. See BOLTER, supra note 2, at 39
The genius of the von Neumann machine is that the program (operating instructions) and the data are stored in the same binary code and loaded together into the
memory, and this coding means that the program can be altered as easily as the
data, indeed, that there is no logical difference between the two.

Id.
375. Guidelines, supra note 367, § 2106(IV)(B)(1).
376. 160 F. 467 (2d Cir. 1908).
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and means for” preventing theft by restaurant waiters.377
Numbered slips kept track of the orders filled by each waiter
for comparison to the cash receipts at the end of the day; any
waiter who pocketed a customer’s payment would be discovered.378 The claims referred in a general way to the composition
of the printed forms and the manner in which they were to be
used.379 The court observed that the system was “not a machine, manufacture, or composition of matter”; at best, it was
an “art.”380 Yet the term “art” did not embrace a “mere abstraction,” which a “system of transacting business” would be if “disconnected from the means for carrying [it] out.”381 The physical
“means” in this case consisted of printed forms, pen and ink,
which the court held insufficient to support patentability.
Apart from the manner of their use, they were not new.382 As to
their use, the court wrote, “[t]he fundamental principle of the
system is as old as the art of bookkeeping.”383 Unfortunately,
the court’s reliance on novelty rendered moot the more interesting subject matter issue: Was the claimed system a patentable
“means” or an unpatentable “abstraction?”384
In Cincinnati Traction Co. v. Pope,385 the invention concerned time-limited transfer tickets for railways and the like.
The claims described a perforated ticket, a portion of which
could be torn off if the ticket were issued in the morning. This
prevented a passenger with a morning ticket from using it to
377. Id.
378. See id. at 467-68.
379. See id. at 468-69.
380. Id. at 469. On the meaning of “art” as a category of patentable subject matter,
see supra Part I.B.
381. 160 F. at 469.
382. See id.
383. Id.
384.
If at the time of Hick’s application, there had been no system of bookkeeping
of any kind in restaurants, we would be confronted with the question whether a
new and useful system of cash-registering and account-checking is such an art as
is patentable under the statute. This question seems never to have been decided by
a controlling authority and its decision is not necessary now unless we find that
Hicks has made a contribution to the art which is new and useful. We are decidedly of the opinion that he has not . . . .

Id. at 472. See also United States Credit Sys. Co. v. American Credit Indem. Co., 59 F.
139 (2d Cir. 1893) (finding nothing novel in printed forms to be used by insurer in classifying risks, but failing to reach the issue of whether the patentee’s business method
could be patentable subject matter).
385. 210 F. 443 (6th Cir. 1913).
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transfer in the afternoon.386 The defendant argued that the
patent claimed only “a method of transacting business, a form
of contract, a mode of procedure, a rule of conduct, a principle
or idea, or a permissive function, predicated upon a thing involving no structural law.”387 Although considering it a close
question, the court disagreed, finding the ticket a “manufacture”388 because of its physical structure.389 Other cases involving coupon books and similar printed items reached the same
result. For example, in Rand, McNally & Co. v. Exchange
Scrip-Book Co.,390 the patent involved transportation tickets issued in increments of money instead of miles, which allowed
the same tickets to be conveniently used for different modes of
transportation.391 The ticket itself consisted of a ribbon or strip
of perforated paper folded into a book.392 The court rejected the
argument that the claim was for nothing more than a business
method:
The ticket patented is not a method at all, but a physical tangible facility, without which the method would have been impracticable, and with which it is practicable. And this is the
status of thousands of like facilities that, once designed and
put into use, have become the first of a new business method;
and patents on such facilities have been sustained.393

On the other hand, in In re Moeser,394 the Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia held that the Patent Office properly rejected claims to a type of insurance contract involving
payments for burial. Although the contracts would be printed
on paper, the court found “no physical construction or combina-

386. See id. at 444-46.
387. Id. at 446 (citation omitted).
388. “The term ‘manufacture,’ as used in the patent law, has a very comprehensive
sense, embracing whatever is made by the art or industry of man, not being a machine,
a composition of matter, or a design.” Id. (citation omitted).
389. See id.
390. 187 F. 984 (7th Cir. 1911); see also Thompson v. Citizens’ Nat’l Bank, 53 F.
250, 255 (8th Cir. 1892) (holding bank books with perforated and foldable pages to constitute patentable subject matter); Benjamin Menu Card Co. v. Rand, McNally & Co.,
210 F. 285, 286 (N.D. Ill. 1894) (holding a perforated combination of menu card and
meal check to be patentable subject matter; “[t]he fact that the structure may be of
cardboard with printed matter upon it does not exclude the device from patentability.”).
391. See 187 F. at 984-85.
392. See id. at 986.
393. Id.
394. 123 U.S. Pat. Off. Official Gazette 655 (D.C. Cir. 1906).

DUR-FIN.DOC

4/5/00 7:27 AM

1490 BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [1999
tion that can convert it from a mere contract into a tangible device or manufacture.”395 Moreover, “[t]he form of such contracts
or proposals for contracts, devised or adopted as a method of
transacting a particular class of this business, is not patentable
as an art.”396
In Guthrie v. Curlett,397 the patent claimed a “consolidated
tariff index,” which combined tariff information for a number of
railroads into one convenient source and conveyed the information by a system of symbols.398 The court held that the invention was not a “manufacture” but an “art,” and not the kind of
art protected under the patent laws.399 Patent law, said the
court, is “prosaically practical” and allows only protection of the
means for carrying out an idea.400 One can monopolize a business system only by patenting such means.401
In this case, however, no means are suggested for making a
consolidated index, except the employment of symbols. There
was a time, say that of Cadmus, when the alphabet was patentable; but we decline to see anything now patentable in
suggesting that a railway be called A or canned goods C.
The patentee may and does call what he produces a manufacture, to wit, a book of so many leaves and a given amount
of print thereon; but the question is not what an interested
party calls it, but what is it, and we consider the only possibly
novel part of it, what might be called the plot of the work—
i.e., the story revealed, and that can be copyrighted, but not
patented.402

These cases come to different conclusions, but they ask the
same question: Is the invention an abstract idea about doing
business, or is it a tangible means, equivalent to a time clock or

395. Id. at 656.
396. Id. The court also held that if the contracts were patentable subject matter,
the patent could still be denied for lack of novelty. See id.
397. 10 F.2d 725 (2d Cir. 1926).
398. Id. at 725-26.
399. Id. at 726.
400. Id.
401. See id.
402. Id. at 726-27. The court distinguished Cincinnati Traction, see supra text accompanying notes 385-89, observing that “a ticket is a form, made once and used any
time; it may truthfully be called a physical facility, as much so [as] the punch that cancels it.” Id. at 727. The index, however, must repeatedly change since the only constant
is the method of compiling it. See id.
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a cash register, which is patentable subject matter even if it
happens to be used in business.403
The Patent Office Board maintained a similar distinction in
In re Murray,404 where the applicant claimed an accounting
method. The steps of the method included “entering” data and
“sorting,” “correlating,” and “sub-totaling” expenditures,405 giving it the character of an unpatentable “mathematical algorithm.”406 But the Board also held the claims unpatentable as a
“method of doing business”:
Considering the claimed method as a whole, it becomes apparent that appellant is seeking patent protection on a
method of conducting business, or providing a banking service, between a financial institution and its customers . . . .
While it may in some situations be problematic to ascertain what falls within the penumbra of the judicially
pr[o]scribed “method of doing business,” we find no such difficulty in the present case. We are convinced that the claimed
accounting method . . . is, on its very face, a vivid example of
the type of “method of doing business” contemplated by our
review court as outside the protection of the patent statutes.407

Echoing the method/means distinction, the Board acknowledged that “an apparatus or system408 capable of performing a
403. Tickets, forms, and indexes also raise issues under the “printed matter” exception to patentability, which holds that a new writing does not create a new and patentable “manufacture.” See In re McKee, 64 F.2d 379 (C.C.P.A. 1933); In re Russel, 48
F.2d 668, 669 (C.C.P.A. 1931). One could not patent a novel, even though the book is a
tangible item and “new” (physically and conceptually) because of the author’s text. On
the other hand, if there is a functional relationship between the printed matter and the
“substrate,” the combination may be patentable. One such case involved measuring
cups that were deliberately mislabeled for the convenience of cooks making fractional
recipes. In re Miller, 418 F.2d 1392 (C.C.P.A. 1969). The Patent Office Guidelines draw
a similar distinction between “functional descriptive material” and “non-functional descriptive material” stored on a computer-readable medium. See supra notes 369-75.
The printed matter rule may reflect an intuitive understanding of the difference between the subject matter of copyright and patent law and, perhaps, of the “useful arts”
limitations of the latter. It may also have some relation to the “mental steps” doctrine,
discussed supra at Part II.A.
404. 9 U.S.P.Q.2d 1819 (Pat. Off. Bd. App. & Int. 1988).
405. Id. at 1820.
406. Id. at 1821.
407. Id. at 1820 (footnote omitted).
408. It is not clear what the Board meant by “system.” A “system” can mean an
abstract method or a physical apparatus. The Board did make specific reference to the
computer “system” at issue in Paine, Webber, Jackson & Curtis v. Merrill Lynch, 564 F.

DUR-FIN.DOC

4/5/00 7:27 AM

1492 BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [1999
business function may comprise patentable subject matter,”
even if “a method of doing business generated by the apparatus
or system is not.”409
The issue of business system patentability came before the
CCPA on several occasions, but each time the court relied on
alternative grounds, leaving the subject matter question for
another day.410 In dicta, however, the court did lend support to
the “business methods exception.” 411 Such dicta continued after
the CCPA became the Federal Circuit. In Grams, for example,
the court declared that “mathematical algorithms join the list
of non-patentable subject matter not within the scope of section
101, including methods of doing business, naturally occurring
phenomenon, and laws of nature.”412 Judge Rich, one of the
drafters of the 1952 Patent Act as well as a CCPA and Federal
Circuit judge of long tenure, remarked in a 1960 article that
“one of the greatest inventions of our time, the diaper service”
could not be patented.413 Patent law treatises also support the

Supp. 1358 (D. Del. 1983), discussed infra at notes 498-511 and accompanying text.
409. Murray, 9 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1821.
410. See, e.g., In re Fox, 471 F.2d 1405, 1406 (C.C.P.A. 1973) (“We affirm on
grounds of obviousness and will not discuss the non-statutory subject matter issue.”);
In re Howard, 394 F.2d 869, 872 (C.C.P.A. 1968) (“Our affirmance . . . [on grounds of
lacking novelty] makes it unnecessary to consider the issue of whether a method of doing business is inherently unpatentable.”); In re Wait, 73 F.2d 982, 983 (C.C.P.A. 1934)
(“[E]ven conceding, without holding, that some methods of doing business might present patentable novelty, we think such novelty is lacking here . . . .”); see also In re
Wiechers, 347 F.2d 608, 611 (C.C.P.A. 1965) (finding that the Patent Office rejection
relied on novelty and, therefore, that subject matter issue was not before the court). In
In re Patton, the court pronounced business systems unpatentable, but only as a prelude to discussing whether the applicant’s structures were novel. See In re Patton, 127
F.2d 324, 327-28 (C.C.P.A. 1942).
411. See, e.g., In re Chatfield, 545 F.2d 152, 157 (C.C.P.A. 1976) (“Some inventions, however meritorious, do not constitute patentable subject matter, e.g., . . . methods of doing business . . . .”); Patton, 127 F.2d at 327 (“[A] system of transacting business, apart from the means for carrying out such a system, is not within the purview of
[patentable subject matter] . . . .”).
412. In re Grams, 888 F.2d 835, 837 (Fed. Cir. 1989); see also In re Alappat, 33
F.3d 1526, 1541 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (en banc).
We further note that Maucorps[, 609 F.2d 481 (C.C.P.A. 1979),] dealt with a business methodology for deciding how salesmen should best handle respective customers and Meyer[, 688 F.2d 789 (C.C.P.A. 1982),] involved a ‘system’ for aiding a
neurologist in diagnosing patients. Clearly, neither of the alleged ‘inventions’ in
those cases falls within any § 101 category.

Id.
413. Rich, supra note 22, at 393-94.
Of course, not every kind of an invention can be patented. Invaluable though
it may be to individuals, the public, and national defense, the invention of a more
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business methods exception.414 In section 706.03(a) of the Manual of Patent Examining Procedure (MPEP), the Patent Office
formalized the rejection of claims to business methods.415
But the exception has long had its critics. In 1934, patent
attorney George E. Tew acknowledged the exception as “probably settled by long practice and many precedents” but denounced “the absence in decided cases of any logical or statutory reason . . . why [methods of doing business] are
unpatentable.”416 More recently, commentators have criticized
the exception as logically unsound, inconsistently applied, and
unsupported by the cited precedent.417 These critics found an
ally in Judge Newman of the Federal Circuit who, in her dissenting opinion in In re Schrader,418 called for the abolition of
the business methods exception in its entirety. Calling the exception “fuzzy” and “an unwarranted encumbrance to the definition of statutory subject matter in section 101,” she proposed
effective organization of the materials in, and the techniques of teaching a course
in physics, chemistry, or Russian is not a patentable invention because it is outside of the enumerated categories . . . [in § 101]. Also outside that group is one of
the greatest inventions of our time, the diaper service.”

Id.
414. See, e.g., CHISUM ON PATENTS, supra note 45, § 1.03[5] (“The decisions hold
that business ‘plans’ and ‘systems’ are not patentable . . . .”); ERNEST BAINBRIDGE
LIPSCOMB III, LIPSCOMB’S WALKER ON PATENTS § 2.17 (3d ed. 1984).
As instances of the non-patentability of ideas, mention may be made of the
various systems of doing business, such as modes of bookkeeping and hotel checking systems. It has been held that a ‘system’ or method of transacting business is
not an ‘art,’ nor does it come within any other designation of patentable subject
matter . . . .

Id.
415. “Though seemingly within the category of process or method, a method of doing business can be rejected as not within the statutory classes.” MANUAL OF PATENT
EXAMINING PROCEDURE § 706.03(a) (1994).
416. Tew, supra note 17, at 607. While conceding, if not approving, the existence of
the rule, Tew suggests a
distinction . . . between a method of doing business and a method used in doing
business, because many patentable processes, those found in telegraphy and telephony for example, are used in doing business, and in a larger sense substantial
portions of the whole field of patentable processes are used in doing business of
some sort.

Id. at 608.
417. See del Gallo, supra note 17, at 435 (“[T]he ‘business method exception’ . . .
has always been a chimera. . . . The so-called ‘business method’ cases, without exception, have been decided on grounds other than subject matter eligibility such as novelty, definiteness or obviousness.”); E. Robert Yoches & Howard G. Pollack, Is the
“Method of Doing Business” Rejection Bankrupt?, 3 FED. CIR. B.J. 73, 83-84 (1993).
418. 22 F.3d 290 (Fed. Cir. 1994). The case is discussed in detail infra notes 512518 and accompanying text.
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that it be “discarded as error-prone, redundant, and obsolete.”419 She dismissed the cases cited in support of the exception, finding that they had been decided, or could have been decided, on other statutory grounds such as novelty or
obviousness.420 At best, those cases “simply reaffirm that the
patent system is directed to tangible things and procedures, not
mere ideas.”421 Nothing would be served, she felt, by perpetuating a rule as “poorly defined, redundant and unnecessary” as
the business methods exception to patentable subject matter.422
The Patent Office eventually concurred. In its 1996 Guidelines,423 the Patent Office reversed its former position, stating:
“Office personnel have had difficulty in properly treating
claims directed to methods of doing business. Claims should
not be categorized as methods of doing business. Instead, such
claims should be treated like any other process claims . . . .”424
The Patent Office deleted its former negative remarks in section 706.03(a) of the MPEP.425 In the State Street case,426 discussed extensively infra at Part IV.B, the Federal Circuit finally addressed the business methods exception head on. Like
the commentators, the court found the precedent weak and the
rationale unconvincing. Business methods, the court held,
should be judged by the same standards of patentability as any
other methods.427 Taking its cue from Judge Newman, the court
seized the “opportunity to lay this ill-conceived exception to
rest.”428
Critics of the business methods exception are right to expose the weakness of the precedent usually relied upon to support it. As already discussed, most if not all of the “precedent”
can be dismissed as dicta. Yet, as with most ideas in patent law
that have since been declared “obsolete,” there was a kernel of

419. Id. at 298.
420. See id.
421. Id.
422. Id.
423. See supra notes 369-375 and accompanying text.
424. Guidelines, supra note 367, § 2106.
425. See MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE, supra note 415, § 706.03(a).
426. State St. Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Group, 149 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir.
1998).
427. See id. at 1377. “Whether the claims are directed to subject matter within §
101 should not turn on whether the claimed subject matter does ‘business’ instead of
something else.” Id.
428. Id. at 1375.
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truth in the exception, however ill-expressed. Judge Newman
identified that kernel as the difference between “tangible
things and procedures” and “mere ideas.”429 Reference to what
is “tangible” recalls the Cochrane v. Deener definition of “process,”430 which seems genuinely outmoded in an age of information.431 A better expression of the principle rests on the distinction between those arts that are technological “useful arts” and
those that are not. A patent on a non-technological432 method of
conducting business should be rejected, not because it is “intangible” (some technological arts, such as cryptography, are
quite “intangible”) or an “abstract idea” (some business plans
are so detailed and practical that they are hardly “abstract”),
but because it is not within the “useful arts.” On the other
hand, an apparatus or method used in a business should be
patentable if it is the product of a technological “useful art.” An
improved telephone for executives should be patentable, as
should a new method of carbonating a profitable beverage. This
distinction follows the method/means dichotomy expressed, for
example, in Murray,433 while affording it a firmer logical and
constitutional basis. Rather than abandon the business methods exception entirely, it would be better to recast it in terms of
the “useful arts.”
It is curious that the author of the opinion “laying to rest”
the business methods exception was Judge Rich, who years before commented on the unpatentability of the diaper service.434
He might have explained what caused him to change his mind,
or, if he had not changed his mind, what distinguishes the diaper service from any other business plan. In State Street, the
Federal Circuit seized its chance to slay the business methods
exception, but it lost a chance to address the more fundamental
“useful arts” issue. Other opponents of the business methods
exception, in an academic or judicial context, also overlook the
“useful arts” question. But it is a critical issue. Those who advocate the abandonment of the business methods exception say
that it is unprecedented, unsupported by congressional action,
429. In re Schrader, 22 F.3d 290, 298 (1994).
430. See supra notes 243-246, 280-281 and accompanying text.
431. See infra Part IV.C.
432. See supra Part I.C-D.
433. See In re Murray, 9 U.S.P.Q.2d 1819, 1821 (Pat. Off. Bd. App. & Int. 1988);
supra notes 404-409 and accompanying text.
434. See Rich, supra note 22, at 393-94; supra note 413 and accompanying text.
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and contrary to the “anything under the sun that is made by
man”435 spirit of § 101. Those criticisms, however, have no force
if the principle behind the business methods exception is of
constitutional dimensions.436 Even if the exception is erased as
far as § 101 is concerned, the language of Article I Section 8
still must be reckoned with.
The State Street court observed, in a footnote, that “[a]ny
historical distinctions between a method of ‘doing’ business and
the means of carrying it out blur in the complexity of modern
business systems.”437 This is a valid point, particularly if “modern business systems” refers to computers. Computer software
is both a plan for doing something and a tool for doing it,438 a
situation that complicates, not only a method/means distinction, but also a technological/non-technological distinction, at
least where the plan itself has no claim to technological status.
This brings us to the heart of the matter: In an age where computers are becoming a dominant tool even in the nontechnological arts, what kinds of computer-implemented inventions should or should not be patentable under the rubric of
“useful arts”?
IV. COMPUTERS AND THE NONTECHNOLOGICAL ARTS
Patent attorneys often keep a collection of unusual patents
to amuse themselves and colleagues. Some of these are simply
strange ideas, like the patent on the cow-shaped pitcher that
“moos” when the cream is poured.439 But some of the most startling patents in such collections are those that challenge one’s
conception of the “useful arts.” A notorious example discloses a
method of lifting a box.440 Another claims a “method of put-

435. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980) (quoting S. REP. NO. 821979, at 5 (1952); H.R. REP. NO. 82-1923, at 6 (1952)).
436. See supra notes 29-33 and accompanying text.
437. State St. Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Group, 149 F.3d 1368, 1376 n.13
(Fed. Cir. 1998). The remark is an uncredited quotation of Judge Newman’s Schrader
dissent. See In re Schrader, 22 F.3d 290, 298 (1994).
438. See supra Part I.E.
439. U.S. Patent No. 5,213,234. Many patents in a similar vein can be found in
RICK FEINBERG, PECULIAR PATENTS, A COLLECTION OF UNUSUAL AND INTERESTING
INVENTIONS FROM THE FILES OF THE U.S. PATENT OFFICE (1994). More are reproduced
on-line. See, e.g., Michael J. Collins, Wacky Patent of the Month (visited Sept. 28, 1999)
<http://www.colitz.com/site/wacky.htm>; IBM, Gallery of Obscure Patents (visited Sept.
28, 1999) <http://www.patents.ibm.com/gallery>.
440. U.S. Patent No. 5,498,162.
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ting.”441 Such patents are “collectable” because they are exceedingly rare and, perhaps, reflect inevitable slips in the Patent
Office machinery that processes a tremendous volume of patent
applications. A far more serious challenge to the concept of
“useful arts” has arisen as applicants claim non-technological
ideas in terms of the computers used to implement them. At
first glance, some of these patents seem equally out of place—
for example, U.S. Patent No. 5,809,484, which concerns a plan
for funding an education through investors who ultimately receive a share of the student’s future income. Described at this
level, the invention hardly seems what the Framers had in
mind. In fact, however, the patent claims a “method and apparatus” for implementing the plan, and the specification bristles
with impressive technical descriptions of computer hardware
and software.442 Perhaps such “means” should be patentable
even if the abstract idea itself would not be.
Such patents have not been the subject of as rich a jurisprudence as those raising the specter of the “mathematical algorithm.” For the most part, the relevant cases deal with computer-implemented business schemes, culminating in the
recent State Street decision of the Federal Circuit.
A. The Road to State Street
Computer technology and printed paper technology, reminiscent of Hotel Security443 or Guthrie v. Curlett,444 came together in In re Johnston.445 The invention concerned automated
record-keeping systems of the kind used by banks. Such systems employ digital computers, optical character readers, and
paper checks printed with magnetic, machine-readable codes.446
The applicant proposed adapting such a system to assist individuals with their own financial record keeping, tracking expenditures according to category much as personal accounting
software like Quicken does today. The customer would indicate
on each check a code number corresponding to an expense
category—the number either in machine readable form or
441. U.S. Patent No. 5,616,089.
442. U.S. Patent No. 5,809,484.
443. Hotel Sec. Checking Co. v. Lorraine Co., 160 F. 467 (2d Cir. 1908).
444. 10 F.2d 725 (2d Cir. 1926); see supra notes 397-403 and accompanying text.
445. 502 F.2d 765, 771 n.12 (C.C.P.A. 1974), rev’d sub nom. Dann v. Johnston, 425
U.S. 219 (1976) (relying on obviousness rather than unpatentable subject matter).
446. See 502 F.2d at 765-66.
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handwritten and converted by the bank. After processing, the
expense data would be stored in the bank’s computer and used
to prepare detailed reports for the customer.447 The application
included diagrams showing the interrelationship of various
hardware components, a detailed software flow chart,448 and a
complete printout of a program to be used with an IBM general-purpose computer.449
The claims described the invention as a “record-keeping
machine system for financial accounts,” including, among other
things, input and output devices, a data processor, a control
system, and a memory.450 The bookkeeping aspects of the invention were incorporated in the claims by reference to the “records” stored in the memory, the record-handling capabilities of
the control system, and the organizing and listing capabilities
of the “output record producing means.”451 The Patent Office
Board held that the claims were “not directed to improved record keeping machinery, but rather to a broad system of keeping financial records.”452 The “sweeping” references to automation were “only . . . a dress for claims that spell out, in effect,
the relationship of a bank and its customers, not any particular
configuration of business machinery.”453 The Board rejected the
claims for obviousness, indefiniteness, and failure to claim patentable subject matter.454 With respect to the last ground, the
Board declared that computer-related inventions are patentable subject matter only if within the “technological arts.”455
The Board observed that “the term ‘technological arts’ should
[not] embrace processes of using machines so as to dominate
practices in the ‘liberal arts,’ such as social or political sciences,
humanities, music and art.”456 Claims to such processes “would
allow the intrusion of the patent system into the social sciences . . . [and] would exceed the constitutional grant of authority to issue patents.”457 Such was the case here, according to the
447.
448.
449.
450.
451.
452.
453.
454.
455.
456.
457.

See id. at 766.
See supra notes 210-212 and accompanying text.
Johnston, 502 F.2d at 767.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 768.
Id.
See id. at 768-69.
Id. at 769.
Id.
Id.
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Board, because the effect of the “machine” claim would be to
prevent banks from using their own computers to expand into
the business of customer bookkeeping.458
In an opinion prefiguring Alappat,459 the CCPA focused on
the literal language of the claims, which described the invention as a “machine system.”460 Such a “machine system,” the
court held, is clearly within the “technological arts.”461 “[W]e
are not aware of, nor can we locate, any dictionary which would
define a machine system as within the purview of the ‘liberal
arts.’ ”462 Contrary to the understanding of the Board, the
claims covered only an apparatus, not a system of banking or a
method of bookkeeping, and they would not prevent banks from
expanding their services except through the use of such an apparatus.463
Judge Rich dissented, unsatisfied with the majority’s reliance on apparatus claims to distinguish Benson. Whether the
claims describe an apparatus or a process,
[t]he point is that the machine or apparatus and process
claims are really directed to the same invention, of which appellant’s main brief says:
. . . this invention is being sold as a computer program to
banks and to other data processing companies so that
they can perform these data processing services for depositors.”
What could more clearly reveal the reality that the invention
is a program—software—and that that is what appellant
wants to protect by the appealed ‘machine system’ claims?

458. See id.
459. See supra notes 337-357 and accompanying text.
460. Johnston, 502 F.2d at 770. Because the claims described an apparatus, the
court held that the “mathematical algorithm” rule of Benson did not apply. Id. at 771.
See supra notes 264-282 and accompanying text.
461. 502 F.2d at 771.
462. Id. Citing Waldbaum, the court reaffirmed that “[t]he phrase ‘technological
arts,’ . . . is synonymous with the phrase ‘useful arts’ as it appears in Article I, Section
8 of the Constitution.” Id. at 771 n.12. The court did not agree with the Board that
banking is a “social science.” Id. at 771 n.13. This does not, however, settle the question
of whether banking is a “technological art.”
463. See id. at 771. Of course, if the apparatus were claimed solely in terms of the
service it enabled or were limited only to computers performing that service, another
bank would have no other “apparatus” to which it could possibly turn.
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Appellant did not invent a machine—i.e., “hardware.”464

Judge Rich discussed the argument that a new computer
program makes a “new machine”—the same argument that,
years later, would figure prominently in his Alappat majority
opinion. He “[did] not deny[] the validity of this principle,”465
but “knowing the invention to be a new program,” he could not
distinguish the case from Benson based only on the superficial
form of the claim.466 “Benson et al. had a program invention too
and they could have cast their claims in machine system form
just as appellant did. Every competent patent draftsman knows
how to do that.”467
In In re Deutsch,468 the applicant claimed a method of operating manufacturing plants by monitoring certain data, such as
materials and energy cost, and using that data to optimize the
production and coordination of multiple plants. The method
could be implemented through a general-purpose computer or,
possibly, through other means such as a hard-wired, specialpurpose computer.469 Relying on Benson and its prohibition of
mathematical “algorithms,” the Patent Office Board rejected
the claims as consisting of unpatentable subject matter.470 The
CCPA reversed, holding that the applicant’s claimed invention
was not an algorithm, but a system of operating manufacturing
plants; “[t]he ‘processing’ programs, if such they are, are incidental to the invention.”471 Whether the claim described a nonstatutory “method of doing business” was discussed at oral argument.472 The court held that it did not because it did not
“merely facilitate business dealings.”473 In addition to that puzzling remark, the court stated: “That translation of business
data into mathematical language intelligible to computers is
employed in carrying . . . out [the claimed invention] does not
make a method of automatically controlling a system of manu-

464. Id. at 773 (Rich, J., dissenting) (omission in original).
465. Id. He did, however, remark cryptically that the “new machine” principle
“partakes of the nature of a legal fiction when it comes to drafting claims.” Id.
466. Id.
467. Id.
468. 553 F.2d 689 (C.C.P.A. 1977).
469. See id. at 692-93.
470. See id. at 691-92.
471. Id. at 692.
472. Id. at 692 n.5.
473. Id.
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facturing plants a method of ‘doing business.’ ”474 Although the
system used business data to make, in effect, business decisions, the court treated the claimed invention as a tool used in
business, rather than as a system of doing business. The court
held that it was “within the technologically useful art of controlling and optimizing a system of manufacturing plants to a
particular end use, . . . [and] a statutory ‘process’ within the
purview of 35 USC 101.”475
The CCPA reached a contrary conclusion in In re Maucorps.476 The patent application in Maucorps, entitled Computing System for Optimizing Sales Organizations and Activities,
described a computer-implemented scheme for calculating the
number of sales representatives that an organization should
have, how they should be managed, and how frequently they
should visit their customers.477 The calculations involved complex mathematical formulas, but the claims described the invention as a “computing system” apparatus comprised of
“means for calculating” the relevant values.478 The application
included a high-level hardware schematic as well as a computer program printout.479 The program could be implemented
through a general-purpose computer, or it could be permanently hardwired into a special-purpose machine.480 The examiner and the Patent Office Board rejected the claims as unpatentable subject matter, and the CCPA affirmed.481 The court
did not discuss whether the invention claimed a method of doing business; instead, like the Patent Office Board, the CCPA
rejected the claims under Benson as having been drawn to an
unpatentable mathematical “algorithm.” Although the claims
literally described an apparatus, this time the court did not
hold the form of the claim dispositive. “Labels,” it said, “are not
determinative in § 101 inquiries.”482 The form of the claim as a
process or apparatus is “often an exercise in drafting.”483 The

474.
475.
476.
477.
478.
479.
480.
481.
482.
483.

Id.
Id. at 693 (emphasis added).
609 F.2d 481 (C.C.P.A. 1979).
Id. at 482.
Id. at 482-83.
See id. at 483-84.
See id. at 483.
See id. at 484-86.
Id. at 485.
Id. (quoting In re Johnson, 589 F.2d 1070, 1077 (C.C.P.A. 1978)).
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CCPA’s successor would emphasize the role of “means-plusfunction” claiming in defining a patentable apparatus,484 but
here the court observed that the format “cannot rescue appellant’s claims from the requirements of § 101, because § 112[(6)]
does not authorize the claiming of apparatus entirely in terms
of ‘means for’ performing a non-statutory method.”485 By “nonstatutory method” the court probably referred to the method of
solving a mathematical algorithm, but the same observation
could apply to a method of doing business, should the latter be
regarded as a “non-technological art.”
Of all of the CCPA’s attempts to distinguish between a
technological means and a non-technological end, In re Toma486
is one of the most interesting. The applicant claimed a computer-implemented method of translating from one human language to another. The method involved the steps of (1) loading
the text to be translated (the “source text”) into a computer
memory; (2) “transforming” the text by attaching to each word
coded information indicating the dictionary meaning of the
word in the “target language” as well as syntactical clues to the
intended meaning; and (3) synthesis of the “transformed”
source text into a grammatical target language translation.487
In order to make the most efficient use of memory, translation
codes for common words were stored in the computer’s “core
memory.”488 Rather than duplicate those codes each time the
word appeared, the “transformed” text simply referred to the
location in the core memory where the relevant codes could be
found.489
The Patent Office rejected the claims as non-statutory subject matter, basing its decision, in part, on Benson’s treatment
of algorithms.490 The examiner also found that claims to a
method of translation were not within the “technological
arts.”491 In the examiner’s view, translation was a “liberal art”
that could not be transformed into a “technological art” merely
because it was accomplished through a machine; “as far as

484.
485.
486.
487.
488.
489.
490.
491.

See supra notes 337-357 and accompanying text.
Maucorps, 609 F.2d at 486.
575 F.2d 872 (C.C.P.A. 1978).
Id. at 874.
Id.
See id. (referring to “memory offset address linkages”).
See id. at 875-76.
Id. at 877.
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computer-related inventions are concerned, only those inventions which ‘enhance the internal operation of the digital computer’ are in the ‘technological’ or ‘useful’ arts.”492 The Board’s
treatment of this issue was, according to the CCPA, too “perfunctory” to indicate approval or disapproval of the examiner’s
views.493
The CCPA disagreed with the examiner, holding that the
claimed method “for enabling a computer to translate . . . languages” was a “method of operating a machine” and was within
the “technological arts.”494 The court stressed that what the
machine did was fundamentally different than what a human
translator would do. While it was “convenient to describe the
steps of the program as if they were being performed by a human translator, in fact, nothing of the kind is happening.”495 In
reality, “the computer [would be] carrying out a series of unthinking, abstract mathematical operations” without regard for
the meaning of the data.496 The result might be translation, but
the computer would still be only a calculating machine, and it
should be treated as such for purposes of the subject matter inquiry.
The “technological” or “useful” arts inquiry must focus on
whether the claimed subject matter (a method of operating a
machine to translate) is statutory, not on whether the product
of the claimed subject matter (a translated text) is statutory,
not on whether the prior art which the claimed subject matter
purports to replace (translation by human mind) is statutory,
and not on whether the claimed subject matter is presently
perceived to be an improvement over the prior art, e.g.,
whether it “enhances” the operation of a machine.497

The court appears to say that anything done by a computer
is inherently “technological.” Even if the computer is writing
haiku or offering moral advice, it is always a machine. In the
492. Id.
493. Id.
494. Id.
495. Id. at 874.
496. Id.
497. Id. at 877-78. The “enhancement” concept recalls earlier CCPA cases holding
that “a process having no practical value other than enhancing the internal operation
of [digital computers]” are within the “technological arts.” In re McIlroy, 442 F.2d 1397,
1398 (C.C.P.A. 1971) (citation omitted) (modification in original). Of course, this does
not mean that only processes “enhancing the internal operation” of a computer are
statutory.
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context of the facts presented in Toma, it is difficult to argue.
The invention was not so much a method of translation as it
was a method of automating translation, including steps designed for the most effective use of computer memory. Whether
the invention actually improved on other methods and, in that
respect, “enhanced” the operation of a machine, the invention
clearly lay within the sphere of computer science or software
engineering, not translation. Suppose, however, that an applicant discovered the key to deciphering a previously untranslatable ancient language. If the applicant claimed a method of operating a “machine” (i.e., a general-purpose computer), but the
method were described only in terms of his translating insights, would the claimed invention still be a “technological”
invention? The rhetoric of Toma suggests that it might, but the
facts did not put that question squarely before the court.
A Delaware district court relied substantially on the Toma
rhetoric in Paine, Webber, Jackson & Curtis, Inc. v. Merrill
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc.,498 in which the patented
invention concerned a “securities brokerage-cash management
system.”499 The system combined a brokerage securities account, a money market fund, and a credit card charge account.
The components were not new, but combining them into a single account yielded “synergistic” advantages.500 For example,
profits generated by the securities account could be reinvested
automatically in the money market account rather than remaining in the securities account as “idle cash.”501 Similarly,
the credit available on the charge card could be adjusted according to the customer’s resources in the other components of
the account.502 All of the transactions in the combined account
could be reflected in a single monthly statement.503
Today, all banking and similar transactions are administered by computers, and the claimed system in Paine Webber
was no exception. The claims referred to a “system for processing and supervising a plurality of composite subscriber accounts,” including various “means” for performing the neces-

498.
499.
500.
501.
502.
503.

564 F. Supp. 1358 (D. Del. 1983).
Id. at 1363.
Id. at 1362.
Id.
See id.
See id.
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sary functions.504 These included, for example, a “brokerage account data file means” for storing current information, a “manual entry means” for entering investment orders, a “data receiving and verifying means,” and a “short term investment
updating means.”505 The patent specification did not describe
apparatus corresponding to any of these “means,” but it included a flow chart illustrating the steps to be performed by the
computer.506
The accused infringer moved for summary judgment under
§ 101, arguing that the patent claimed a “method of doing
business.” The patent disclosure, it maintained, “reveal[ed]
that the invention fits squarely into the business system category and has nothing to do with machinery, technology, process, manufacture, or composition of matter.”507 The court, however, declined to focus on what it called the “product” of the
patent claims—the financial management account. Instead, as
required by Toma, it focused on “the method by which the . . .
[system] operates.”508 The patent claims, it held, were similar to
those discussed in Toma and Johnston.509
The product of the claims of the ‘442 patent effectuates a
highly useful business method and would be unpatentable if
done by hand. The CCPA, however, has made clear that if no
Benson algorithm exists, the product of a computer program
is irrelevant, and the focus of analysis should be on the operation of the program on the computer. The Court finds that the
‘442 patent claims statutory subject matter because the
claims allegedly teach a method of operation on a computer to
effectuate a business activity. Accordingly, the ‘442 patent
passes the threshold requirement of Section 101.510

The court could have relied upon the program flow charts
and any programming insights (as opposed to accounting insights) that they revealed. Such insights could have been considered a part of the claimed invention by virtue of § 112(6),511
bringing the invention, as a computer programming technique,
504.
505.
506.
507.
508.
509.
510.
511.

Id. at 1364.
Id.
See id. at 1363-64.
Id. at 1365.
Id. at 1369.
See id.
Id.
See supra note 340.
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within the realm of the technological “useful arts.” However,
the court did not find it necessary to do this. It seemingly interpreted the lesson of Toma in the broadest sense: any invention claimed as a computer system is inherently “technological,” even if the patent discloses nothing about the computer or
its programming.
In In re Schrader,512 the Federal Circuit could have conveyed its own interpretation of Toma, but it chose another
path. Schrader claimed an improved system for conducting
auctions, wherein participants could bid on any item or combination of items offered for sale. In a real estate auction, one
buyer might bid on Black Acre, another on White Acre, and a
third on the combination of Black Acre and White Acre. Using
the claimed method, the seller could determine which bid or
combination of bids to accept in order to maximize profits.513
The claims to this “method of competitively bidding” did not
make explicit reference to a computer, but it is likely that a
computer would be used for the necessary data storage, calculations, and display.514 The court rejected the claims as drawn
to an unpatentable “mathematical algorithm,” even though the
references to mathematics were, at best, generalized and indirect.515 The court did not discuss whether the invention was
“technological” under Toma or whether more explicit references
to a computer could have made it so. However, in her dissent
(in which she also advocated the abolition of the “methods of
doing business” exception relied upon by the Patent Office
Board516), Judge Newman referred to processes handling data,
including data representing bids, as “processes . . . employed in
technologically useful arts.”517 Schrader’s method, she wrote,
“requires the performance of specified steps and procedures, including calculations, to achieve a technologically useful result.”518 Her intention was to argue that the claims were not
unpatentably abstract, but it is unclear what she meant by
“technologically useful.” Is auctioneering a “technological art”?
Is applied mathematics? Or is “technology” involved because of
512.
513.
514.
515.
516.
517.
518.

22 F.3d 290 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
See id. at 291-92.
Id. at 291.
See id. at 293-96.
See supra notes 418-422 and accompanying text.
Schrader, 22 F.3d at 297 (Newman, J., dissenting).
Id.
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the assumed use of a computer? These issues would confront
the Federal Circuit again in the State Street case.
B. State Street
In State Street Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Financial
Group,519 the patent describes a system for managing a portfolio of mutual funds, using a “Hub and Spoke” configuration.
The “Spokes” consist of individual mutual funds managed by
one centralized entity, or “Hub,” organized as a partnership.
Each “Spoke” owns an interest in the “Hub.”520 This pooling of
assets allows economies of scale, lowered administrative costs,
and beneficial tax consequences.521 The system is, however,
complex to administer.522 All gains and losses of the “Hub” portfolio are allocated to each “Spoke” on a pro rata basis. Moreover, each “Spoke” mutual fund is also an investment vehicle,
so that, as their values fluctuate, partnership interests in the
“Hub” portfolio must be constantly adjusted.523
As one would expect, the accounting is performed by a computer programmed to store the financial data and perform the
required calculations.524 This computer, or “data processing
system,” is the invention described by the claims. The claims,
however, define that system solely as a collection of “means” for
performing the functions required. Claim 1 is representative:
A data processing system for managing a financial services
configuration of a portfolio established as a partnership, each
partner being one of a plurality of funds, comprising:
(a) computer processor means for processing data;
(b) storage means for storing data on a storage medium;

519. 927 F. Supp. 502, 504 (D. Mass. 1996), rev’d, 149 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 1998),
cert. denied, __U.S.__, 119 S. Ct. 851 (1999).
520. See U.S. Patent No. 5,193,056 [hereinafter ‘056 Patent] cols. 1:43-2:30, 4:3661.
521. See id. col. 2:3-66.
522. See id., col. 2:67-68.
523. See id. cols. 2:67-3:30.
524. “A new and unique data processing system and method is necessary to enable
accurate daily allocations to be made among each of the funds in a portfolio.” Id. col.
3:23-25. “The present invention provides a data processing system and method for
monitoring and recording the information flow and data, and making all calculations,
necessary for maintaining a partnership portfolio and partner fund (Hub and Spoke)
financial services configuration.” Id. col. 4:36-41.
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(c) first means for initializing the storage medium;
(d) second means for processing data regarding assets in
the portfolio and each of the funds from a previous day
and data regarding increases or decreases in each of
the funds, [sic] assets and for allocating the percentage
share that each fund holds in the portfolio;
(e) third means for processing data regarding daily incremental income, expenses, and net realized gain or loss
for the portfolio and for allocating such data among
each fund;
(f) fourth means for processing data regarding daily net
unrealized gain or loss for the portfolio and for allocating such data among each fund; and
(g) fifth means for processing data regarding aggregate
year-end income, expenses, and capital gain or loss for
the portfolio and each of the funds.525

Such “means-plus-function” claim language requires one to
turn to the patent specification to identify the “structures” that
perform those functions.526 Yet the descriptions of physical
structure in this patent consist of no more than cursory references to computers, floppy disk storage media, and CRT displays of the kind that accompany most desktop computers.527
Most of the patent disclosure relates to a set of flow charts528
outlining the process of administering a “Hub and Spoke” mutual fund portfolio.529 A key aspect of that process appears to be

525. Id. col. 13:22-45.
526. 35 U.S.C. § 112(6) (1994), discussed supra note 340 and accompanying text.
527. See, e.g., ’056 Patent, supra note 520, col. 6:48-56 (“The portfolio/fund accountant makes use of a personal computer 44 programmed with software 50 . . . . The
personal computer . . . is capable of producing printed output 46 and storing data on
data disk 52, which preferably is a floppy disk, although other types of storage media
may be used.”); col. 7:59-60 (“a main menu is displayed, for example, on the CRT of a
personal computer”). Figure 4 includes simple cartoon drawings of personal computers,
and a featureless cylinder representing the “data disk.”
528. See id. figs. 5-11. Figure 1 is a block diagram showing the overall organization of a “Hub and Spoke” fund portfolio. Figures 2-3 illustrate the administrative cost
savings that can be realized through the “Hub and Spoke” management structure. Figure 4 is a high-level organizational chart showing the relationships of the shareholder,
investment advisor, transfer agent, portfolio/fund accountant, and portfolio administrator, with cartoon representations of a generic computer network.
529. As described in the “Summary of the Invention,”
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a “book capital account” for each fund, which tracks daily
shareholder purchases and redemptions, the fund’s proportional share of the portfolio’s administrative expenses, and the
fund’s share of realized and unrealized gain or loss.530
After licensing negotiations broke down, State Street filed
suit against patent owner Signature Financial Group, seeking
declaratory judgment of invalidity, unenforceability, and noninfringement.531 On State Street’s motion for summary judgment,
the Massachusetts District Court held the patent invalid under
§ 101 for failing to claim patentable subject matter. After reviewing the Supreme Court trilogy,532 as well as the CCPA and
Federal Circuit “mathematical algorithm” cases, the court concluded that the patent claimed a non-physical abstract mathematical algorithm of the kind rejected in Schrader533 and Maucorps.534
Like the business-related systems in Schrader and Maucorps,
the ‘056 Patent claims an invention that essentially performs
mathematical calculations on data gleaned from pre-solution
activity and stores and displays the results. As with
Schrader’s bids, the fact that those numbers represent financial constructs, such as the Hub and Spoke configuration,
does not save Signature’s patent. The claims do not recite any
significant pre- or post-solution activity. Neither does the invention measure physical objects or phenomena as in ArThe data processing system determines the percentage share (allocation ratio) that
each fund has in the portfolio, while taking into consideration daily changes both
in the value of the portfolio’s investment securities (as determined by market
prices) and in the amount of each fund’s assets (as determined by daily shareholder purchases and redemptions). The system also allocates to each fund the
portfolio’s daily income, expenses, and net realized and unrealized gain or loss,
calculating each fund’s total investments based on the concept of a book capital account, thus enabling determination of a true asset value of each fund and accurate
calculation of allocation ratios between the funds. The data processing system also
tracks all the relevant data, determined on a daily basis for the portfolio and each
fund, so that aggregate year-end income, expenses, and capital gain or loss can be
determined for accounting and for tax purposes for the portfolio and for each fund.

Id. col. 4:44-61.
530. See id. col. 3:52-61.
531. State St. Bank v. Signature Fin. Group., 927 F. Supp. 502, 504 (D. Mass.
1996), rev’d, 149 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 1998), cert. denied, __U.S.__, 119 S. Ct. 851
(1999).
532. See supra Part II.B.
533. In re Schrader, 22 F.3d 290 (Fed. Cir. 1994); see supra notes 512-518 and accompanying text.
534. In re Maucorps, 609 F.2d 481 (C.C.P.A. 1979); see supra notes 476-485 and
accompanying text.
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rhythmia535 or Abele536 nor does it physically convert data into
a different form as in Alappat.537

The court also found the claims so broad that, in effect, they
covered the “Hub and Spoke” arrangement itself, rather than
any particular “data processing system” for implementing such
an arrangement.538 This, the court held, rendered the claims
unpatentable as a “method of doing business.”539
The Federal Circuit reversed, in an opinion written by
Judge Rich. It held that Signature’s claims describe a “machine” and illustrated the point by reproducing claim 1 with
the “structures” of the specification incorporated in brackets:
A data processing system for managing a financial services
configuration of a portfolio established as a partnership, each
partner being one of a plurality of funds, comprising:
(a) computer processor means [a personal computer including a CPU] for processing data;
(b) storage means [a data disk] for storing data on a storage medium;
(c) first means [an arithmetic logic circuit configured to
prepare the data disk to magnetically store selected
data] for initializing the storage medium;
(d) second means [an arithmetic logic circuit configured to
retrieve information from a specific file, calculate incremental increases or decreases based on specific in-

535. Arrhythmia Research Tech., Inc. v. Corazonix Corp., 958 F.2d 1053 (Fed. Cir.
1992); see supra notes 319-336 and accompanying text.
536. In re Abele, 684 F.2d 902 (C.C.P.A. 1982).
537. State St. Bank v. Signature Fin. Group, 927 F. Supp. 502, 515 (D. Mass.
1996) (footnotes inserted by author), rev’d, 149 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 1998). In re Alappat, 33 F.3d 1526 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (en banc), is discussed supra notes 337-357 and accompanying text.
538. State Street, 927 F. Supp. at 516.
If Signature’s invention were patentable, any financial institution desirous of
implementing a multi-tiered funding complex modelled on a Hub and Spoke configuration would be required to seek Signature’s permission before embarking on
such a project. This is so because the ‘056 Patent is claimed sufficiently broadly to
foreclose virtually any computer-implemented accounting method necessary to
manage this type of financial structure.

Id.
539. Id. at 516 (“[P]atenting an accounting system necessary to carry on a certain
type of business is tantamount to a patent on the business itself . . . .”).
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put, allocate the results on a percentage basis, and
store the output in a separate file] for processing data
regarding assets in the portfolio and each of the funds
from a previous day and data regarding increases or
decreases in each of the funds, [sic, funds’] assets and
for allocating the percentage share that each fund
holds in the portfolio;
(e) third means [an arithmetic logic circuit configured to
retrieve information from a specific file, calculate incremental increases and decreases based on specific input, allocate the results on a percentage basis, and
store the output in a separate file] for processing data
regarding daily incremental income, expenses, and net
realized gain or loss for the portfolio and for allocating
such data among each fund;
(f) fourth means [an arithmetic logic circuit configured to
retrieve information from a specific file, calculate incremental increases and decreases based on specific input, allocate the results on a percentage basis and
store the output in a separate file] for processing data
regarding daily net unrealized gain or loss for the portfolio and for allocating such data among each fund; and
(g) fifth means [an arithmetic logic circuit configured to
retrieve information from specific files, calculate that
information on an aggregate basis and store the output
in a separate file] for processing data regarding aggregate year-end income, expenses, and capital gain or
loss for the portfolio and each of the funds.540

The court held this data-processing “machine,” consisting of
the structures recited in the specification or their equivalents,
to be “proper statutory subject matter under § 101.”541 The
court did, however, consider the “mathematical algorithm” issue. Such algorithms, the court held, are unpatentable “to the
extent they are merely abstract ideas”—i.e., if they are not “reduced to some type of practical application” producing “a useful, concrete and tangible result.”542 The distinction between a

540. State St. Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Group, 149 F.3d 1368, 1371-72
(Fed. Cir. 1998) (alterations in original).
541. Id. at 1372.
542. Id. at 1373 (citation omitted).

DUR-FIN.DOC

4/5/00 7:27 AM

1512 BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [1999
patentable algorithm and an unpatentable algorithm lies in a
“useful” application.543 The court found such an application in
the Signature patent.
Today, we hold that the transformation of data, representing discrete dollar amounts, by a machine through a series of
mathematical calculations into a final share price, constitutes
a practical application of a mathematical algorithm, formula,
or calculation, because it produces ‘a useful, concrete and tangible result’—a final share price momentarily fixed for recording and reporting purposes and even accepted and relied
upon by regulatory authorities and in subsequent trades.544

As long as the invention has “practical utility,” it is statutory whether categorized as a machine or process, and “even if
the useful result is expressed in numbers, such as price, profit,
percentage, cost, or loss.”545 As for the “business methods” doctrine, the court “[took] this opportunity to lay this ill-conceived
exception to rest.”546
For all of its reliance on the “useful” nature of the claimed
invention, the court did not discuss whether an accounting
scheme is a “useful art” in the constitutional sense (i.e., a
“technological” art) and, if not, whether Signature’s claim to a
“system” for implementing an accounting scheme is within the
“useful arts,” given the patent’s disclosure of very little other
than the scheme itself. Consequently, while State Street appears to be a landmark case in the development of the law of
statutory subject matter, particularly as it affects accounting
methods and methods of doing business, it leaves serious questions unanswered.
C. Scylla and Charybdis
The easiest approaches to the State Street situation are the
most extreme. One could simply conclude that computer programming is not a “useful art,” as the Framers imagined those
arts, because programming is too abstract and intangible. Pro543. Id. See also AT&T Corp. v. Excel Communications, Inc., 172 F.3d 1352, 1357
(Fed. Cir. 1999) (“[A] mathematical algorithm may be an integral part of patentable
subject matter such as a machine or process if the claimed invention as a whole is applied in a ‘useful’ manner”). However, as previously discussed, it is no simple matter to
define what is “useful.” See supra text accompanying notes 135-137.
544. State Street, 172 F.3d at 1373.
545. Id. at 1375.
546. Id. at 1375.
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gramming consists of logic and mathematics, not the material
goods—the “horse collars” and “buggy whips”547—that the
Framers intended our patent laws to cover. Hence, any computer-related invention dependent on new software is beyond
Congress’s power to include within the scope of patentable subject matter. The only allowable computer patents are those describing new hardware, such as a new tracking mechanism for
a mouse, a new transistor design, a new memory card, and so
forth. This approach has the advantage of simplicity, but, as
has already been suggested,548 it would not reflect well the
Framers’ policy in the establishment of the patent authority.
Programming is an industry comparable to those that the
Framers sought to promote. It produces useful goods that are
improved through the process of invention, to the ultimate
benefit of consumers and the national economy. Sometimes the
intangible goods produced by the software industry are interchangeable with material goods produced by traditional hardware industries. It is unlikely that the Framers would have
wanted to exclude such an important industry from the patent
system, and there is no compelling policy reason to do so.
Nor should software be required to transform a tangible object into “a different state or thing” before it is patentable, as
suggested by the narrow Cochrane v. Deener definition of “process.”549 Certainly software inventions that are a part of a
larger transformative process—such as the rubber curing process in Diehr—should be patentable subject matter. But there
are other software inventions that have little or no physical effects, yet are equally utilitarian. Techniques of computer cryptography, for example, are unquestionably technological,
though they operate solely in the realm of mathematics and
data.550 Users of the Internet are familiar with the benefits of
search engine algorithms and algorithms for detecting com-

547. In re Waldbaum, 457 F.2d 997, 1003 (C.C.P.A. 1972).
548. See supra Part I.A.
549. Cochrane v. Deener, 94 U.S. 780, 788 (1877).
550. But cf. Berardini v. Tocci, 190 F. 329, 332-33 (S.D.N.Y. 1911). Berardini held
that a “code message” for directing money transfers by telegraph was really a system
for encoding message and that it was not a patentable “art,” in the sense explained in
Hotel Security Checking Co. v. Lorraine Co., 160 F. 467 (2d Cir. 1908), supra notes 376384 and accompanying text. The patented invention was not a means, but only abstract
“advice[— i]t is for an art only in the sense that one speaks of the art of painting, or the
art of curving the thrown baseball. Such arts, however ingenious, difficult, or amusing,
are not patentable within any statute of the United States.” Berardini, 190 F. at 333.
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puter viruses. Those algorithms are tools for the analysis, manipulation, and transformation of data; in a sense, they are
“buggy whips” for the information age. Such things should be
considered to be at the core of patentable subject matter, without straining to rely on the tangible aspects of the computer
hardware. The silicon and wire of the computer circuits, the
electrons that course through those circuits, the mouse and
keyboard that provide input, and the monitor or paper that
displays the results are all physical entities. A new computer
program even produces new physical effects measurable on a
microscopic scale, such as a new pattern of electrical charge
stored on a floppy disk. But to consider these things the key to
patentable subject matter is to confuse the medium with the
message. When an inventor conceives of a new program algorithm, the essence of the invention rests in the logic, not in the
incidental physical details of the computing system on which it
is implemented. As scientists conceive of computers based on
quantum mechanics, beams of light, or DNA, the irrelevance of
the hardware becomes increasingly apparent.
At another extreme, one could argue that anything “useful”
is the product of a “useful art,” hence an accounting scheme, an
advertising gimmick, a pedagogical method, a system of meditation, or even a method of presenting a legal argument may be
patented as a “process,”551 leaving only purely abstract ideas,
like a mathematical formula applied to no “useful” purpose, as
unpatentable subject matter. As already discussed,552 the
Framers most likely did not have in mind such a broad interpretation of the “useful arts,” nor is it clear on policy grounds
that such a diverse range of human ingenuity should be
brought within the realm of patent law. It seems increasingly
the modern viewpoint that anything of value should be regarded as property, but this was not necessarily the Framers’
view, particularly when “property” means “monopoly.”553 The
courts have held that “useful arts” includes only what is “technological,”554 and even the advent of the information age provides no reason to depart from that conclusion. One may have
to expand one’s definition of “technology” to embrace the more
551. This is assuming, of course, that the process meets the other requirements of
patentability, such as novelty and nonobviousness.
552. See supra Part I.A.
553. See supra notes 47-48 and accompanying text.
554. See supra Part I.B.
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intangible tools of computer programming, but, unless one
abandons the probable intentions of the Framers, “useful arts”
and “technology” cannot be limitless.
An intermediate approach might grant that there are nontechnological arts beyond the scope of patentable subject matter, but the tools (at least the physical tools) used to implement
those arts are potentially patentable. In many cases, this is
certainly correct. For example, one should be able to patent a
new musical instrument, artist’s paint brush, cash register, or
teacher’s chalkboard, regardless of the ultimately nontechnological application to which those tools are put. The
manufacture of musical instruments, paint brushes, and so
forth, are industries of the most traditional, industrial kind;
there is no doubt that the Framers would have considered
those industries “useful arts.” Patenting a new physical implement to be used in a non-technological art does not raise the
same issues as patenting a new process in those same arts. The
invention is technological in character because, in a sense, it
deals with the manufacture of a new implement, and manufacturing is at the center of the useful arts, historically and conceptually. The “art” of a patent on a new trumpet is not the art
of music, but the art of trumpet manufacturing. Similarly, one
could argue that a computer system, or a computer program,
should be patentable subject matter because systems and programs are designed by the practitioners of the technological art
of computer science, even if these technological tools ultimately
are employed for non-technological ends.
This argument is an appealing one, at least as long as the
inventor claims the technological tool in terms of what it is—
that is, in terms of the specific attributes that are the product
of its manufacture or design. When a claim describes a tool in
terms of how it is to be used, as is commonly done under §
112(6) of the Patent Act,555 the problems with this tool/use distinction become apparent. Consider the following claim, which
might have been composed by the first salesman to conceive of
the idea of telephone marketing:556
A communications system for soliciting business from potential customers through person-to-person conversation,

555. See supra note 340 and accompanying text.
556. I first created this example for use in the State Street amicus brief discussed
supra in the first footnote.
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comprising:
A remote signaling means for alerting a potential customer
of one’s desire to converse;
A remote communications sending means for transmitting
a voice communication to said customer, for the purpose of soliciting said customer’s business;
A remote communications receiving means for receiving
from said customer a response to said solicitation; and
A means for terminating communications to and from said
customer.

The patent specification, disclosing the “structures” supporting each “means” element, might describe an ordinary telephone system.
If we assume that the applicant did not invent the telephone, and if we further assume that telephone solicitation is
not a technological “useful art” (even if it is a profitable business technique), should the “communications system” claimed
by the applicant be considered within the “useful arts” because
it is a “machine”? The applicant might support that conclusion
by annotating his claim in the manner found in the State Street
opinion:
A communications system for soliciting business from potential customers through person-to-person conversation,
comprising:
A remote signaling means [a telephone with a ringing
mechanism] for alerting a potential customer of one’s desire to
converse;
A remote communications sending means [a telephone
transmitter and telephone wire] for transmitting a voice
communication to said customer, for the purpose of soliciting
said customer’s business;
A remote communications receiving means [a telephone receiver and telephone wire] for receiving from said customer a
response to said solicitation; and
A means [a telephone cradle switch] for terminating communications to and from said customer.
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Something seems amiss, however. What the applicant invented is not an apparatus, but a new method of using it. The
apparatus and the method are in different arts—the former in
the technological art of electronics, and the latter in the nontechnological art of business relations. Nevertheless, two principles of patent law suggest that the claim does describe a patentable machine. The first holds that the applicant’s claim, not
the detailed disclosure of the specification, defines the “invention.”557 Here, the claim literally describes a machine. Second,
courts often stress that patentable subject matter under § 101
should not be confused with novelty under § 102 (or the related
question of non-obviousness under § 103).558 Subject matter and
novelty have been described as separate “doors” through which
an applicant must pass to meet the objective of patentability.559
The door of patentable subject matter cannot be barred because
the telephone is not new—novelty is a separate question. Similarly, one cannot extract from the claim the “point of novelty”—
the thing that separates the claimed invention from its predecessors—and consider that the applicant’s “actual invention.”560
The invention is what the claim says it is, and the claim must
be judged as a whole.
The claim might be allowed to pass through the § 101 subject matter “door” because it describes a machine, but stopped
at the § 102 “door” of novelty on the ground that telephones are
557. See Bell Communications Research, Inc. v. Vitalik Communications Corp., 55
F.3d 615, 619 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (quoting Yale Lock Mfg. v. Greenleaf, 117 U.S. 554, 559
(1886) (“[T]he language of the claim defines the scope of the patented invention . . . .”).
558. See In re Bergy, 596 F.2d 952, 962-63 (C.C.P.A 1979), vacated sub nom. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 444 U.S. 1028 (1980), reconsidered, 596 F.2d 952 (C.C.P.A.),
aff’d, 447 U.S. 303 (1980).
Falling into a category [of patentable subject matter under § 101] does not involve
considerations of novelty or nonobviousness and only those two considerations involve comparison with prior art or inquiry as to whether all or any part of the invention is or is not in, or assumed to be in, the prior art or the public domain. Prior
art is irrelevant to the determination of statutory subject matter under § 101. An
invention can be statutory subject matter and be 100% old, devoid of any utility, or
entirely obvious.

Id.; see In re Freeman, 573 F.2d 1237, 1243 n.2 (C.C.P.A. 1978) (“Considerations of
novelty or obviousness are of no effect whatever in determining whether particular
claims define statutory subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101.”).
559. See, e.g., Bergy, 596 F.2d at 960-62.
560. In re Taner, 681 F.2d 787, 791 (C.C.P.A. 1982). “The court in Diehr rejected
the ‘point of novelty’ analysis saying ‘[t]he “novelty” of any element or steps in a process . . . is of no relevance in determining whether the subject matter of a claim falls
within the § 101 categories of possibly patentable subject matter . . . .’” Id. (quoting
Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 189 (1981)) (alterations in original).
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already known. This approach presents two problems. First, no
patent claim element or claim language may be ignored.561 To
treat the claim as anticipated by prior telephones would be to
disregard the claim language describing the (for the sake of argument) new and nonobvious use of the telephone.562 Second, if
telemarketing as described in the claim really is new, it is perverse to rely on novelty as the ground for rejecting the claim.
The real problem, to borrow a trope attributed to Samuel Johnson, is this: the claimed invention is both new and technological, but the part that is new is not technological, and the part
that is technological is not new. 563 Yet, as long as we insist that
subject matter and novelty are entirely separate issues, and as
long as we allow the applicant unfettered freedom to define the
nature of the invention, it is difficult to articulate a ground for
rejecting or invalidating such a claim. Either the black letter
rules of patent law must give a little, or we must resign ourselves to patents on some essentially non-technological inventions.
It is, of course, not telephones but computers that present
the hardest issues. A non-technological insight may be claimed
561. See Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 29 (1997)
(“Each element contained in a patent claim is deemed material to defining the scope of
the patented invention . . . .”).
562. One could hold that prior telephone systems anticipated the claim on the
ground that such systems and their component parts were always capable of performing the recited functions even if they were never used in that manner. See In re Schoenwald, 964 F.2d 1122, 1124 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (holding that discovery of a new use for a
known composition cannot support a claim to the composition itself). Yet patent law
does allow one to claim, as a process, a newly discovered, non-obvious use for an existing machine or composition of matter. See 35 U.S.C. § 100(b) (1994) (defining “process”
as including “a new use of a known . . . machine”); In re King, 801 F.2d 1324, 1326
(Fed. Cir. 1986); Loctite Corp. v. Ultraseal Ltd., 781 F.2d 861, 875 (Fed. Cir. 1985),
overruled in part, on unrelated grounds, by Nobelpharma AB v. Implant Innovations,
Inc., 141 F.3d 1059, 1068 (Fed. Cir. 1998). Rather than treat telephones that were
never used in this manner as anticipating prior art, it would be better, in the absence
of any new structure, to treat the invention as a new method, rather than as a new
machine, and to require the method to stand or fall on its own “technological” credentials. See Freeman, 573 F.2d at 1247 (“Though a claim expressed in ‘means for’
(functional) terms is said to be an apparatus claim, the subject matter as a whole of
that claim may be indistinguishable from that of a method claim drawn to the steps
performed by the ‘means.’ ”). However, the Federal Circuit has resisted such attempts
to recharacterize claims. See In re Alappat, 33 F.3d 1526, 1540-41 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (en
banc).
563. When asked to review a manuscript, Johnson said, “Your manuscript is both
good and original, but the part that is good is not original and the part that is original
is not good.” See THE DAVID & CHARLES BOOK OF QUOTATIONS 326 (Robert I. Fitzhenry
ed., 1986).
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via the conventional “computer system” that is essential to implement it. The “means-plus-function” claim format,564 which
allows the claim to include explicitly only functional limitations, makes this approach particularly convenient for the applicant. In the case of a computer, one can argue not only that
the claimed invention is a “machine,” but that it is a “new machine,” either because of the microscopic physical changes
wrought by new programming or, more convincingly, because of
the change in the computer’s functioning when it executes new
software. The standard digital computer of today is what is
called a “von Neumann machine,” after computer theorist John
von Neumann.565 In a von Neumann machine, the computer
program is stored in the same binary code and located in the
same memory as the data on which the program operates.566
Consequently, the von Neumann machine is infinitely malleable: changing the function of the machine only requires an
easy alteration of the code stored in the computer’s memory.567
In a very real sense, a new program does make a “new machine”:
Each program in effect makes the computer into a different
machine, one with a new purpose, without any change in the
wiring. The same physical equipment may serve first to calculate the orbit of a spacecraft, then to alphabetize a list of
names, then to determine averages and deviations of a statistical sample. Since each of these tasks calls for a logically different Turing machine,568 the physical equipment that can accomplish them all is a universal Turing machine. Thus logic
and electronics meet precisely at this point: the von Neumann
computer.569

564. See supra note 340 and accompanying text.
565. See generally, WILLIAM POUNDSTONE, PRISONER’S DILEMMA 76-77 (1992).
566. See BOLTER, supra note 2, at 39, 47-49.
567. See id. at 39 (“[T]he computer is not a fixed mechanism.”); see also id. at 49.
In fact, computers are so flexible that they can be programmed to write their own programs. Bolter writes that “[t]he equivalent process in a steam engine would be to throw
the gears into the furnace along with the coal and expect the engine to produce by itself
a design for a new machine.” Id. at 40.
568. A “Turing machine” is an idealized computing mechanism named after computer pioneer Alan Turing. See HILLIS, supra note 221, at 62-64.
569. BOLTER, supra note 2, at 49 (footnote added by author); see also id. at 39-40.
A programmer is a designer who has the remarkable advantage of being able to
test his design as soon as it is specified. For the design is the program, written in a
suitable language such as PASCAL, and he need only submit the program to the
computer to find his machine realized.
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If it is accurate to think of a re-programmed computer as a
“new machine,” then it is reasonable to regard that new machine as an addition to a technological art. This can best be
seen by imagining the program implemented through a specialpurpose physical computer—perhaps made from the Tinker
Toys and string of Hillis’s computer570 or from mechanical cogs
and wheels. If the State Street algorithm could be implemented
in a machine made from cogs and wheels, as theoretically it
could, and the desired mutual fund management could be accomplished at the pull of a lever, why should such a new machine be denied its status as “technological” any more than a
new cash register or adding machine? And if the cog-and-wheel
version is “technological” and the product of a “useful art,” why
not the electronic version? Yet, one could argue that the State
Street claims are no more “technological” than the hypothetical
telemarketing claim. The computer technology is prior art; only
the non-technological accounting scheme is new.
One way of dealing with such claims is to “pierce the veil” of
the claim language to determine what it is the applicant or
patentee “actually invented.”571 If the “actual invention” represents an advancement in the technological art of computing,
then the patent serves the purpose of “promot[ing] the Progress
of . . . [the] useful Arts,” as the Constitution requires.572 On the
other hand, if the “actual invention” represents an advancement only in a non-technological art, such as accounting, then
the patent should be rejected as drawn to unpatentable subject
matter. This idea is a promising one, but it can be applied in
vastly different ways. The narrowest application would grant
patents only to advancements that improve the internal operation of a computer, such as an innovative program structure
Id.
570. See HILLIS, supra note 221, at 16-18.
571. See In re Alappat, 33 F.3d 1526, 1562 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (en banc) (Archer, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
[S]atisfaction of § 101, and eligibility for the patent reward in general, requires a
judgment that the applicant for the patent has actually invented or discovered
something in the useful arts and for that reason is deserving of exclusive patent
rights. To determine whether the applicant has invented or discovered something
within the patent law, it makes no sense for the sole question to be, “Does the applicant happen to recite structure in the claims or not?”

Id.; see In re Grams, 888 F.2d 835, 839 (stating that the “critical question” is not “What
does the claim say,” but “What did [the] applicants invent?” (quoting In re Abele, 684
F.2d 902, 907 (C.C.P.A. 1982))).
572. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
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that permits a computer to operate faster or make better use of
its memory. Such advancements clearly are advancements in
the technological art of computing. On the other hand, an algorithm that merely performs a new function would be denied a
patent if that function did not have independent technological
credentials.573 For example, a program that implemented an
entirely new accounting scheme would be unpatentable, even if
it were the first of its kind, if it did not, in any other sense,
produce a better computer.
This, however, is a too narrow a view of programming technology and, hence, too confining a definition of patentable subject matter. A designer who exercises his programming talents
to create new accounting software is engaged in a technological
endeavor as much as a watchmaker who designs a new watch.
If the product of the programmer’s endeavor is a different kind
of program, then the program should be as patentable as the
watchmaker’s different kind of watch. The program should not
have to be faster or more efficient than other programs, any
more than the watch has to keep better time.574 What should be
required is that the claimed invention reflect the programmer’s
art rather than the non-technological art in whose service the
programmer’s art is employed. If the program is one that implements an accounting scheme, the claim, in substance,
should be about the programming, not about the accounting. If
the claim formally refers to a “data processing system” or “a
software programming method,” but the substance of the claim
refers only to the requirements of the accounting scheme, then
the claim does not reveal the “nuts and bolts” of the program
which may legitimately claim technological status.
As previously discussed, a program can be described at
various levels of generality, mirroring the typical evolution of a
software development project.575 At the most general level, a
program can be described by its overall goal. Or a program can
573. If the program functioned as a part of a larger technological endeavor, such
as a method of rubber manufacturing, then the invention would not have to depend on
the art of computing for its technological status.
574. Neither “utility” nor any other concept of patent law requires that a patentable invention be better than other alternatives. See Demaco Corp. v. F. Von
Langsdorff Licensing Ltd., 851 F.2d 1387, 1390 (Fed. Cir. 1988). “An invention need not
be the best or the only way to accomplish a certain result, and it need only be useful to
some extent and in certain applications . . . .” Stiftung v. Renishaw PLC, 945 F.2d
1173, 1180 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
575. See supra Part I.E.
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be described in terms of its logical structure, elements of which
can themselves be described more or less generally. Ultimately,
a program can be described by its own code, which sets forth, in
minutest detail, what the computer executing the program is to
do. Copyright law employs a corresponding “levels of abstraction” analysis for deciding which aspects of a program are uncopyrightable “ideas” and which aspects are protectable “expression.”576 If a program accused of infringing another
program’s copyright is similar only when described at the most
general level, the similarity may be too abstract, and may capture too much of the program’s function to permit copyright law
to intervene. Such similarities are similarities of idea. On the
other hand, if the similarities are more detailed, and are not
dictated by the ultimate functional requirements of the program, then such similarities may be considered protectable
“expression.”577 A similar analysis sheds light on whether a
claim to a computer-implemented endeavor embodies the technological aspects of the computer program. A claim so general
that it describes only non-technological goals fails to capture
the technological aspects of the program. On the other hand, a
claim that describes specific aspects of the program logic has
likely crossed the divide between the non-technological vision
and the craft of computer programming. In a sense, the technology is in the details.578
When a patent claims a software implementation of a nontechnological plan, the validity of the claim under § 101, and
under the “useful arts” clause of the Constitution, should depend on whether the claim includes enough substantive details
relating to program logic or data structures that the invention
is one within the technological art of computer programming.
Expert testimony, similar to that which helps to identify the

576. Computer Assoc. Int’l v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693, 706-07 (2d Cir. 1992).
577. See id. at 707-11 (following “levels of abstraction” dissection of copyrighted
program, program attributes dictated by efficiency, the computing environment, or the
general “idea” of the program should be “filtered” and discarded before the programs
are compared for substantial similarity).
578. Although the analysis may be similar, the divide between idea and expression for copyright law purposes will probably differ from the divide between nontechnology and technology for patent law purposes. Program attributes which are specific enough to be technological may be too functional to count as copyrightable expression. In fact, it may be that only such functional details have patentable novelty and
utility.
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“art” of an invention in the obviousness context,579 may be of
assistance. If the claim, in substance, speaks in nontechnological language of non-technological concepts, it should
be considered a claim to a non-technological invention. On the
other hand, if the claim speaks in the programmer’s language
of the programmer’s art, then the claim should be considered
one to a “useful art.”
Often the line may be difficult to draw. For example, the
same series of steps might describe the details of the accounting scheme and, in a general sense, the structure of the program that implements it. If the claim says “add quantity x to
quantity y and store the result,” one could characterize this as
a description of steps in an accounting scheme or as a description of program architecture. It is the nature of computer programs that plan and implementation blend. However, the sequence of program design provides some guidance. As
discussed supra in Part I.E, the first stages of program design
typically culminate in a “functional specification,” a document
describing what the program is supposed to do.580 It includes
some details, but they are, in a sense, external details relating
to the program’s function—what features it will have, what the
user interface will be like, what relation the output will bear to
the input, and so forth. The next phase of software design leads
to a “design specification.”581 This document describes how the
goals of the functional specification will be achieved. This
document records high-level program architecture and information on the nature of the data structures. Although it is not
a precise demarcation, the transition from “functional specification” to “design specification” roughly indicates when, from a
programmer’s perspective, the party who envisions a program’s
function turns over the development process to the engineer
who implements it.582 An accountant’s skills would be adequate
to prepare a functional specification for an accounting program;
the accountant only has to imagine, in detail, what he would
like the program to do. A programmer’s skills are necessary for

579. See, e.g., Wang Labs., Inc. v. Toshiba Corp., 993 F.2d 858, 864 (Fed. Cir.
1993).
580. See supra notes 203-205 and accompanying text.
581. See supra notes 206-209 and accompanying text.
582. At least figuratively speaking. The functional specification and the design
specification may be prepared by the same person, if it is a person with the skill and
knowledge necessary to envision the features of the program and to implement them.
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a design specification because only a programmer can describe,
in a programmer’s language, how it will be done. The distinction between “what” and “how” is not an easy one, but it seems
the right distinction to make.
The “how” aspects of a program may be captured in a claim
by explicit description of program architecture, or by invoking §
112(6) and relying upon the specification to disclose the “structures” covered by the claim.583 The latter would likely be more
practical for applicants, and it would still bind the claim to its
technological foundations. Another programmer who discovered an alternative, non-equivalent logical structure could design around the claim, avoiding the patented technology while
still achieving the same non-technological goals.584 Today software inventions are often claimed in terms of the physical
components of the computer system. The State Street claims,
with their references to storage “means” and processing
“means” are of this variety. As long as the physical components
are new, one cannot object that the invention, as claimed, is not
technological. Computer hardware is an eminently technological field.
This brings us to the subject of novelty, which the courts
have insisted is an entirely separate question from that of patentable subject matter.585 That separation cannot be so strictly
maintained that courts or the Patent Office turn a blind eye to

583. One could argue that § 112(6) contemplates as “structures” only physical entities, in which case it might be more appropriate to employ the seldom-seen “step-plusfunction” provision, based on the following language of § 112(6):
[a]n element in a claim for a combination may be expressed as a . . . step for performing a specified function without the recital of . . . acts in support thereof, and
such claim shall be construed to cover the corresponding . . . acts described in the
specification and equivalents thereof.

35 U.S.C. § 112(6) (1994). One of the reasons the step-plus-function format is so rare
may be the difficulty of distinguishing between a “step” and an “act.” However, it would
seem possible to have a claim describing, for example, the “steps” required by a nontechnological accounting method and to construe that claim to cover only the program
logic “acts” described in the specification and their equivalents.
584. That is not to say that such design-around alternatives are necessary in order
for the claim to be valid. In the mathematical algorithm arena, courts have considered
the preemptive effect of a claim as a measure of the “abstractness” of the invention.
Whether it is correct or incorrect in that context, it is a poor measure of technology.
Some non-technological schemes may be unachievable without a particular technological tool, so the effect of the patent on the tool may be to grant broad exclusive rights in
non-technological fields. But that does not mean that a claim to the tool itself transcends the “useful arts.”
585. See supra notes 558-560 and accompanying notes.

DUR-FIN.DOC

4/5/00 7:27 AM

1419] “USEFUL ARTS” IN THE INFORMATION AGE

1525

the character of the applicant’s invention. Specifically, an application should not slip past the § 101 “door” by relying on one
aspect of the claimed invention and the §§ 102-103 “doors” by
relying on an entirely different aspect. There should be a single
concept, or a single “invention,” that is in the “useful arts,” new
and non-obvious. A new plan for using an existing technology is
not always a technological advancement. A composer who
imagines a new rhythm to play on the trumpet has imagined
nothing technological, even though the trumpet itself is technological. The same is true of the salesman who imagines a new
marketing technique to be carried out by telephone, or the accountant who imagines a new accounting scheme to be implemented, as such schemes typically are, on existing computer
systems. A patent claim that, in substance, describes only a
non-technological advancement should be held beyond the
scope of the “useful arts,” even if it makes general references to
existing technology. “Existing technology” includes conventional general-purpose computer systems, as well as media,
such as floppy disks, on which programs are stored.
On the other hand, new programming does create a “new
machine,” and, as long as the claim describes the substance of
the programming in the language of programming, the claim is
within the useful arts. Whether the claim should also be considered novel or nonobvious is a difficult question that can be
treated only briefly. It has been suggested586 that the obviousness of a program implementing a non-technological plan
should be judged as if a programmer of ordinary skill were already aware of that non-technological plan. For example, if a
program implements a new accounting scheme, one should ask
whether the program would have been obvious given the needs
of the new accounting scheme. This seems an unfairly restrictive approach to non-obviousness. Even unpatentable, nontechnological insights may lead to new technologies, which
should be patentable. For example, if the composer’s conception
of a new rhythm led him to invent a new trumpet on which it
could be played, nothing should prevent the composer from
patenting the trumpet. The same would be true if the salesman’s marketing innovations led to the invention of a physi-

586. See Vincent Chiappetta, Patentability of Computer Software Instruction as an
“Article of Manufacture”: Software as Such as the Right Stuff, 17 J. MARSHALL J.
COMPUTER & INFO. L. 89, 172-74 (1998).
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cally different telephone. To assume that the new rhythm or
new marketing plan is already known is contrary to fact, and it
adopts too narrow a view of invention. Inventions are often inspired by non-technological aspirations, and, even if the inventor’s leap of imagination is non-technological, one should not
discount the new and technological result. In the computer
programming context, one should not assume that the nontechnological plans inspiring a new program were already
known if, in fact, they were not.
The most difficult issue of nonobviousness in the programming context is whether program architecture or data structures (which we shall now assume to be technological in character) are new if they are structurally or mathematically the
same as those of prior programs, but the meaning is new. Assume, to take a trivial example, that existing programs included steps of adding quantity x to quantity y and storing the
result in memory. Is a program that calls for the same operations, but in which x and y stand for different entities (e.g.,
share prices instead of shipping weights), a new program? This
issue may be worthy of an article of its own, and I will not attempt to unravel it here. Whether or not the structure is new,
however, it is technological.
V. CONCLUSION
As we enter a new millennium, it is fitting to contemplate
how far American industry has progressed since the days of
“horse collars and buggy whips,” or the kinds of manufactures
recited by Tech Coxe in 1787. Industrial power and wealth are
moving increasingly into the “information industries” rather
than the “smokestack” industries of the past.587 The largest
587. The shift was apparent even in the mid-1980s. See Vincent E. Giuliano, The
Mechanization of Office Work, in THE INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY REVOLUTION, supra
note 2, at 298 (“Information-related activities are becoming ever more important in
American society and the American economy; the majority of workers are already engaged in such activities, and the proportion of them is increasing.”); Halton, supra note
260, at 3 (“The world is undergoing a major social and economic change, a Second Industrial Revolution, through the new information-processing technology of communications and computers.”); Yoneji Masuda, supra note 2, at 620 (forecasting a new “information society” in which “the production of information values and not material values
will be the driving force behind the formation and development of society”). Ellul also
writes of a “new industrial revolution” based on the computer. See JACQUES ELLUL,
THE TECHNOLOGICAL SYSTEM 25 (1980).
[F]or several years now, people have been speaking of a fourth industrial revolution [after those based on coal, electricity, and atomic energy]: the one launched by
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corporation in the world, in terms of market capitalization, is
Microsoft.588 The United States is justifiably proud of its leadership in the “information industries,” and much that is accomplished in those industries is richly technological. If we accept the principle that patent rights encourage the progress of
technology, as governments around the world have concluded
for centuries, then we must ensure that the patent system continues to function, even in areas of technology that the Framers
would hardly have recognized. On the other hand, we cannot
allow the patent system to devour realms of human ingenuity
that are not at all within the confines of the “useful arts.”
Technology has made inroads into many aspects of life, but, in
spite of Ellul’s vision, we have not yet reached the point where
technology is all. The patent system is only a vehicle for promoting technological development. We cannot predict the consequences if, through artful claiming, progress in essentially
non-technological endeavors is swept within the domain of the
patent system.
I have suggested a general approach to the identification of
a “technological” or “useful arts” invention when a nontechnological vision leads to new programming for a conventional general-purpose computer. The implementation of nontechnological ideas may lead to significant progress in the “useful art” of computer programming, and such progress should be
promoted, as the Framers would have intended, by the conveyance of exclusive rights for limited times. However, the patent
claim should reflect the art of programming; it should reflect
the substantive details that belong to the programming art and
that enable the technological implementation of the nontechnological plan. The claim should deal with the how of the
invention, not the what. As I have suggested, the distinction

the computer. . . . The dominant factor is no longer a growth of potential or exploited energy, but rather an apparatus of organization, information, memorization, and preparation for decision-making, to replace man in a huge number of intellectual operations.

Id.
588. See Weber et al., Call It the Net Effect, BUS. WK., July 12, 1999, at 50.
How much has the Net changed things? Only a decade ago, Japanese banks,
a Swiss confectioner, and even a Philadelphia utility company were vastly more
popular with investors than Microsoft Corp. . . . Today, after riding the personalcomputer wave right on into the Internet boom, Microsoft has vaulted to No. 1 in
our annual rankings.

Id. at 50.
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between how and what cannot be a bright one due to the nature of computer programming, and particular cases can be decided only on their own facts. If the courts and the Patent Office adopt the proposed distinction, at least patent applicants
will have an increased incentive to emphasize their technological programming insights, both in drafting claims and in preparing the detailed disclosures of the specification. This in itself will contribute to the progress of “useful arts” in the
information age.

